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Introduction
This thesis consists of three essays two of which analyze the impact of liberalization
of access to pipelines in natural gas markets within EU on the power of involved
market players. The third essay is devoted to the analysis of methodological issues.
Before giving a brief overview of all three essays, we decribe the main steps of
liberalization process.
Liberalization of EU gas markets
Until 1990s the natural gas markets of EU Member States were typically character-
ized by the presence of vertically integrated ’national champions’ such as GdF in
France and ENI in Italy. The champions controlled imports, domestic production in
a region, transmission and distribution networks. The Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community guarantees the free movement of goods, persons, services and
capital. To provide these freedoms and to create a common market that will ensure
the energy security, the EU Commission started liberalization of the European gas
industry. The very first step of liberalization process was undertaken in the early
nineties with the Council Directive 91/296/EEC on the transit of natural gas through
grids (EU (1991)) and the Council Directive 90/377/EEC concerning a Commu-
nity procedure to improve the transparency of gas and electricity prices charged to
industrial end-users (EU (1990)). Several years later, in 1998, the Commission is-
sued Directive 98/30/EC which is usually referred to as the First Gas Directive. This
document settled the main principles of liberalization such as market opening and
provision of non-discriminatory access to the transmission and distribution systems.
According to Directive 98/30/EC, market opening had to be introduced initially for
the large users of gas. The document presented a schedule of how the degree of
market opening had to evolve over time. To provide non-discriminatory access to
the networks, the Commission introduced the models of negotiated and regulated
third-party access. The Member States had to comply with the First Gas Direc-
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tive by 10 August 2000. Many of the requirements presented in this directive were
later changed. Still, the document laid the basis for the gradual development of the
liberalization process. In the words of Stern, ”the value of the directive, therefore,
lies not so much in its specific provisions, which are likely to be rapidly overtaken
by events, but rather in the fact that it established both the principle of access to
(pipeline) networks, and the assurance that opponents of competition and liberali-
sation cannot indefinitely procrastinate in the opening up of their gas markets”.1
The implementation of the First Gas Directive and its impact on markets has been
evaluated in several dimensions. The degree of market opening, price differences
between countries, switching activity of customers and dynamics of new entries
into the markets might be considered as indicators of the progress towards internal
market. In December 2001 the Commission issued the ”first benchmarking report
on the implementation of the internal electricity and gas market”. Though some
Member States opened their markets on a larger scale than it was initially required
by the First Gas Directive, the Commission considered the declared market open-
ing in the year 2000 as satisfactory only for Germany and the UK.2 The UK with
the liberalized market performed extremely well with respect to all indicators. The
level of market opening in other countries was evaluated as the obstacle for com-
petition. However, the schedule of market opening was considered as satisfactory
for almost all countries as they intended to achieve the full market opening till 2008
at the latest. Only Denmark and France did not announce the date of the full mar-
ket opening which was perceived as a bad signal by the Commission.3 Comparing
the implementation of the reform across EU, Arentsen (2004) emphasized that the
data presented in the report of the Commission ”reflect the legal positions of the
Member States on market opening” and ”should not be read as real market open-
ing”.4 The first benchmarking report presented also evidence of switching activity
among eligible customers. Except for the UK and to some extent for the Nether-
lands, the Commission found the overall progress in switching to be rather slow.5
The same was observed for entry dynamics. New entrants tended to be incumbents
of other Member States and the ”proportion of gas transported by the third-party
1Stern (1998), p. 18.
2Commission (2001), Commission (2000).
3Commission (2001), Table 3, p. 5.
4Arentsen (2004), p. 78.
5Commission (2001), Table 4, p. 116.
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access” was rather modest.6 In October 2002 the Commission issued the second
benchmarking report. Some further progress was observed in market opening and
switching activity. Nevertheless, the switching levels continued to be limited. The
analysis of price changes showed that prices remained dispersed between Mem-
ber States. There were almost as many cases when the prices for large users
increased as when they reduced after the directive came into force.7 Reviewing the
progress in opening of natural gas markets, Newbery (2001) pointed out the im-
portance of regulated third-party access for the achievement of the Commission’s
goals.
To accelerate the liberalization process, the Commission issued Directive
2003/55/EC or the Second Gas Directive in the year 2003. Main modifications re-
ferred to the rules concerning market opening and provision of non-discriminatory
access to the networks. With Directive 2003/55/EC all non-household customers
had to become eligible from July 2004 and all customers had to be able to buy gas
from supplier of their choice from July 2007. So that full market opening was in-
troduced. The Commission stressed the importance of fair access to the networks
for achievement of the common market. According to the Second Gas Directive,
the access to the system had to be organised only by using the model of regulated
third-party access based on published tarrifs. To eliminate the possibility of net-
work operators to discriminate between system users, the Commission required
unbundling of operators from the vertically integrated gas structures. Directive
2003/55/EC did not require ownership unbundling. Transmission system opera-
tors (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs) had to become independent
at least in terms of ”legal form, organisation and decision making”.8 The document
settled the same requirements for both types of operators. The only difference in
requirements referred to the time frames. The Commission required legal and func-
tional unbundling of TSOs from July 2004. The functional unbundling of DSOs was
required from July 2004. The deadline for legal unbundling of DSOs was settled to
July 2007, when all customers had to become eligible according to the Second Gas
Directive.
Though the acceleration directive was introduced, the Commission continued to
report indicators of slow progress towards internal market. For most of the coun-
6Commission (2001), Table 4, p. 21.
7Commission (2002), Table 4, p. 6.
8EU (2003), Article 9(1) and Article 13(1).
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tries cumulative switching rates since market opening were less than 50%.9 The
lack of market integration was depicted in slow convergence of prices.10 Neumann
et al. (2006) provided evidence of insufficient integration of the continental mar-
kets. The authors analyzed the convergence of prices for three trading hubs: the
’NBP’ in the UK, ’Zeebrugge’ in Belgium and ’Bunde’ in Germany. The daily day-
ahead bid prices from March 2000 until February 2005 were used in the analysis.
While finding evidence of strong convergence for the pair the NBP and Zeebrugge,
the authors did not observe any price convergence for the pair Zeebrugge and
Bunde. Robinson (2007) presented controversial results for the convergence of
retail prices. The author conducted an econometric analysis of convergence of
annual retail gas prices for six countries for the period from 1978 to 2003 using
three tests. For this period the convergence hypothesis was not rejected for 2 tests.
Results of the third test do not support the hypothesis.
There are also studies devoted to an econometric analysis of the effect of liberaliza-
tion on prices. Copenhagen Economics (2005) estimated the impact of liberaliza-
tion on industrial prices across 15 European countries and found that liberalization
decreased prices by 1% in the short-run. Ernst & Young (2006) also reported the
decrease of industrial prices from liberalization. They found ”evidence of a signifi-
cant benefit on consumer prices from completing the full unbundling of the TSO”.11
Brau et al. (2010) estimated the impact of reform on household prices. The authors
implemented analysis for the period from 1991 to 2007 for 15 European countries.
Brau et al. (2010) used several reform indicators, e.g. indicators of the degree of
vertical integration and public ownership.12 The estimates present a minor impact
of indicators on prices. The interesting result is that the variable ’vertical integra-
tion’ is never significant. Haase and Bressers (2010) discussed the obstacles for
estimation of the effect of ”regulation-for-competition” on the natural gas prices (e.g.
linkage to the oil prices). Overall, the authors pointed to the lack of empirical re-
search studying the impact of regulation on the economic perfomance of natural gas
industry. Booz & Company et al. (2013) also stress the lack of empirical research
in their literature survey and emphasize that existing studies are controversial with
respect to the results.13
9Commission (2005), Table 3.2, p. 39.
10Commission (2005), p. 20.
11Ernst & Young (2006), p. 36.
12Brau et al. (2010), p. 3.
13Booz & Company et al. (2013), p. 10.
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In addition to the annual report, in 2005 the Commission started a Sector Inquiry
that revealed a number of shortcomings in the previous legislation. The Commis-
sion presented numerous examples of discriminatory behavior of TSOs, e.g. charg-
ing of different transportation tariffs from the affiliated and non-affiliated users. The
scope for discrimination existed because of insufficient unbundling of networks. The
problem is that in the Second Gas Directive the Commission tried to ensure that
TSOs ”act independently from the incentives of the vertically integrated group”, but
the document did not remove incentives of national champions to discriminate.14
From the Commission’s point of view, the importance of the proper unbundling of
networks was stressed by evidence of the favourable impact of ownership unbun-
dled TSOs on prices.15 In contrast, most champions were against ownership un-
bundling. The champions questioned the favourable impact and pointed out that
ownership unbundling was implemented in countries with large domestic produc-
tion.16
To overcome the flaws of the Second Gas Directive, the Commission issued Direc-
tive 2009/73/EC which refers to the Third Energy Package.17 Directive 2009/73/EC
introduced stricter rules for unbundling of operators in order to avoid discriminatory
behavior. Member States could choose ownership unbundling of TSOs or choose
between the models of independent system operator or independent transmission
operator. The requirements for unbundling of DSOs remained almost the same as
in Directive 2003/55/EC. Additional rules referred to the regulation procedure. The
reason is that at the time the Sector Inquiry was conducted, the impact of the un-
bundling of DSOs could not be fully studied due to the time frames defined by the
Second Gas Directive.
Liberalization of access to pipelines is aimed to boost the entry into the natural
gas industry and to create a competitive market. This process is perceived differ-
ently by various stakeholders. Non-incumbent stakeholders consider the market
dominance of champions and vertical integration of activities throughout the supply
chain as the sources of high prices.18 Incumbents point out the high concentration
14Commission (2007b), First Phase, p. 57.
15Commission (2008), p. 5.
16Commission (2007b), Second Phase, p. 211.
17The Third Energy Package includes also Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 that requires establish-
ment of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) and defines its
tasks (EU (2009b)).
18Commission (2007b), Second Phase, p. 206.
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of producers in the upstream market outside EU and the strong dependence of EU
on imports from these outside suppliers. So that incumbents argue for a ”limited
number of strong market players in the industry”.19 Not only champions, but also the
researchers stress possible negative consequences of liberalization. For example,
Austvik (2009) discusses a conflict between the ”consumers’ short- and long-terms
interests”.20 Resulting in lower and more volatile prices in the short-term, the liber-
alization might lead to a delay of ”investments in new production capacity”.21 In the
long-term this will result in a decrease of supply and higher prices, because natu-
ral gas is a non-renewable resource and it takes time to develop a new gas field.
Therefore, the author calls for caution in implementing the reform and emphasizes
the importance of gradual market opening required in Directive 2003/55/EC.
We are interested in the question of whether national champions can create coun-
tervailing power against external producers. Another question we are interested in
is at the expense of which players consumers in EU could gain. It is important to
note that before the liberalization process champions had the role of middlemen
between customers within EU and producers outside EU. Opening of access to
pipelines eliminates this role of champions. Economic intuition suggests that the
customers and producers will reap the benefits of such a step, but it is unclear how
they will share the gains.
Common framework
To study the impact of liberalization on the power of market players, we develop
a disaggregated model of the Eurasian natural gas supply system. We model the
Eurasian gas network as the set of nodes and links. Overall, the network is rep-
resented by 83 links and 66 nodes. The set of nodes includes different types of
nodes such as production, transit and consumption nodes. The set of links consists
of onedirectional links such as production and consumption links and bidirectional
transit links. The set of nodes differs from the set of strategic players. The nodes
represent the endpoints of the links. The players have access to parts of the net-
work and are needed for the access to the links. For example, the player ’Belarus’
has access to production and consumption links in Belarus and is needed for ac-
cess to the pipes between Belarus and Poland and between Belarus and Russia.
19Commission (2007b), Second Phase, p. 207.
20Austvik (2009), p. 99.
21Austvik (2009), p. 99.
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We consider four main exporters of pipeline gas to Europe (Russia, Norway, Algeria
and Libya) and two main transit countries for Russian gas (Belarus and Ukraine).
Within EU we aggregate some countries into regions (e.g. Spain and Portugal are
aggregated into ’SpainPort’ region) and consider also separate countries (e.g. Italy,
Belgium). We include Turkey into the geographical scope and take into account gas
flows from the Caspian region.
We model interdependenices among the players in the Eurasian gas network as a
cooperative game for which we consider various solutions: the Shapley value, the
nucleolus and the core. To obtain the value function we have to solve a constrained
maximization problem for each coalition. We maximize the joint surplus of players
in a coalition with respect to the gas flows in available pipelines subject to a number
of constraints. For the purpose of our research, in the first essay we consider 17
players and, hence, 131 072 coalitions. In the second and third essays we work with
20 players and, hence, with 1 048 576 coalitions. Essential part of the research is
the development an algorithm to solve the optimization problem fast and efficiently.
Liberalization represents a change of access rights. Before the reform, an owner of
pipeline can arbitrary restrict the access to it. With liberalization the owner has to
grant third-party access on a cost base. So that the owner cannot derive bargain-
ing power from denying the access. We model liberalization by changing the set of
players who are needed for the access to a pipeline. For example, before liberal-
ization, in order the link between Belarus and Poland to be available for a coalition,
both Belarus and Poland have to be in the coalition. If access to the transmission
networks is liberalized, then only Belarus is needed for the access to this link.
To calibrate our theoretical model we use data on consumption and flows between
the regions. Since all three essays are built on one calibrated network model, we
present one technical documentation on the programming packages in the end
of this thesis. The documentation includes the description of all steps taken to
conduct the calculations and to receive the results. The programming packages
were written in Wolfram Mathematica and in MATLAB. The code is available online
at http://www.ms-hns.de/research gas. We thank Johannes H. Reijnierse for
providing us with MATLAB code for calculating the nucleolus.
The essays
In the first paper we study the regional effects of liberalization of access to trans-
mission networks within EU. Here we use only the Shapley value as a power index.
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We focus on the redistribution of power between EU regions and external suppliers.
Each EU region controls domestic production and access to local customers. So
that we do not consider the impact of reform on the power of customers as com-
pared to the power of champions within a region. Within this framework we also
study incentives of outside producers for cartelization. We compare the gains from
creating a cartel before and after opening of access to high-pressure pipelines. We
also analyze the profitability of pairwise mergers within EU and consider the effect
of centralized EU policy with respect to external gas relations.
In the second paper we consider the liberalization of access to transmission net-
works as the first step of reform and liberalization of access to distribution networks
as the second step. We distinguish explicitly between a champion and a customer
in a region. As the number of calculations increases fast in the number of players,
we introduce a champion and a customer only for selected regions. These regions
are ’Center-East’, ’Center’, ’South-West’, Netherlands and Italy. As a result, the set
of players includes regional champions and customers, some EU regions and play-
ers outside EU. Taking into account the second step of reform, we can estimate the
effect of cutting out the middlemen between the customers and outside producers
on the power of involved players. As an alternative to the Shapley value concept we
also use the nucleolus which represents a unique point in the core. While robust
with respect to parameters, the results of the model depend on the applied solu-
tion concept. This leads us to the analysis of the methodoligical issues of applying
cooperative game theory.
In the third paper we continue to use the previous framework, but the focus is on
the relation of the Shapley value and the nucleolus to the core. With respect to the
application of the Shapley value we focus on the stability issue. For our gas network
model the Shapley value is never in the core and, hence, not stable. To evaluate
the degree of instability of a payoff allocation which is not in the core, we introduce
several stability measures. We propose an extension of the strong ϵ-core, the nϵ-
core, and consider three metrics to evaluate (in)stability. The first measure is given
by the minimal costs of setting up a coalition which provide stability of the allocation
for a given upper bound on the size of coalitions. The second metric refers to the
minimal size of a blocking coalition for a given value of costs. The third measure is
the fraction of deviating coalitions to the total number of coalitions for a given upper
bound on the size of coalitions and for given costs. We apply all three measures to
our real life model and study the impact of liberalization on the degree of instability
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of the Shapley value.
With respect to the nucleolus and the core, we study whether the change of nucle-
olus is a good indicator of the effect of liberalization on the core. First, we explore
the effect of each step of reform on the core. We prove that liberalization consec-
utively compresses the core. We study the impact of liberalization on the minimal
and maximal values achievable by players in the core and find the dominant effects.
Then we discuss whether the impact on the nucleolus might be considered as the
indicator of the shift of the core.
Chapter 1
Competition or Countervailing




This chapter is based on a joint paper with Franz Hubert.
Abstract
Heading towards a common market for natural gas, the EU Commission is trying to
liberalize pipeline access, break up vertically integrated structures and foster com-
petition between the regions. However, critics argue that strong national players
are needed to counter the power of a small number of external gas suppliers, such
as Russia, Norway and Algeria, on which the EU depends to satisfy more than half
of its consumption. We model the European gas supply system as a cooperative
game and use the Shapley value as a power index for the players. In accordance
with the buyer power argument, we find that the liberalization of access to the high
pressure pipeline system within the EU, on balance, strengthens the power of ex-
ternal suppliers and weakens the regions within EU. Though, there is considerable
variety on both sides of the market.
Keywords: Bargaining Power, Network Access, Natural Gas
JEL class.: L1, L95
This paper is part of larger collaborative research project on the Eurasian gas network to which Onur
Cobanli made essential contributions. The authors are thankful for helpful comments from seminar
participants at meetings of EARIE, EcoMod and Verein für Socialpolitik.
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1.1 Introduction
When the European Union formally established the common market in 1993, its gas
sector was a fragmented industry, where state owned or heavily regulated “national
champions”, such as Gaz de France, Italian ENI, or German Ruhrgas, dominated
local production and distribution as well as imports and long distance transport.
As in telecommunications and electric power, the Commission initiated a policy to
achieve integration and foster competition by opening access to bottleneck facil-
ities such as transport pipelines and distribution networks.22 However, critics of
the Commission point to a fundamental flaw in its approach. In marked contrast to
electric power, which is almost entirely produced within the Union, two third of its
gas consumption is imported from a small number of producers beyond EU jurisdic-
tion, whose stakes in transportation and distribution within the EU are negligible.23
Gas importers, and often their governments, argue that strong national or even Eu-
ropean players are needed to create “countervailing power” against gas exporting
countries. In the words of France’s former President Nicolas Sarkozy: “Without
Gaz de France, who would stand up to Gazprom?” (quoted in Mortished (2007)).
According to critics, by weakening the national champions, the Commission risks
strengthening already powerful outside producers such as Russia, Algeria, and
Norway, which together account for 85% of imports.
These opposing views on priorities in the gas sector also clashed in several merger
cases. When German energy companies E.ON and Ruhrgas applied for merger
in 2001, Bundeskartellamt, the German authority for merger control, declined ap-
proval arguing that it would give the company a dominant position in import, trans-
port and distribution. While the German Monopoly Commission and the European
Commission supported Bundeskartellamt’s pro competitive stance, the German
Government overruled the verdict. It claimed that the concentration is justified by
22The process started with Directive 98/30/EC (EU (1998)), later amended by the Directive
2003/55/EC (EU (2003)) concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and the
Council Directive 2004/67/EC of 26 April 2004 concerning measures to safeguard security of natural
gas supply (EU (2004)). Frustrated with slow progress the Commission introduced stricter rules for
unbundling gas transport (see Directive 2009/73/EC (EU (2009a))).
23It is, in fact, surprising how little attention the Commission initially payed to Europe’s import de-
pendency in the gas sector. For example, in its explanatory memorandum on proposed amendments
to the Directive 2003/55/EC, the Commission consistently speaks of an “electricity and gas market”
both in the analytical statements as well as in its recommendations. The whole document fails to
acknowledge any structural differences between the two sectors.
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an overriding public interest, namely it would help to improve the security of supply
of natural gas in Germany.24 While the Commission could not block the German
deal, it successfully prevented Italian ENI in cooperation with Portuguese power
company EDP from taking over Portuguese gas operator GDP in 2004.
Concerns over producer power grew stronger in the years before the financial cri-
sis. The foundation of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum 2001 in Teheran fueled
worries that a gas cartel similar to the OPEC might be in the making. Later, rapidly
increasing gas prices put ‘energy security’ on the top of the European agenda.
Although most observers discount the chances for a strong gas cartel, the Com-
mission began to move towards a centralization of the EU’s foreign energy relations.
As a first step it obliged members to provide information about intergovernmental
agreements with third countries that influence gas supplies in order to be able to
assess “the security of supply at Union level”. The aim is to enhance coherence of
the external energy policy eventually making it possible for EU to “speak with one
voice”.25
In this paper we analyze a disaggregated model of the European gas supply sys-
tem as a cooperative game and use the Shapley value as a power index for the
players. Our focus is on the distribution of power between regions within EU and
outside producers and how it is affected by institutional change. The starting point
is a patchwork of local monopolies, each controlling access to production, distribu-
tion, and the trunk pipes in its respective region. First, we analyze the liberalization
of access to the long distance transport system within the EU. This reform strips
the local champions of the power derived from monopolizing transit and creates an
integrated wholesale market. However, it falls short of creating a fully competitive
market. National champions retain control of local production and local distribution,
hence access to customers. Second, we look at mergers between two or more
local champions, both in a fragmented and an integrated market. We also ana-
lyze the potential of centralized bargaining with outside suppliers through political
coordination at the EU level.
We find that the liberalization of access to the high pressure pipeline system within
the EU, on balance, strengthens the power of external suppliers and transit coun-
24See Bundeskartellamt (2002) and Bundesminister für Wirtschaft und Technologie (2002).
25On the gas cartel see Hallouche (2006), Finon (2007), and Gabriel et al. (2012). The ground-
work for the Commission’s policy has been laid out in a series declarations EU (2010), Commission
(2011a), Commission (2011b).
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tries for Russian gas and weakens the regions within EU. There is, however, con-
siderable variety on both sides of the market, which might explain some of the
difficulties of implementing the reforms in the European Union. Surprisingly, while
the integration of the wholesale market tends to strengthen outside producers, it
reduces their possible gains from establishing a producer cartel.
Our results regarding mergers depend much on the market structure. In a frag-
mented wholesale market, pairwise mergers of ‘national champions’ tend to be prof-
itable for the parties, but the impact on outside producers is rather mixed. Among
pairwise mergers of EU regions, excluding Netherlands, which is the main producer
within EU, we find almost as many cases where the bargaining power of outside
producers as a group is enhanced, as cases where it is diminished. Hence, a frag-
mented market provides only little evidence in support of the view that it takes large
European players to counter the power of outside producers. Once market inte-
gration is achieved, a number of pairwise mergers turn unprofitable, often because
they increase the bargaining power of Russia and transit countries for Russian gas.
Again excluding Netherlands, only few mergers involving the UK curb the power of
all outside producers. Under both market structures, however, there are large gains
to be obtained by full centralization at the EU level.
The concept of ‘countervailing power’ has been controversial ever since it was
coined by Galbraith (1952). The theoretical literature has proposed several models
of bargaining in vertical structures which relate buyer size to market power, but it
did not develop a canonical setting for the analysis of two sided market power.26
By modeling the inter-dependencies among the players as a cooperative game we
avoid assumptions on details of the negotiation process altogether. We assume
that players can make efficient use of the network and by using the Shapley value
we derive the power structure endogenously from the agents’ role in gas produc-
tion, transport and consumption. In this way we separate the issue of power from
the issue of efficiency. The institutional changes have no effect on the efficiency of
the industry, they affect only the power structure.
The cooperative approach separates the paper from most of the applied studies
on the European gas market, e.g. Grais and Zheng (1996), Boots et al. (2004),
Von Hirschhausen et al. (2005), Egging and Gabriel (2006), and Holz et al. (2008).
Notwithstanding a number of differences they all analyze the gas industry as a
26See among others Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Snyder (1998),
Chae and Heidhues (2004), Inderst and Wey (2003).
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succession of activities (production, transport, distribution), where the interaction
among players of the same level of activity is modeled as a non-cooperative game
either in linear prices or quantities. In addition, it is often assumed that the different
levels decide in a given order, which essentially implies that those who move first
(producers) have the ability to commit, whereas those who move later (transiters,
importers) cannot commit (Grais and Zheng (1996), Boots et al. (2004)). While this
approach has computational advantages when solving large disaggregated mod-
els, we do see two important conceptual shortcomings. First, the distribution of
power between producers, importers and customers is largely determined by ad
hoc assumptions on the type of interaction at the different levels and on the se-
quencing of actions, hence, the ability to commit. Second, the literature ignores
that most pipeline gas is delivered under negotiated, comprehensive price-quantity-
contracts. These contracts with so called ‘take–or–pay’ provisions stipulate prices
and quantities to ensure the efficient usage of the capacities (see Energy Char-
ter Secretariat (2007) for details). Contracts with transit countries also cover tariffs
and quantities. Instead, the literature adopts counter-factual assumptions from the
standard Cournot or Bertrand set up. In combination with market power, these
restrictions on the strategy space lead to inefficiencies (double marginalization),
which can be avoided by the contracts, which exist in the real world.
The paper is closely related to Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b). Their focus however
is on the impact of pipelines and their regional scope is too narrow to allow for an
analysis of changes in market structure. Here we extend their model to include
several competing producers and transit countries such as Turkey. We also allow
importers in the European Union to act strategically. With these modifications we
can assess the reform’s impact on all major market participants. Finally, the paper
shares the quantitative model of the gas industry and the calibration with Hubert
and Cobanli (2014) who analyze the impact of strategic pipeline investments on the
power structure.
1.2 The Approach
In this section we briefly describe the representation of the physical network, the
cooperative game, the solution concepts and the model calibration. More details
are given in the technical appendix at http://www.ms-hns.de/research gas and
at http://www.ms-hns.de/paper gas countervailing. While addressing a differ-
ent topic, this paper uses the same approach as Hubert and Orlova (2014b), Hubert
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and Cobanli (2014), and Cobanli (2014). Hence, there is considerable overlap with
the corresponding sections in these papers, and the reader may skip it if familiar
with any of the other papers.
1.2.1 The Model
The Eurasian gas network consists of a set of nodes R, which may be production
sites RP , customers RC or transit-connections RT , and a set of directed links L
representing pipelines. A link l = {i, j}, i , j ∈ R connects two nodes. Gas flows
are denoted fi j where negative values indicate a flow from j to i. For those links,
which connect a producer to the network or the network to a customer, flows have
to be positive ( fi j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ RP or j ∈ RC). For each link {i, j} we have a capacity
limit ki j and link specific transportation cost Ti j(x), which includes production cost
in case of i ∈ RP. For capacities which already exist, transportation costs consist
only of operation costs, because investment costs are sunk. When we allow for
investments to increase ki j, the capital costs for new capacities are added to the
transportation costs. Each customer is connected through a single dedicated link
to the network. So consumption at node j ∈ RC is equal to fi j and the inverse
demand is p j( fi j).
The set of strategic players is denoted N. The interdependencies among the players
can be represented by a game in value function form (N, v), where the value (or
characteristic) function v : 2|N| → R+ gives the maximal payoff, which a subset
of players S ⊆ N can achieve. The legal and regulatory framework determines
the access rights of the various players. So for any coalition S ⊆ N we have to
determine to which pipelines L(S ) ⊆ L the coalition S has access. Access to the link
{i, j}, i ∈ RP is equivalent of having access to production at p. Access to {i, j}, j ∈ RC
yields access to customer j. The value function is obtained by maximizing the joint
surplus of the players in S using the gas-flows in the pipelines:
v(S ) = max
{ fi j |{i, j}∈L(S )}
 






Ti j( fi j)
 (1.1)




j ft j, ∀ t ∈ RT (S ), the capacity
constraints of the network | fi j| ≤ ki j, ∀ {i, j} ∈ L(S ) and non-negativity constraints
fi j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ RP or j ∈ RC. The value function captures the essential economic fea-
tures, such as the geography of the network, different cost of alternative pipelines,
demand for gas in the different regions, production cost, etc. It also reflects institu-
tional features, such as ownership titles and access rights.
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Finally, we calculate the Shapley value, ϕi, i ∈ N, which is player i’s weighted con-




P(S ) [v(S ∪ i) − v(S )] (1.2)
where P(S ) = |S |! (|N | − |S | − 1)!/|N |! is the weight of coalition S . The Shapley value
assigns a share of the surplus from cooperation to each player, which will be also
referred to as his ‘power’. Usually we express the power in relative terms as a share
of the total surplus.
Suppose we start with an institutional setting generating the value function vo. By
changing access rights we obtain a new game characterized by v1. The impact of
the change on a player i is then given by ϕi(v1) − ϕi(vo).
When deriving the value function, we have to make two major assumptions on the
scope of the game. The first refers to the temporal scope and the second refers to
the geographical scope including the level of regional disaggregation.
1.2.2 Specification & Calibration
Temporal scope / network flexibility.
We assume a stationary environment with constant demand, technology and pro-
duction cost etc. The value of a coalition, nevertheless, depends on the temporal
scope of the model (Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b)). In the short run, there are less
instruments available to increase the surplus than in the long run. It is instructive to
look at three different scenarios:
Very short term: It covers a time span lasting up to several weeks. The Ukrainian
transit crisis in January 2009 may be taken as practical illustration for this case.
The events showed the immediate impact of the withdrawal of one player, Ukraine,
on gas flows and consumption, given the very high demand in the winter season,
peaking load on major transport links and maximal withdrawal from storage facili-
ties. The ‘very short term’ is like an emergency scenario, in which only gas flows
can be redirected.
Short term: Here we consider a span of one year up to perhaps three years. Such
a period allows to ignore the seasonal pattern of demand and the possibility of
gas storage.27 It is also long enough to convert existing pipeline to bidirectional
27In Europe storage facilities help to smooth seasonal patterns of consumption, but at present they
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usage but too short to build new pipelines or develop new fields. We refer to this
variant as the ‘status-quo’ variant, because pipeline capacities are static. It can
also be interpreted as a ‘shortsighted’ assessment of power, because the effects
of adjustments which take longer than two or three years to be achieved are simply
ignored.
Long term: Here we envisage a scenario in which transport capacities can be in-
creased. As a result the network is considered to be flexible. As these investments
will take at least a couple of years to become effective, we consider a period start-
ing some three years ahead from the date for which we assess the power structure.
We refer to this variant as flexible network, because a coalition can use (almost)
all investment possibilities to enhance its value. It can be also considered as a
‘farsighted’ assessment of power because it ignores the period which is needed to
bring new capacities on stream.
We assume that decision makers, when assessing bargaining power, look beyond
the very short term emergency, but we are somewhat agnostic as to whether they
tend more to the ‘shortsighted’ or to the ‘farsighted’ view. It is worth remembering
that many gas contracts are long-term covering periods from 5 to 20 years, so we
would expect that the conditions agreed on, reflect long term considerations. On
the other hand, the further one projects into the future, the more uncertain the
prospects become, so that the clearer short term options may exert a stronger
influence on relative power. In any case, we will report results for both cases and
take these as limits for the range in which we would expect the true values to be.28
Geographical scope.
To obtain a detailed representation of the various customers, owners of pipelines
and gas producers etc. we would like to consider a large set of players. Unfor-
tunately, computational complexity increases fast in the number of players, as we
have to solve 2|N| − 1 optimization problems to calculate the value function. It is for
computational reasons that we restrict the geographical scope by aggregating cus-
are too low to act as a strategic reserve for longer periods.
28As pointed out in Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b), due to the linearity of the Shapley Value, the
‘shortsighted’ and the ‘farsighted’ assessment can be combined easily to obtain a more balanced
result. Let vs denote the value function and ϕs be the power index for the ‘shortsighted’ game and v f
and ϕ f characterize the ‘farsighted’ variant, then the Shapley value of the weighted game is given as
weighted average of the two Shapley values ϕ̄ = δϕs + (1 − δ)ϕ f .
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Figure 1.1: The Network
Blue nodes represent producers, major transit nodes are white. Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are marked with
yellow color as we introduce domestic consumption for these countries. Orange points represent regions where
we have a major transit node, which is linked to local production and local customers (the nodes are not shown
separately). Solid arrows represent the main pipelines as existing in 2005. Grey nodes and pipelines are taken
into account but not considered as strategic instruments. The red pipeline is Nord Stream, which started the
operation recently.
tomers into large markets and leaving out producers which appear to be of minor
strategic relevance (for a stylized picture of the network see figure 1.1).
As to outside producers we focus on Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya which to-
gether cover about 85% of the gas imports into the European Union.29 Main transit
countries for Russian gas are Belarus and Ukraine. We introduce domestic con-
sumption for Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Turkey is a major gas consumer and a
possible transit country for Russian gas. We aggregate customers and producers
within the European Union into ten regional players. Each controls local produc-
tion, access to local customers, and possibly transit through the region. France,
Italy, Poland, Netherlands, UK and Belgium correspond to the respective countries.
In each of these countries a national champion dominates imports and local supply
(GDF, ENI, PNGiG, Gasunie, Botas). We collect Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia in one region called “Center-East”. South Stream
and Nabucco would end in Center-East, from where gas would be distributed to
other European consumers. The countries in the region exhibit similar consump-
29Figures are calculated for the year 2009 from BP (2010).
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tion and import dependency patterns. With very little alternative supplies the region
depends with 80 % of its imports on Russia. While the pipeline networks are largely
privatized, some owned by Western importers, the Austrian OMV can be seen as
the dominant private supplier in the region. Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and
Luxembourg are bundled to “Center”. In terms of consumption the region is clearly
dominated by Germany, which is also home of large Gas suppliers E.ON-Ruhrgas
and Wintershall. The region covers more than three quarters of gas consumption by
imports, but its pipeline imports are well diversified between Russia (35%), Norway
(34%) and Netherlands (26%). Spain and Portugal are aggregated into “SpainPort”.
Finally, we collect Romania, Bulgaria and Greece in a region called “Balkan”. The
region has only weak links to other European regions and imports mainly Russian
gas. We aggregate all pipelines and interconnection points between any two play-
ers into one link. As to access rights, we assume that outside EU every country
has unrestricted control over its pipelines and gas fields.
Cost and demand.
The details of the numerical calibration are given in a technical appendix. Here we
outline only the main principles. We assume piece-wise linear production cost for
each producer and linear demand functions with the same intercept for all regions.
The model is calibrated using data on consumption in the regions and flows be-
tween the regions from 2009. Production cost have a common base, to which we
make minor regional adjustments to replicate flows in 2009. The slope parameters
of demand are estimated as to replicate the consumption in 2009. The most impor-
tant implication of our calibration of demand in relation to cost is that the pipeline
system as existing in 2009 is sufficient. Given the willingness to pay and the cost
of supplying gas the network is able to deliver the efficient amount of gas into the
different consumption nodes. Nevertheless, the options to change the network will
affect bargaining power, because they allow coalitions, which do not have access
to the full network, to adjust it to their needs.
This approach also ensures that the main difference between the regions is the
relation of total consumption to own production on which we have solid information
and not our assumption on demand functions on which information is poor. The
main difference between producers is production capacity and pipeline connections
to the markets, for which data are good, and not differences in wellhead production
cost, which are difficult to estimate.
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1.3 Results
Since a player’s Shapley Value is the weighted sum of his contributions to the values
of possible coalitions of other players, any change can be traced back to changes
of these contributions. The value of a coalition depends on its access to pipelines,
markets and gas fields. Hence, a player can increase the coalition value by pro-
viding additional markets, additional supply or by improving connections through
transit. In any case, the value of his contribution will depend on how well his re-
sources complement what is already there. Adding a market to other markets with
no access to production helps little compared to making the same market available
to several producers, which are short of customers.
When we assess the impact of a change in the rules for pipelines access, we com-
pare the power index for two games. Generally speaking, a player benefits from
getting better access to complementary inputs himself, but at the same time suf-
fers from competitors also gaining better access. More specifically, a producer may
gain from better access to markets, but he may suffer from his rivals improved ac-
cess to the same markets, i.e. increased supply competition. A customer may gain
from better access to suppliers, but he may suffer from other customers improved
access to the same producers, i.e. increased demand competition. Finally, a tran-
sit country may gain from better access to markets and suppliers, but it may be
harmed by other transit routes gaining access to the same markets and suppliers,
i.e. increased transit competition. The change of own access will feature promi-
nently in those coalitions, which do not include major rivals, whereas the effect on
competition will be stronger in coalitions which include many potential rivals.
The trade-off between access and competition is complicated by the fact that some
countries play multiple roles. For example, Center-East is a major gas customer,
a transit region for Russian gas flowing westwards, and a transit region for North-
Western gas flowing eastwards. Moreover, the role of a player depends on the
coalition against which he is evaluated. For example, Italy and Turkey are importers
when all players are in the coalition. However, Turkey becomes a transit country for
Russian gas in a smaller coalition, for which neither gas from North Sea nor transit
through Belarus and Ukraine is available. Similarly, Italy becomes a transit country
for North-African gas, if other producers drop out. If we consider coalitions consist-
ing only of countries, which are customers in the grand coalition, those with higher
own production relative to demand should start exporting. Multiple and changing
roles make it sometimes difficult to predict, what the overall impact of a measure on
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a player will be.
1.3.1 Fragmented Market
Our benchmark structure reflects the situation in Europe before the onset of re-
forms. We consider a fragmented market composed of regional monopolies, each
controlling local production and both the high pressure transport network, hence,
long distance gas transit, as well as the low pressure distribution network, hence,
access to the customers in its region. While each customer can access producers
only through the ‘regional champion’, we can accommodate various institutional ar-
rangements at the local level. The champion may be a private profit maximizing
firm efficiently exploiting local customers or an efficient public utility acting in the
best interest of its constituency. In other words, we focus on how the surplus is
shared between regions but we are agnostic about rent sharing within a region.
For this institutional set up we consider two network scenarios. The first reflects
major pipeline as operational around the year 2005. The second takes into account
the new offshore pipeline Nord Stream. For each network scenario we look at the
shortsighted and the farsighted assessment of bargaining power, leaving us with
four variants of the benchmark structure. In table 1.1 we report the Shapley values
for the different variants. To simplify the interpretation, we consider only the surplus
from cooperation regarding pipeline gas. So we deduct the payoff, which players
can obtain on their own (e.g. from consuming own production or LNG import). All
figures are given as percent of the total surplus. Figures in the first column report
the shortsighted power assessment for the old pipeline network. Altogether, the
group of outside producers, transit countries for Russian gas and the major EU
supplier, the Netherlands, obtains a share of 46 per cent. The Russian supply
chain receives more than half of this share or roughly a quarter of the total surplus.
Belarus and Ukraine gain not only from transit, but also from consuming Russian
gas. Other powerful producers are Algeria, Norway and Netherlands with shares of
4.7, 9.7 and 5.0, respectively. Their shares reflect their production capabilities but
also their strategic location vis-a-vis major customers. Turkey and the EU countries
(except Netherlands) benefit mainly through imports and transit of gas. Typically,
their shares increase in the size of their own market, decrease in the amount of gas
obtained through alternative means such as own production and LNG imports, and
increase in their importance as a transit region. With a share of 17.9 Center, which
includes Germany, Switzerland and Denmark, benefits most from cooperation. It
23
Table 1.1: Fragmented Market: Exclusive Access to Trunk Pipes
Shapley Values in percentage of the total surplus
without Nord Stream with Nord Stream
shortsighted / farsighted shortsighted / farsighted
Russia 13.2 16.4 16.0 16.9
Belarus 4.5 4.0 4.1 3.9
Ukraine 7.7 5.8 6.2 5.4
Algeria 4.7 4.0 4.4 3.9
Libya 1.5 1.2 1.4 1.2
Norway 9.7 7.4 7.7 7.0
Turkey 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.7
Netherlands 5.0 3.9 4.1 3.8
Balkana 0.7 1.1 0.6 1.1
Belgium 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.8
Center-Eastb 7.0 6.7 6.7 6.6
France 5.3 5.8 5.6 5.9
Centerc 17.9 20.5 20.7 21.0
Italy 12.3 13.2 12.7 13.2
Poland 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.6
Spain/Portugal 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.1
UK 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8
sum EU 56.9 59.5 58.5 59.9
a Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
b Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
c Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
is a large market with little own supply or LNG imports and a strategic location for
potential gas transits. Balkan (0.7), in contrast, collects a number of countries with
little consumption, considerable own production and few transit options.
In the farsighted assessment (second column), we employ a longer perspective
and allow for investment in additional pipeline capacity. It is worth remembering
that due to our calibration the grand coalition of all players would decide against
such investments. Nevertheless, the investment options have a substantial impact
on the power index. Russia increases its share by 24 percent up to 16.4, while the
transit countries Ukraine and Belarus see their shares cut by 25 and 11 percent,
respectively. Russia’s main competitors Algeria, Norway and Netherlands all loose
about a fifth of their shares. Center and Italy gain while Center-East looses bar-
gaining power. To a large extent these effects are driven by the option to invest in
Nord Stream.30 There are two exceptions, Balkan and Italy, which mainly gain from
30A similar result has been obtained in Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b) for the North-Western region
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the option to strengthen pipeline links to the Center-East and Center. The figures
in columns 3 and 4 assess power for the time after the completion of Nord Stream.
Comparing columns 3 and 1, we see that the completion of Nord Stream with a
capacity of 55 bcm/a has a strong impact on the shortsighted power index. In fact
the shortsighted power index when having Nord Stream in place, hence investment
cost sunk, is similar to the farsighted index (column 2) when Nord Stream is only
an expensive option (again Balkan and Italy are the exception). Accounting for ad-
ditional investment options in other links has only little effect on the power index.
After the completion of Nord Stream, the differences between a shortsighted and a
farsighted evaluation (column 3 and 4) become small.
1.3.2 Integrated Market
Starting from a fragmented market, an integrated market is achieved by liberaliz-
ing access to the high pressure pipelines within EU. While regional champions still
control local production and access to low pressure distribution, hence local cus-
tomers, they cannot block long distance transit. As a result, competition between
the regions as well as among producers is enhanced. A priory, the effect is am-
biguous. On the one hand producers gain through improved access to customers.
For example, in a fragmented market, Russia needs the cooperation of Center and
Poland or Center-East to deliver gas along the eastern corridor to reach customers
in France. With liberalized access, Russia is entitled to use the transit pipelines
and needs only the distribution network in France to access the customers in this
region. Russia as a producer and France as a customer gain by saving transit rents
at the cost of Center, Center-East and Poland. By the same argument, however,
competition between producers is intensified. In a fragmented market, producers
enjoy market power vis-a-vis captured customers, i.e. those regions which need
cooperation of other European countries to access alternative suppliers. After lib-
eralization of pipeline access, any two producers connected to the European transit
grid will compete for any European customer.
In table 1.2 we present the impact of integration measured as the change in per-
centage point compared to the benchmark cases in table 1.1. Perhaps the most
important result is that the members of the Union as a group lose from liberalizing
gas traffic among themselves. Their share decreases by 1.7 percentage points of
the surplus in a shortsighted assessment of power before Nord Stream is available
of the network.
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Table 1.2: Impact of Wholesale Market Integration
Change in percentage points compared to table 1.1
without Nord Stream with Nord Stream
shortsighted / farsighted shortsighted / farsighted
Russia −2.7 −3.7 −2.9 −3.7
Belarus 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.3
Ukraine 0.3 0.1 −0.1 0.0
Algeria 0.4 0.7 0.0 0.6
Libya 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2
Norway 1.8 2.1 2.0 2.1
Turkey 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.4
Netherlands 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4
Balkana 0.0 −0.3 0.0 −0.2
Belgium −1.0 −0.7 −0.8 −0.7
Center-Eastb 1.0 2.0 1.9 2.2
France 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8
Centerc −3.0 −4.3 −4.7 −4.6
Italy 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.5
Poland −0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1
Spain/Portugal 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −0.1
UK −0.2 −0.3 −0.1 −0.2
sum EU −1.7 −1.2 −0.6 −0.9
a Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
b Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
c Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
(column 1 of table 1.2). The losses become smaller in a farsighted evaluation of
power (-1.2) or when Nord Stream is online (-0.6 and -0.9 for short and farsighted
variant, respectively). These results cast into doubt that it is in the general interest
of EU to liberalize access to the transmission networks. In other words, the results
support the view that strong regional monopolies may be needed to counter the
power of large producers. However, there are marked differences in the way the
redistribution of bargaining power affects the various regions within EU as well as
the various producers outside.
EU Countries.
Center, here a union of Germany, Denmark and Switzerland, depends little on tran-
sit within EU. The region is directly connected to Netherlands and Norway and has
already two competing supply routes, Ukraine/Center-East and Belarus/Poland, for
Russian gas, to which the completion of Nord Stream added a direct link. Hence, as
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a customer Center has little to gain from liberalization. At first glance Center’s role
as a transit country may appear to be modest. With 4.3 bcm/a and 9.1 bcm/a gas
flows through Center to France and to Italy, respectively, are not particular large.
However, the region is Europe’s most important potential gas hub. Whenever one
of the major producers is taken out of the picture, Center becomes a central transit
region. Suppose Russian gas flows through Ukraine are interrupted. Norwegian
and Dutch gas would have to flow through Center to reach Center-East and Italy.
Similarly, if Norway’s gas is to be substituted by supplies from Russia and Nether-
lands, these would have to travel through Center to reach the customers. Due to its
strategic location Center enjoys substantial bargaining power as a potential transit
region, which is lost when pipeline access is liberalized. As a result Center carries a
loss of 3.0 percentage points, which further increases in the farsighted assessment
or with the completion of Nord Stream. Belgium is another EU member, which will
loose from liberalization for similar reasons.
Center-East (+1.0) and Italy (+1.1) in contrast, are regions set to gain from lib-
eralized pipeline access. They highly depend on pipeline gas, but being directly
connected only to one producer have little leverage over suppliers. As a result their
bargaining position is strengthened through improved access to alternative suppli-
ers. Somewhat surprisingly, even for Center-East, the important transit country for
Russian gas, improved supply competition matters more than the loss of transit
power. Center-East features higher gas transits than Center, but at the same time
is more easily substituted for, in particular after Nord Stream becomes available.31
The pattern differs for Poland. Though Poland, as Center-East region, is the cap-
tured customer of Russia, it suffers a small loss of power (−0.4). On the one hand,
Poland has much smaller market than Center-East. On the other hand, Poland
is an important transit region for the Western part of the network and for Belarus
with minor own production. For Poland the loss of transit power matters more than
the improved supply competition. However, after Nord Stream becomes available,
Poland is more easily substituted for and the negative effect is offset.32
31The liberalization’s impact on the Shapley values given in table 1.2 already nets out gains in
the contribution to some coalitions and losses in the contribution to others. If we look at these two
components separately, we find that Center’s gain from increased supply competition (+1.3) constitute
roughly a half of those for Italy (+2.8) and Center-East (+2.7), which have much smaller markets. Loss
from curbing transit power and increased demand competition, in contrast, is - 4.4 percentage points
for Center, much larger than Center-East’s (−1.7).
32Poland, having much smaller market than Center-East, gains only +0.4 percentage points from
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Outside Producers and Transit Regions.
Russia faces important transit constraints outside EU, but with respect to EU itself
it can deliver gas through a number of geographically diversified entry points such
as Balkan, Center-East, Poland and Center (with Nord Stream). It also has direct
access to Turkey. As a result, Russia gains little in terms of market access but
will loose in terms of increased supply competition for regions such as Poland and
Center-East. Norway starts from the opposite position. With its main connections
all located in the North West, it has less diversified access to Europe. Moreover, it
does not benefit from ‘captured customers’, as Russia does. Norway faces direct
competition from Netherlands, which neighbors its direct customers. To reach other
important markets, such as Italy, France and potentially Center-East and Poland, it
depends on transit through Center and Belgium. As a result Norway gains from the
integration through improved market access.
Liberalizing pipeline access within the EU increases the power of Belarus and has
an ambiguous effect on Ukraine. On the one hand, both transit countries for Rus-
sian gas have domestic consumption and, hence, gain through improved access to
alternative sources of gas. On the other hand, in the integrated market it becomes
cheaper to circumvent each of the countries, but, as long as Nord Stream is not
available, it requires the other country to do so. For example Russian gas can by-
pass Ukraine by flowing through Belarus, Poland, Center and back to Center-East
and Italy. Avoiding transit rents for Poland and Center enhances the position of
Belarus and weakens the position of Ukraine. As a result, when Nord Stream is not
taken into account, Belarus and Ukraine gain 1.5 and 0.3 percentage points, re-
spectively. With Nord Stream the positive effect of the improved access to markets
is weakened for both countries, so that benefits of Belarus decrease (+1.2), while
Ukraine is exposed to the slight loss of power (−0.1).
1.3.3 Integration and the Risk of Producer Cartels
Several initiatives of gas producing countries to establish a cartel similar to the
OPEC have failed to produce tangible results. At first glance this may look surpris-
ing as it requires only a small number of major exporters to Europe to coordinate.
One reason may be that competition between producers is weak in a fragmented
market and so may be the incentives to form a cartel to reduce competition. If com-
the improved supply competition. At the same time Poland suffers (−0.8) from a loss of transit power
and increased demand competition.
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Table 1.3: Pipeline Access and Producer Cartel
Fragmented Marketa Integrated Market
shortsighted / farsighted shortsighted / farsighted
No cartel [absolute shares]
Russia 16.0 16.9 13.1 13.2
Algeria 4.4 3.9 4.4 4.5
Norway 7.7 7.0 9.7 9.1
sum others 13.4 12.3 14.9 14.1
sum EU 58.5 59.9 57.9 59.0
Impact of cartel: Russia, Algeria [differences]
Russia+Algeria 1.5 1.7 0.7 0.6
Norway 0.1 0.2 1.0 1.3
sum others −0.4 −0.3 −0.7 −0.5
sum EU −1.2 −1.6 −0.9 −1.4
Impact of cartel: Russia, Algeria, Norway [differences]
Russia+Algeria+Norway 6.5 7.0 6.1 6.4
sum others −1.1 −0.6 −2.2 −1.6
sum EU −5.4 −6.5 −3.9 −4.8
aAll variants are with Nord Stream being in place.
petition is increased through liberalized access to the transport system, the gains
from cartelization may increase as well. However, our calculations show that liber-
alizing access to the EU transit system appears to decrease the risk of a producer
cartel.
The upper panels of table 1.3 summarize previous results. The left panel gives
figures for the case of exclusive access to pipelines obtained from the right panels
of table 1.1. The right panel reports the shares for liberalized access. It can be
obtained by adding the right panels of table 1.1 and 1.2. In the middle and lower
panels we report the gains and losses from establishing cartels among gas produc-
ers. As expected cartels are profitable. If Russia and Algeria form a cartel against a
fragmented market they gain 1.5 and 1.7 percentage points in the shortsighted and
farsighted assessment of power, respectively. If all major exporters join the cartel,
the gains increase to 6.5 and 7.0 points, respectively.
Cartels remain profitable in an integrated market, but the gains from cartelization
become smaller. In a fragmented market, there are important instances of bilat-
eral competition for customers, which create strong incentives for cartelization. For
example Italy is a major customer for Russian and Algerian gas. In a fragmented
market other potential suppliers, such as Netherlands and Norway, are kept at bay
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by the need to ensure transit. Hence Russia and Algeria gain a lot by eliminat-
ing their mutual competition. In an integrated market Italy’s access to alternative
sources of gas is improved. Hence, the rent for which Russia and Algeria compete
is diminished and so are the gains from cartelization. At the same time the spill-over
to competing producers becomes larger.
1.3.4 Mergers and Centralization
In the previous section we argued that liberalizing access to the long distance net-
work hurts the regions within EU as a group. Forcing regional champions to open
their trunk pipes to competitors, or even spinning them off into a separate business,
works against the fragmentation of the market by loosening up the vertical integra-
tion of the industry. Now we will turn to the question, how horizontal concentration
affects the power structure. Such concentration can be result of private mergers
of ‘regional champions’ like the E.ON - Ruhrgas merger mentioned in the introduc-
tion. It can also be achieved through public intervention such as the attempts of the
European Commission to coordinate the EU’s foreign gas relations.
Following Segal (2003) we model a merger as a change by which one party, the
‘proxy player’, acquires the exclusive right to use the resources of the other parties,
which thereby become ‘dummy players’. This change of access rights defines a
new game. For the merging parties, the impact is measured by the difference
between the share of the proxy player and the sum of the individual pre-merger
shares. For all other players it is simply the difference between their shares in the
two games. We have to distinguish two cases depending on whether we start in
a fragmented market with exclusive access to trunk pipelines or in an integrated
market where access is liberalized. In a fragmented market, the parties merge
local production, access to local customers, and their transport network. Once
the market is integrated, the merger embraces only local production and customer
access. A centralized external policy of the European Union can be analyzed in
the same manner. All members transfer their decision rights as far as relations
with outsiders are concerned to a central player. With respect to the outside world,
political centralization yields the same result as if the national champions would
merge into a single ‘European super champion’.
Recall that a merger does not change the total surplus, which depends only on the
cost of producing and transporting gas and the benefits from consuming it. Hence,
it benefits the merging parties only if surplus is redistributed at the cost of non-
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merging players (outsiders). Under which circumstances can this be expected? As
is shown in Segal (2003) the answer to this question turns out be complicated. It
does not depend on whether the resources of the merging parties are complements
or substitutes as such. Instead, a merger between two players i and j harms an
outside player k, hence benefits i and j, if their complementarity is decreased (their
substitutability is increased) by k.33
Table 1.4 presents the impact of selected mergers and centralization on the power
structure. For simplicity we report only the shortsighted scenario with Nord Stream
being operational. Left and right panels refer to the fragmented market and the in-
tegrated market, respectively. The figures indicate by how many percentage points
the players’ share will change in comparison to the relevant benchmark case. In
the first column of the left panel we report the impact of a merger between Cen-
ter and Center-East, two important transit regions in a fragmented market. Such a
merger would make it easier for Russian gas to bypass Ukraine but also for Nor-
wegian gas to reach Russia’s captured customers. As a result, Ukraine looses 0.8
points, Norway gains 0.4 points, while the impact on Russia is negligible. Within
EU, Netherlands gains for similar reasons as Norway but Italy suffers. Center and
Center-East provide alternative import routes for Italy so they gain by avoiding tran-
sit competition. The merging parties gain 0.4 points and the EU in total would gain,
because the bargaining power of outsiders is weakened. In an integrated market,
however, the same merger has very different effects (left column in the right panel).
It is no longer profitable for the merging parties (-0.3), nor it is for the EU (-0.3).
Russia and transit countries gain, while Algeria suffers a small loss.
For a merger between Center and Italy we observe a similar pattern. In a frag-
mented market the EU gains at the cost of outsiders, although in this case the
African producers Libya and Algeria loose while Russia and Norway gain. Inside
EU the merging parties and Netherlands gain while Center-East suffers. Italy de-
pends more on Center-East for importing Russian gas than Center, which has al-
ternative routes (e.g. Nord Stream). So the merger diminishes the transit power
of Center-East. In an integrated market, the merger becomes unprofitable for the
33Two players i and j are complements (substitutes) with respect to a group S of players, if i’s
contribution to value of S is larger (smaller) if S includes player j. k decreases the complementarity
(increases the substitutability) of i and j, if this difference becomes smaller (or larger in absolute
terms if it is negative), if S also includes k. In a complex network like ours, such a criterion will never
be fulfilled for all possible S and all possible outsiders k, but the network structure determines what
will be more prominent on average.
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Table 1.4: Impact of Mergers and Centralized Bargaining
fragmented Marketa integrated marketb
Center is merged with
Center Italy Nether- all EU Center- Italy Nether- all EU
East lands East lands
Russia 0.0 0.4 −1.9 −1.3 0.2 0.3 −0.6 −0.5
Belarus 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.1 −0.1 0.1
Ukraine −0.8 −0.1 −0.2 −0.9 0.2 0.3 −0.3 0.5
Algeria 0.0 −0.6 −0.2 −1.4 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.9
Libya 0.0 −0.2 −0.1 −0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.3
Norway 0.4 0.4 −0.6 −0.3 0.0 −0.1 −0.5 −1.7
Turkey 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Netherlands 0.4 0.3 - - −0.1 −0.1 - -
Balkanc 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Belgium 0.1 0.0 −0.8 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Center-Eastd - −0.4 0.4 - - 0.0 −0.1 -
France 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 - 0.0 0.0 −0.1 -
Centere 0.4 0.3 3.2 4.2 −0.3 −0.5 2.1 2.7
Italy −0.4 - 0.3 - 0.0 - −0.1 -
Poland −0.1 0.0 0.1 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Spain/Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
UK 0.1 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 −0.1 -
sum EU 0.4 0.2 3.0 4.2 −0.3 −0.4 1.7 2.7
aShortsighted assessment with Nord Stream being operational. Difference to table 1.1, column 3.
bShortsighted assessment with Nord Stream being operational. Difference to the sum of column 3 of table 1.1
and column 3 of 1.2.
c Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
d Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
e Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
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parties (-0.5) and the EU (-0.4), while Russia and transit regions gain in a similar
fashion as if Center and Center-East would merge.
The third example of a pairwise merger is between Center and Netherlands. It
would pool a major producer with a large market and important transit region. In a
fragmented market this merger would be highly profitable both for the merging play-
ers (+3.2) as well as for EU as a group (+3.0). Within EU the power of Center-East
and Italy increases by 0.4 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. Both regions
increase complementarity of merging Center region and Netherlands. In the frag-
mented market Center is a transit region for Italy and Center-East for gas from
the Northwest, including Netherlands. Therefore, both customers increase comple-
mentarity of Center as transit region and Netherlands as a producer. Belgium in
contrast is hurt (-0.8) because it competes with Center for Dutch gas. All outside
producers are hurt by the merger, with Russia and Norway bearing the brunt of the
losses. As in the other cases, liberalization of pipeline access tends to decrease
the profits of a merger, but the effect is not strong enough to turn it into a loss. In
an integrated market, the merging parties gain 2.1 points. The gain for EU (loss to
outside suppliers) is 1.7 points.
If thought to an end, a sequence of pairwise mergers would lead to full centraliza-
tion, which is also the aim of the EU’s attempts to speak ‘with a common voice’ in
all external energy relations. The last columns of the two panels show the impact of
such a scenario. Bargaining as a group the EU would gain 4.2 percentage points in
a fragmented market and 2.7 points when internal markets are already integrated.
In summary, we find that in a fragmented market pairwise mergers of ‘national
champions’ tend to be profitable for the parties. There is however much hetero-
geneity in the impact on others. As a rule some outside producers gain while oth-
ers loose and the same holds true for other regions in the Union. So we see little
evidence for the view, that it takes large European players to counter the power
of outside producers. Once market integration is achieved, the attractiveness of
mergers is much decreased and the results become more homogeneous. Bilat-
eral mergers within EU have small effects on their fellow EU regions, Norway and
Algeria, but they tend to increase the power of the Russian supply chain.
The reason for this pattern is to be found in the architecture of the network. Overall,
the transport system is designed to ship gas from different points at the periphery
Northwest (Netherlands and Norway), East (Russia) and South (Algeria, Libya) to
33
the various centers of consumption in Europe. In a fragmented market each Euro-
pean region enjoys exclusive control of sections of the network of trunk pipelines.
As these pipeline sections tend to be complementary, customers depend on each
other to access suppliers. Since outside producers are located at different points,
it depends on the particular merger, whether an outside producer increases or de-
creases the complementary. Take Center and Italy as an example. With respect
to Norwegian or Dutch gas Center and Italy are complementary. Italy depends on
transit through Center. Algeria reduces this complementarity by providing an inde-
pendent source of gas for Italy, so it is hurt by the merger. If we consider Russia
instead of Algeria, supply in the North becomes very large, hence, Italy’s market
becomes more valuable for Center. So Russia increases the complementarity and,
therefore, benefits from the merger. The first pattern is slightly more prevalent and
tends to dominate other effects. As a result bilateral mergers of customer/transit re-
gions tend to harm the group of outside producers and transit countries. However,
the opposite case is also common and often the merging parties gain more at the
cost of other regions within the EU.
In an integrated market each region enjoys access to the whole network. A merger
joins access to customers and local production. The European regions are similar
in the sense that they depend on imports, so they are competitors i.e. substitutable
with respect to an outside producer.34 In the previous example, with open access to
trunk pipes Center and Italy become substitutable with respect to Norwegian gas.
Russia, as additional producer, will reduce the competition between consuming re-
gions and, hence decrease substitutability. Therefore, a merger tends to strengthen
the bargaining power of Russia and the transit countries for Russian gas.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
For a long time European gas markets used to be dominated by ‘national champi-
ons’, vertically integrated firms, controlling local production, trunk pipes, hence im-
ports, and distribution networks, hence access to customers. The EU Commission
is trying to overcome this fragmentation by liberalizing pipeline access, breaking
up vertical structures and fostering competition between the regions. Critics argue,
however, that strong European players are needed to create buyer power against
a small number of external gas suppliers, such as Russia, Norway and Algeria, on
which the EU depends for more than half of its consumption.
34The main exception is Netherlands, which produces gas in excess of its own consumption.
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In this paper we model the European gas supply system as a cooperative game
and use the Shapley value as a power index for the players. We analyze how the
liberalization of access to the European high pressure transport system affects the
power of the various regions. Such a measure would establish an integrated whole-
sale market by stripping the national champions of their power to block interregional
gas transit. However, it falls short of creating a truly competitive internal market, be-
cause access to local customer through low pressure distribution networks is still
monopolized.
We find that forcing the European companies to open access to their network of
trunk pipes, on balance, strengthens the power of external suppliers and transit
countries for Russian gas and weakens the regions within EU. There is, however,
considerable variety on both sides of the market, which might explain the difficulties
of implementing the reforms in the European context. Though market integration
tends to strengthen outside producers, it reduces their possible gains from estab-
lishing a producer cartel. Overall, with respect to long distance gas transport, we
find some support for the claim that it takes ‘countervailing power’ to curb the dom-
inance of outside producers.
In a fragmented market, pairwise mergers of local champions tend to be profitable
and increase bargaining power vis-a-vis outside producers in many cases. But
there are also many instances where outside producers gain power. So depend-
ing on the particular case, the argument of countervailing power has some validity.
However, once access to trunk pipes is liberalized, many pairwise mergers turn
unprofitable for the merging parties, mostly because they increase the bargaining
power of the Russian supply chain. We also analyze the effect of a centraliza-
tion of EU gas policy. Independently of whether we start from a fragmented or an
integrated market, the EU can benefit a lot by “speaking with one voice”.
The next step towards a fully liberalized market would be to open access to cus-
tomers, for example by unbundling local production from ownership of distribution
networks. The national producer would loose its captured local customer base and
have to compete against other producers inside and outside EU on level playing
field. Most likely such a step will benefit customers within Europe, but again it might
come at the expense of increased power of outside producers. In this sense the
present paper provides only a partial answer to the question of whether it is worth
to protect ‘national champions’ to curb the power of outside producers.
Appendix A
A.1 Calibration
In this section we describe the functions and parameters used for the calculation
of the value function (equation (1.1) in the main text). Let f ∗i j, {i, j} ∈ L(N) denote
the solution to the program in (1.1) when solved for the grand coalition, which has
access to all resources. To calibrate the model, we have to determine p j and Ti j
such that f ∗i j are reasonably close to observed consumption patterns and flows. As
we assume that the players cooperate effectively, they will make efficient use of
the existing network. Hence, in each region the marginal willingness to pay for gas,
p j( fi j), will be equal to the local marginal cost of supplying gas, the nodal cost c j( fi j),
which take into account the physical constraints of the system. We use this feature
to calibrate first inverse demand and then supply cost using data on consumption
and flows.
A.1.1 Demand
Transport costs within Europe are small compared to the cost of producing gas
and transporting it to Europe’s borders. As a first approximation, we neglect the
small differences among local cost and assume a common constant supply cost
c.35 For each consumption region we assume a linear inverse demand function. To
reduce the number of parameters we assume the same demand intercept (a + c)
for all regions. Efficiency requires p j( fi j) = a + c − b j fi j = c for each region j. The
slope parameters b j are then calibrated as to replicate the consumption in 2009:
b j = a/ fi j, where fi j is the consumption of gas in region j compiled from IEA (2010)
35For none of the links within Europe the capacity constraints were binding in 2009/10. So nodal
cost differ only by the variable transportation cost between connected nodes which are small.
35
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Table A.1: Pipeline Network: Consumption links
Links Consumption Slope Players
given needed
[bcm/a] a = 500 for
access
from to fi j b j
Russia RussiaC 426.4 1.2 Russia
Belarus BelarusC 17.9 28.0 Belarus
Ukraine UkraineC 53.3 9.4 Ukraine
Belgium BelgiumC 16.9 29.6 Belgium
Poland PolandC 16.0 31.3 Poland
UK UKC 90.5 5.5 UK
Balkana BalkanC 20.2 24.8 Balkan
Turkey TurkeyC 36.4 13.7 Turkey
Centerb CenterC 104.6 4.8 Center
Center-Eastc Center-EastC 41.4 12.1 Center-East
Italy ItalyC 75.6 6.6 Italy
Netherlands NetherlandsC 48.3 10.4 Netherlands
France FranceC 44.1 11.3 France
SpainPortd SpainPortC 38.8 12.9 SpainPort
a Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
b Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and Luxembourg
c Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, Slovenia
d Spain, Portugal
and IEA (2011).36 See Table A.1 for the resulting parameter values.
The common supply cost c acts as a shift parameter, which does not affect the
consumer surplus. A decrease of a, with b j being adjusted, affects all players pro-
portionally. Such a change has little impact on the relative Shapley value (measured
in per cent of the surplus), hence, will have little effect on our index for bargaining
power.
A.1.2 Production
For each region we introduce a production link, which connects the production site
and the network. We present the parameter values for the production links in Table
A.2.
36All quantities are quoted in bcm/a. All prices or cost are quoted in mn e/bcm (giving the same
figure as the more common e/tcm).
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Our focus is on the imported pipeline gas, which is considered to be the marginal
source of gas. For Russia, Belarus and Ukraine welfare includes the benefits from
local consumption. We treat Norway, Algeria and Libya as pure producers which
benefit only from export earnings. For these countries we consider only production
which could be made available for exports to Europe and Turkey after deducting
own consumption and exports to other markets. For all players, except Russia, we
restrict the capacities of production links to be equal to the respective production
volumes in 2009. The data on production volumes are collected from IEA (2010)
and IEA (2011).
The differences in the operating cost of producing from existing fields are small
compared to differences in the cost of developing new fields. In addition, meaningful
information on wellhead production cost is difficult to obtain. As with demand we
make a bold assumption by introducing a common production cost parameter cP
with some adjustments (∆i j) for few cases. Since it is more difficult to produce at
maximal capacity ki j, we assume production cost to be piecewise linear : Ti j( fi j) =
(cP + ∆i j)(min[ fi j, 0.75 ∗ ki j] + 1.2 max[ fi j − 0.75 ∗ ki j, 0]). Per unit production costs are
constant, but only up to 75% of the pipe capacity and increased by 20% for the
remaining 25%. These adjustments help to get more realistic flows for the network,
but have only a negligible impact on our estimate of bargaining power. Since the
demand system is adjusted to any choice of cP, its absolute value is rather irrelevant
and arbitrarily set as cP = 20. To account for the regional differences in wellhead
production cost we compute ∆i j based on Table 13.6 (IEA (2009)). For most EU
regions, as well as for Belarus and Ukraine, we ignore any cost of own production.
A.1.3 LNG
In case of all market structures a local champion (or a region itself) controls not
only own production, but also LNG-imports. For all EU players we introduce LNG
links, which represent the LNG terminals. The parameter values are reported in
Table A.3. The data on LNG-imports are collected from GIE (2010), IEA (2010) and
IEA (2011). In accordance with Table 13.5 and Table 13.6 in IEA (2009) we set the
total costs of using LNG to be equal to 2cP which gives LNG a slight disadvantage
compared to pipeline gas. As before, we assume a piecewise linear cost function:
Ti j( fi j) = 2cP ∗ (min[ fi j, 0.75 ∗ ki j] + 1.2 ∗max[ fi j − 0.75 ∗ ki j, 0]), where ki j denotes the
capacity of the link. We restrict the capacities of LNG links to the respective flows
in 2009.
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Table A.2: Pipeline Network: Production links
Links Capacity Flow Operating Players
Cost needed
cP + ∆i j for access
from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm]
Production outside EU
RussiaP Russia 650.8 550.5 cP Russia
NorwayP Norway 99.4 99.4 cP − 7 Norway
AlgeriaP Algeria 77.7 77.7 cP − 5 Algeria
LibyaP Libya 15.9 15.9 cP − 8.8 Libya
BelarusP Belarus 0.2 0.2 0 Belarus
UkraineP Ukraine 21.9 21.9 0 Ukraine
Production within EU
BalkanP Balkan 10.8 10.8 0 Balkan
BelgiumP Belgium 0 0 0 Belgium
CenterEastP CenterEast 4.9 4.9 0 CenterEast
FranceP France 0.9 0.9 0 France
CenterP Center 23.7 23.7 0 Center
ItalyP Italy 8.1 8.1 0 Italy
NetherlandsP Netherlands 78.7 78.7 cP − 4.4 Netherlands
PolandP Poland 5.8 5.8 0 Poland
SpainPortP SpainPort 0 0 0 SpainPort
TurkeyP Turkey 0.7 0.7 0 Turkey
UKP UK 62.1 62.1 0 UK
Table A.3: Pipeline Network: LNG links
Links Capacity Flow Operatinga Players
Cost needed
cP + ∆i j for access
from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm]
BalkanLNG Balkan 0.8 0.8 2cP Balkan
BelgiumLNG Belgium 3 3 2cP Belgium
FranceLNG France 10.1 10.1 2cP France
CenterLNG Center 0 0 2cP Center
ItalyLNG Italy 2.9 2.9 2cP Italy
NetherlandsLNG Netherlands 0 0 2cP Netherlands
PolandLNG Poland 0 0 2cP Poland
SpainPortLNG SpainPort 28.5 28.5 2cP SpainPort
TurkeyLNG Turkey 6.1 6.1 2cP Turkey
UKLNG UK 10.1 10.1 2cP UK
a The global parameter cP is set equal to 20. We give the unit cost for flows up to 75%
of the capacity. For the remaining 25% of capacity the numbers are increased by 20%.
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A.1.4 Transport
The total cost of transporting gas consists of operating cost and capacity cost.
In the shortsighted assessment of power, capacity costs of existing pipelines are
sunk and we do not take them into account. This simplification is based on the
assumption that bargaining among rational players should not be influenced by
sunk cost.
The operating cost is composed by management & maintenance cost and energy
cost, which are proportional to the length of the pipeline as well as to the quantity of
gas transported. Since it is difficult to run a pipeline throughout the year at maximal
capacity, we assume a piecewise linear function: Ti j( fi j) = cTi j ∗ (min[ fi j, 0.75 ∗ ki j] +
1.2∗max[ fi j−0.75∗ki j, 0]), where ki j denotes existing capacity. Per unit transportation
costs are constant, but only up to 75% of the pipe capacity and increased by 20% for
the remaining 25%. Capacities of the links between the transit nodes are compiled
from ENTSOG (2010) and public sources. The data on flows are collected from IEA
(2010) and IEA (2011). Capacities of the links, which are connected to the areas
outside of the regional scope, are limited to the respective flows in 2009.
To calculate the link specific cost parameter cTi j, we assume universal operating
cost of 0.3 e/tcm/100km for onshore pipelines. For offshore pipelines we assume
operating cost to be 50% higher to account for higher pressure and increased cost
of maintenance. These coefficients are then multiplied by the distance between the
nodes to obtain the link specific operating cost shown in Table A.4 column 4.
A.1.5 Investment
In the farsighted scenario we allow for investment in new capacity for links within EU
and in the pipelines for Russian gas. For additional capacities we add annualized
capacity cost to the operating cost. To obtain capacity expenditures for new projects
and enlargement of existing pipeline networks we refer to public sources for costs
estimates of the project consortia, which are supplemented by own estimates if
figures are unavailable. To simplify the analysis we abstract from economies of
scale and assume constant capacity cost. We use a rather high discount rate of
15% to translate capital expenditures into annualized capacity cost. This rate is
a common hurdle rate in the gas industry and reflects the real option nature of
the investment and depreciation. For those links where investment is possible,
transportation cost are given as: Ti j( fi j) = cTi j∗(min[ fi j, 0.75∗ki j]+1.2∗max[ fi j−0.75∗
ki j, 0]) + cKi j max[ fi j − ki j, 0], where c
K
i j denotes annualized capacity cost, measured
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Table A.4: Pipeline Network: Transit
Links Capacity Flow Operating Capacity needed




from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm] [e/tcm/a]
Transit outside EU
Russia Belarus 100 49.2 2.1 - Russia, Belarus
Russia RussiaN 165 0 2.3 - Russia
Russia RussiaS 240 8.9 2.1 - Russia
Russia UkraineE 415 109.1 2.0 - Russia, Ukraine
RussiaS UkraineE 200 24.6 1.2 - Russia, Ukraine
UkraineE Ukraine 122 95.1 2.5 12.6 Ukraine
TurkeyE Turkey 20 11.8 2.4 12.1 Turkey
Transit into (out of) EU
Algeria Italy 30.2 25.4 6.2 - Algeria*
Algeria SpainPort 12 9.2 4.5 - Algeria*
Libya Italy 11 9 4.7 - Libya*
Belarus Poland 33 31.3 1.4 8.9 Belarus*
Norway Belgium 15 12.2 5.2 - Norway*
Norway France 18.3 15.0 5.9 - Norway*
Norway Center 46 29.2 5.2 - Norway*
Norway UK 46.4 24.0 4.9 - Norway*
UkraineE Balkan 31.3 16.5 3.4 4. Ukraine*
Ukraine Center-East 105.8 77.0 1.9 9.5 Ukraine*
Ukraine Poland 5 3.2 1.2 6. Ukraine*
RussiaN Center 0 0 6.9 26.8 Russia*
Balkan Turkey 16.3 8.9 1.8 9.2 Turkey*
RussiaS Balkan 0 0 5.6 23.8 Russia*
RussiaS Turkey 16 8.9 4.8 11.9 Russia, Turkey
Transit within EU




within EU is free.
*In the fragmented
market both players
from the left column
are needed.
Belgium Center 26 1.0 0.6 3
Center-East Balkan 1.7 1 3.3 16.5
Center-East Center 77.8 18.4 2.4 12
Center-East Italy 37.0 21.3 2.7 13.5
Center France 28 4.3 1.4 7.1
Center Italy 20.2 9.1 3.5 17.3
Netherlands Belgium 53 10.7 0.5 2.6
Netherlands Center 80 11.7 0.6 3
Netherlands UK 15.3 7.0 1.0 3.5
Poland Center 31.4 24.4 3.2 16.1
UK Belgium 25.5 7.5 1.5 4.9
France SpainPort 4.7 1.1 3.2 15.8
Balkan Italy 0 0 3.9 28.5
Out of regional scope
Azerbaijan RussiaS 0 0 3.8 - Russia
Azerbaijan TurkeyE 4.5 4.5 2.4 - Turkey
Iran TurkeyE 7.2 7.2 1.2 - Turkey
Iraq TurkeyE 0 0 1.7 - Turkey
Kazakhstan Russia 0 0 5.1 - Russia
Kazakhstan RussiaS 32.3 32.3 3.6 - Russia
a In the farsighted scenario we allow for investments in the links within EU and in the pipelines for Russian gas.
b We list the players which are needed in the integrated market. We mark with a * those cases, where there is
a change for the fragmented market. Then both players from the left column are needed for access to a link.
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in e per tcm per year (for figures see Table A.4 column 5).
Chapter 2




This chapter is based on a joint paper with Franz Hubert.
Abstract
We study the impact of the liberalization of EU natural gas markets on the balance
of power between ‘local champions’, customers, and outside producers, such as
Russian Gazprom. We distinguish between two steps of the reform: 1. opening
access to transit pipes and 2. opening access to distribution systems, hence cus-
tomers. Using the Shapley value as a power index, we find a modest and rather
heterogeneous impact from the first step. The impact of the second step is much
larger and yields a clear pattern: all local champions lose, while all customers and
all outside producers gain. As one third of the losses of champions within EU leaks
to players abroad, current reforms might enhance the dominance of already pow-
erful outside producers. When network power is assessed with the nucleolus, in
contrast, full liberalization of access to customers does not benefit outside produc-
ers at all.
Keywords: Network Access, Natural Gas, Countervailing Power, Shapley Value,
Nucleolus
JEL class.: L1, L95
This paper is part of larger collaborative research project on the Eurasian gas network to which Onur
Cobanli made essential contributions. We are thankful to Johannes H. Reijnierse for providing us
with MATLAB code for calculating the nucleolus. We are also thankful for helpful comments from
participants at the annual meeting of Verein für Socialpolitik, UECE Lisbon Conference and IMA
Conference on Game Theory and its Applications.
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2.1 Introduction
In the early nineties the European gas industry looked like a patchwork of regional
monopolies. Typically, a state owned or tightly regulated domestic champion con-
trolled (i) local gas production, (ii) the high pressure transmission grid, hence, gas
transit, and (iii) the distribution networks, hence, access to local customers.37 When
taking up the challenge to develop this fragmented industry into an integrated and
competitive common market, the European Commission identified the liberaliza-
tion of access to gas pipelines as the key element for success. Transparent and fair
access to the bottle neck facility creates a level playing field, which will allow compe-
tition to flourish. It is expected that consumers will benefit from a diversified choice
of suppliers and competitive prices. But according to the Commission not only cus-
tomers are supposed to gain from open pipeline access: “An integrated market
also provides a more powerful bargaining position for European energy companies
when sourcing energy in global markets since there is a larger range of options
available as regards supply routes and better access to customers.” 38
Skeptics, however, point out that two thirds of the Union’s gas consumption is
imported from a small number of producers beyond EU jurisdiction. Russian
Gazprom, Algerian Sonatrach and Norwegian Statoil, which alone account for more
than three quarters of imports, have only negligible stakes in the intra-European
pipeline network. They derive market power from controlling the source, gas fields
outside the Union, not from owning pipelines within. In their opposition to the Com-
mission’s policy, national champions, and often their respective governments, claim
that a limited number of strong European market players is needed to counter the
power of these outside producers. It is argued that by dismantling the European
champions, the Commission fosters the dominance of outside producers.39
The notion that it takes strong buyers to create ‘countervailing power’ against pow-
erful sellers has been controversial among academic economists ever since it was
coined by Galbraith (1952). The literature on deregulation and liberalization tends
37Obviously, this is an idealized description, fitting nicely to France/GdF, Austria/OMV, Italy/Eni. In
Germany, however, there is E.ON-Ruhrgas, which faces a smaller rival Wintershall, and both have
only limited stakes in the distribution networks. When gas pipelines were privatized in Slovakia and
Czech Republic they were bought by foreign companies. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a
dominant player for most regions in Europe.
38Commission (2007a), p. 5.
39For a summary of the arguments see Commission (2007b)-Second Phase (public consultation).
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to emphasize potential efficiency gains. In the gas industry, however, sunk invest-
ment in gas fields and pipelines creates large quasi rents, so that a loss of bar-
gaining power can have a substantial impact on the distribution of welfare between
customers, regional champions and outside producers.
The theoretical literature has proposed several models of bargaining in vertical
structures, but it did not develop a canonical setting for the analysis of market power
in vertical structures.40 Previous studies on the impact of liberalization on the Eu-
ropean gas market used a non-cooperative approach, e.g. Golombek et al. (1995),
Boots et al. (2004), Egging and Gabriel (2006), and Holz et al. (2008). Notwith-
standing a number of differences, this literature analyzes the gas industry as a
succession of activities (production, transport, distribution), where the interaction
among players of the same level of activity is modeled as a non-cooperative game
either in linear prices or quantities. In addition, it is often assumed that the different
levels decide in a given order, which essentially implies that those who move first,
usually the producers, have the ability to commit, whereas those who move later,
i.e. transit countries or importers, have to follow.
As already pointed out in Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b) and Hubert and Orlova
(2014a) there are several conceptional shortcomings of this modeling strategy. The
distribution of market power depends on ad hoc assumptions on the type of in-
teraction at the different levels of the value chain and the ability to commit which
is determined by the sequencing of actions. Second, the literature assumes that
the players are setting either quantities or (linear) prices, whereas in reality, most
pipeline gas is delivered under negotiated, comprehensive price-quantity-contracts
(so called ‘take–or–pay’ provisions). This counter-factual assumption implies dou-
ble marginalization, an inefficiency, which is reduced if competition is enhanced
through liberalization. It is worth emphasizing that the contracts which are widely
used in the real world gas industry can exactly avoid this inefficiency. We suspect
that the non-cooperative literature underestimates the ability of the actors to make
efficient use of the existing pipeline system and, therefore, overestimates possible
efficiency gains from liberalization.
In this paper we analyze the inter-dependencies among the players as a cooper-
ative game. Thereby, we allow for comprehensive contracts and give none of the
players an a-priory strategic advantage. Instead, the power of a player is derived
40See among others Horn and Wolinsky (1988), Von Ungern-Sternberg (1996), Snyder (1998),
Chae and Heidhues (2004), Inderst and Wey (2003).
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endogenously, entirely determined by his control over gas fields, pipelines and cus-
tomers. In this way we also separate the issue of power from the issue of efficiency.
In our framework liberalizing pipeline access has no effect on the efficiency of the
industry, it will only affect the power structure. This allows us to focus on the alleged
trade-off between enhancing customer’s power on the one hand and keeping a lid
on the power of external producers on the other.
There are several solutions for cooperative games. In this paper the emphasis is on
the well known Shapley value. Following Shapley and Shubik (1954) the Shapley
value has regularly been used as a power index for voting games, both in political
science (Brams (2013)) as well as in corporate finance (Crama and Leruth (2013)).
Myerson (1980) initiated a literature, where the Shapley Value is applied to com-
munication structures and social networks, but so far only few attempts have been
made to investigate the power structure in industrial networks. The main alterna-
tive to the Shapley value is the core, which is however, difficult to use as it does not
yield a unique solution.41 Following Montero (2005), we consider the nucleolus as
an alternative power index. The nucleolus is of interest because it is in the core,
provided the core is not empty, and can be considered as the lexicographical center
of the game (Maschler et al. (1979)).
We are not concerned with the institutional details of liberalization, e.g. whether it
is achieved by ownership unbundling or by regulated third party access. However,
the distinction between access to high pressure trunk pipes, which are needed
for gas transit across Europe and access to low pressure distribution networks,
which allow for access to customers in a region, will be crucial. Conceptually, the
Commission does not draw such a distinction, though in practice, the liberalization
of transmission networks is advancing at a faster pace.42
To obtain a differentiated picture we start from a fragmented market in which re-
gional champions control local production, transmission, and access to local cus-
tomers. This scenario captures the stylized features before the onset of reforms.
In a first step, we consider the liberalization of access to the transmission net-
works. With free transit, we obtain a regime which we call an integrated market.
Local champions, as well as external producers, can ship their gas freely within the
41Later we will calibrate a model with 20 players. As a result the core is characterized by over a
million inequalities.
42In the year 2003 the Directive 2003/55/EC (EU (2003)) specified deadlines for legal unbundling
of July 2004 and July 2007 for transmission and distribution networks, respectively.
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Union, but the champions remain the gatekeepers of access to local customers.
This intermediate scenario roughly corresponds to the current status of the imple-
mentation of reforms. In a second step, we also allow for open access to distribution
networks, a scenario to which we refer as liberalized market. Here, the champions
are reduced to local producers, competing for customers against each other and
against the outside producers. We take this scenario to reflect the final aim of the
Commission’s liberalization policy.
Opening access to trunk pipes is likely to have very different effects on the power
structure than opening access to distribution pipes. Consider the example of Rus-
sian Gazprom planning to supply gas from the German/Polish border to a customer
in France. In a fragmented market, it needs the cooperation of the French champion
Gaz de France to access the customer, and the German champion E.ON-Ruhrgas
to transport the gas to France. Both partners will use their leverage to extract some
of the surplus of the deal between the external producer and the local customer. In
an integrated market, access to transmission networks is open and Gazprom can
do away with the German champion, but it still needs the cooperation of Gaz de
France to access the customer. Cutting out the German ‘middleman’ will benefit
Gazprom, Gaz de France, and the French customer. In this sense, Gaz de France
and its customers may gain from improved access to other producers outside and
inside the Union. However, the overall impact of market integration is more complex
because Gaz de France, as other regional champions, also loses its transit power.
A gas poor region with privileged location for Russian gas, such as Poland, will be
exposed to tougher competition from customers in other regions as gas is more
easily shipped away from its borders. On the other hand, it will also benefit from
easier access to alternative suppliers.43
Now consider the case, when, in addition to transit pipelines, access to the distri-
bution networks is liberalized. In such a fully liberalized market, Russian Gazprom
and the French customer can cut out both, the German and the French champion.
Regional champions lose the ability to extract rents from controlling transit and ac-
cess to customers and are reduced to their function as local producers. Customers
and outside producers will gain through improved access to suppliers and markets,
respectively. But it is difficult to imagine how such a move could strengthen the
bargaining position of European energy companies, as it is claimed by the Com-
mission’s statement cited above.
43These regional effects have been analyzed in detail in Hubert and Orlova (2014a).
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Our quantitative results support this intuition if network power is assessed with the
Shapley value. Overall, we find modest and heterogeneous effects for the opening
of access to transit pipelines. Customers in the union tend to gain. The exception
are customers in the Netherlands, which enjoyed a privileged position with respect
to ample local supplies in a fragmented market. Local champions in the central re-
gions providing transit for Russian and Norwegian gas lose bargaining power, while
those which are located more at the receiving end, e.g. Italy and France/Spain,
gain from improved suppliers access. All these effects, however, are fairly small
and the aggregate impact on the balance of power between customers and cham-
pions within the European Union on one side, and outside producers and transit
countries on the other side is negligible.
If we add the liberalization of access to distribution networks, thus moving on to a
completely liberalized market, the effects are amplified by order of magnitude and a
simple pattern emerges. Compared to the initial situation of a fragmented market,
the power of customers is substantially enhanced in all regions of the European
Union, while the power of the old champions, now reduced to local producers,
is dramatically diminished. Roughly a quarter of the joint share of the European
players is redistributed through the reform. However, more than a third of what is
taken from the champions ends up not with European customers, but with external
suppliers and transit countries. We do not find support for Galbraith’s controver-
sial hypothesis that customers would ultimately benefit from countervailing power.
Quite to the contrary, European customers do gain a lot from dismantling the power
of local champions, but there is also a very substantial ‘leakage’, benefiting outside
producers.44
When the nucleolus is used to measure the power structure, we again obtain a very
substantial redistribution through the full liberalization. Surprisingly however, with
the nucleolus outside producers do not benefit from ‘cutting out the middlemen’. All
the losses of the local champions are transferred to the European customers.
The focus on the power of external producers and use of a cooperative approach
44So far the liberalization of the gas sector has moved at low speed. According to our analysis the
move from a fragmented to an integrated market has small impact on the power distribution in the Gas
sector, which is in line with the limited empirical evidence (Haase and Bressers (2010)). However,
the next step towards a fully liberalized market has a large potential to enhance the power of outside
producers. This might justify protective measures, such as the strategic diversification of gas supplies
as analyzed in Hubert and Cobanli (2014), or the use of trade quotas as discussed in Ikonnikova and
Zwart (2014).
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separates this paper from previous literature on gas market reforms mentioned
above. Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011a), Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b) and Hu-
bert and Suleymanova (2008) pioneered the use of cooperative game theory in
the analysis of the gas industry. However, these papers consider a small sector in
North-Western Europe and focus on pipeline investments not on access rights. For
this paper we develop a much larger model of the natural gas network, covering the
whole of Europe and its major suppliers. Variants of this model are used in Hubert
and Orlova (2014a) to analyze the regional effect of market integration and the in-
centives for mergers and cartels and in Hubert and Cobanli (2014) to investigate
strategic pipeline investments. The present paper differs (a) in its focus on the dis-
tribution of power between customers and local champions and (b) in its analysis
of access to distribution systems.
Looking beyond gas and regulation, the paper contributes to a small strand of liter-
ature applying cooperative game theory to the analysis of vertical structures. There
exists a very substantial theoretical literature on the various solutions for cooper-
ative games, their relations among each other, possible non-cooperative founda-
tions, and computational issues. But with the notable exception of voting games
and the allocation of common cost, the latter being mainly normative, this sophisti-
cated theory had little impact on applied research. As a result, little is known about
the practical differences of the various solution concepts, their intuitive appeal in
the understanding of power relations, and their predictive power. Our results for
access regulation in the European gas network show that the Shapley value nicely
corresponds to the intuition that ‘cutting out the middlemen’ benefits both sides of
the market. The nucleolus in contrast, allocates all the increase in power only to
one side of the market, the customers.
2.2 The Approach
In this section we briefly describe the representation of the physical network, the
cooperative game, the solution concepts and the model calibration. More details
are given in the technical appendix at http://www.ms-hns.de/research gas and
at http://www.ms-hns.de/paper-network-access. While addressing a different
topic, this paper uses the same approach as Hubert and Orlova (2014a), Hubert
and Cobanli (2014), and Cobanli (2014). Hence, there is considerable overlap with
the corresponding sections in these papers, and the reader may skip it if familiar




The model of the Eurasian gas network consists of a set of nodes R, which may
be production sites RP , customers RC, or pipeline inter-connectors RT , and a set
of directed links L. Each link l = {i, j}, i , j ∈ R connects two nodes. Let fi j
denote gas flows, with negative values indicating a flow from j to i. For those links,
which connect a producer to the network or the network to a customer, flows have
to be positive ( fi j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ RP or j ∈ RC). Links between inter-connectors which
represent the trunk pipelines can be used in both directions. For each link {i, j} we
have a capacity limit ki j and link specific transportation cost Ti j( fi j), which includes
production cost in case of i ∈ RP. For existing capacities, transportation costs
consist only of operation costs, because investment costs are sunk. When allowing
for investments to increase ki j, the annualized capital costs for new capacities are
added to the transportation costs. Each customer is connected through a single
dedicated link to the network. So consumption at node j ∈ RC is equal to fi j. The
inverse demand is p j( fi j).
Game.
The inter-dependencies among the players can be represented by a game in value
function form (N, v), where N is the set of players and the value (or characteristic)
function v : 2|N| → R+ gives the maximal payoff, which a subset of players S ⊆ N,
also called coalition, can achieve. The legal and regulatory framework determines
the access rights of the various players. Access to the link {i, j}, i ∈ RP is equiv-
alent of having access to production at i. Access to {i, j}, j ∈ RC yields access to
customer j. For any coalition S ⊆ N we have to determine to which links L(S ) ⊆ L
the coalition S has access. The value function is obtained by maximizing the joint
surplus of the players in S using the gas-flows in the pipelines which are accessible
for S :
v(S ) := max
{ fi j |{i, j}∈L(S )}
 












j ft j, ∀ t ∈ RT (S ) (node-balancing)
| fi j| ≤ ki j, ∀ {i, j} ∈ L(S ) (capacity constraints)
fi j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ RP or j ∈ RC (non-negativity)
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The value function captures the essential economic features, such as the geogra-
phy of the network, different cost of alternative pipelines, demand for gas in the
different regions, production cost, etc. It also reflects the institutional framework,
such as ownership titles and access rights through its dependence on L(S ). By
defining a new system of access rights, each step of reform yields a new value
function.
Solutions.
Cooperative game theory has developed a number of solutions for games in value
function form. In the following we emphasize the Shapley value (Shapley (1953)),
which assigns a unique payoff to each player, ϕi, i ∈ N. It is based on the contri-
bution v(S ∪ i) − v(S ) which a player i can make to the various subgroups of other
players S . The Shapley Value nicely captures the intuition, that a player’s payoff
from cooperation, interpreted as his power in the game, should increase with his
importance for other players, as measured by the value of his contributions. For-




P(S ) [v(S ∪ i) − v(S )] (2.2)
where P(S ) = |S |! (|N | − |S | − 1)!/|N |! is the weight given to S . For convenience ϕ
denotes the vector of Shapley Values and ϕS =

i∈S ϕi the sum of Shapley Values
of a coalition S .
The other major solution concept for the cooperative games is the core. Let x be
a payoff vector and xS :=

i∈S xi be the total payment to the members of S . Here,
we consider only payoff vectors x which are efficient

i∈N xi = v(N) and individually
rational xi ≥ v(i), so called imputations I. The excess e is the difference between
what a coalition can achieve alone and what it receives e(S , x) := v(S ) − xS . The
larger the excess is, the ‘worse’ is the coalition doing under x. If the excess is
positive, the coalition should reject (block/veto) a proposed x, because it can do
better on its own. The core is the set of imputations for which no coalition has
positive excess: c(ϵ) := {x : e(S , x) ≤ 0, ∀S ⊂ N}.
If not empty, the core is typically not unique and its characterization through 2|N | − 2
inequalities is cumbersome if the number of players is large. Instead, we use the
nucleolus, which always exists, is unique and in the core if this is not empty. More-
over it can be interpreted as the lexicographic center of the game (Maschler et al.
(1979)). Originally, the nucleolus has been proposed as the imputation which min-
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imizes ‘inequity’ among coalitions (Schmeidler (1969)). Let θ(x) be the vector of
excesses arranged in decreasing order for a payoff vector x and let ⪯ stand for lex-
icographical smaller. The nucleolus, denoted µ, is defined as the imputation which
minimizes the excess in lexicographic ordering: µ := {x ∈ I : θ(x) ⪯ θ(y) for all y ∈ I}.
It can be computed by solving a nested sequence of linear optimization problems.
First excess is made minimal for the coalitions, which are doing worst. Then excess
is reduced for the coalitions, which come second, and so on.45
2.2.2 Specification & Calibration
Regional scope and players.
The biggest practical challenge is the calculation of the value function, for which we
have to solve 2|N| − 1 optimization problems. In order to economize on computing
time we have to limit the number of players |N |. So we leave out producers which
appear to be of minor strategic relevance and aggregate European regions into
larger areas.
As to outside producers we focus on Russia, Norway, Algeria, and Libya which
together cover about 85% of the gas imports into the European Union.46 We also
account for Belarus and Ukraine, which are major transit countries for Russian gas.
These producers and transit countries are represented by one player each.
We collect Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, and Serbia in one
region called “Center-East”. The countries in the region exhibit similar consumption
and import dependency patterns. With very little alternative supplies the region
depends with 80 % of its imports on Russia. While the pipeline networks are largely
privatized, some owned by Western importers, the Austrian OMV can be seen as
the dominant private supplier in the region. Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and
Luxembourg are bundled to “Center”. In terms of consumption the region is clearly
dominated by Germany, which is also home of large Gas suppliers E.ON-Ruhrgas
and Wintershall. The region covers more than three quarters of gas consumption by
imports, but its pipeline imports are well diversified between Russia (35%), Norway
(34%) and Netherlands (26%). We aggregate France, Spain and Portugal in a
region labeled “South-West”, which hosts two large champions, Gaz de France and
45In the terminology of operation research computation of the nucleolus is a ‘hard’ problem for
which we use an algorithm proposed by Potters et al. (1996) who also provided us with the MATLAB
code.
46Figures are calculated for the year 2009 from BP (2010).
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ENAGAS. More than half of the gas consumption in the region is covered by LNG
imports. Pipeline imports are diversified between Norway (39%), Algeria (18%) and
Russia (18%).
For Center-East, Center, and South-West, as well as for Netherlands and Italy, we
distinguish explicitly between a fictive regional champion and a fictive regional cus-
tomer. Only for these five regions, which together account for 71 % of the EU’s gas
consumption, we can analyze how liberalization affects customers as compared to
champions. Having only one player on each market side, we abstract from compe-
tition between different customers or different champions within the region.
There are four more regions which are represented by one player only. Belgium,
Poland and UK correspond to their respective countries. Finally, we collect Roma-
nia, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey in a region called “Turkey & Balkan”. The region
has only weak links to other European regions and imports mainly Russian gas.
For these regions we can only identify ‘regional’ effects. With these aggregations
and simplifications we are left with 20 players, hence a little more than a million
possible coalitions.
Regarding access rights, we assume that outside EU every country has unre-
stricted control over its pipelines, customers and gas fields. Hence a coalition,
which does not include Russia, has no access to Russian gas. If it does not include
Ukraine, Ukraine’s transit pipelines cannot be used to transport gas from Russia
to Europe etc. Access to resources and consumers within Europe depends on
the regulatory regime. Under any scenario the local champion enjoys exclusive
ownership of local gas production and import terminals for liquefied natural gas
(LNG-imports). In a fragmented market we need the local champion also to ac-
cess transit pipes and local customers. In an integrated market, European transit
pipelines are available to all players, but a local customer can only be reached with
the collaboration of the local champion. Only in the fully liberalized market, the lo-
cal champion is reduced to his role as local producer and LNG-importer, while local
customers can access all suppliers on their own.
Temporal scope / network flexibility.
We assume a stationary environment with constant demand, technology and pro-
duction cost etc. The value of a coalition, nevertheless, depends on the temporal
scope of the model. In the short run, the architecture and the capacities of the
network are given, but in the long run the network is flexible.
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First we consider a rather short time horizon of one year up to perhaps three years.
Such a period allows to ignore the seasonal pattern of demand and the possibility
of gas storage.47 It is also long enough to convert existing pipeline to bidirectional
usage but too short to build new pipelines or develop new fields. We refer to this
variant as the ‘status-quo’ variant, because pipeline capacities are static. It can
also be interpreted as a ‘shortsighted’ assessment of power, because the effects
of adjustments which take longer than two or three years to be achieved are simply
ignored.
We reckon that decision makers, when assessing bargaining power, may look be-
yond such a short period. To assess the robustness of our results, we also consider
a longer time span. Here we envisage a scenario in which transport capacities can
be increased so that the network capacity is flexible. As these investments will take
at least a couple of years to become effective, we consider a period starting some
three years ahead from the date for which we assess the power structure. We refer
to this variant as flexible network, because a coalition can use (almost) all invest-
ment possibilities to enhance its value. It can be also considered as a ‘farsighted’
assessment of power because it ignores the period which is needed to bring new
capacities on stream.48
Cost and demand.
The details of the numerical calibration are given in a technical appendix. Here we
outline only the main principles. We assume piece-wise linear production cost for
each producer and linear demand functions with the same intercept for all regions.
The model is calibrated using data on consumption in the regions and flows be-
tween the regions from 2009. Production cost have a common base, to which we
make minor regional adjustments to replicate flows in 2009. The slope parameters
of demand are estimated as to replicate the consumption in 2009. The most impor-
tant implication of our calibration of demand in relation to cost is that the pipeline
47In Europe storage facilities help to smooth seasonal patterns of consumption, but at present they
are too low to act as a strategic reserve for longer periods.
48The distinction between status-quo/shortsighted and flexible/farsighted is borrowed from Hubert
and Ikonnikova (2011b). It is worth remembering that many gas contracts are long-term covering
periods from 5 to 20 years, so we would expect that the conditions agreed on, reflect long term
considerations. On the other hand, the further one projects into the future, the more uncertain the
prospects become, so that the clearer short term options may exert a stronger influence on relative
power.
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system as existing in 2009 is sufficient. Given the willingness to pay and the cost
of supplying gas the network is able to deliver the efficient amount of gas into the
different consumption nodes. Nevertheless, the options to change the network will
affect bargaining power in a long-term assessment, because it enables coalitions,
which do not have access to the full network, to adjust their sub-network to their
needs.
The calibration ensures that the main difference between customers is the size as
measured by total consumption, and network connection on which we have solid
information. The main difference between producers is production capacity and
pipeline connections to the markets, for which data are good, and not differences
in wellhead production cost, which are difficult to estimate. The overall size of the
surplus is largely determined by our assumption on the difference between the com-
mon supply cost and the common demand intercept. We discuss the robustness of
our results with respect to changes in these parameters at the end.
2.3 Network Access and Power
We imagine the liberalization of the European market for natural gas to be achieved
in two steps: first, by opening access to high pressure trunk pipes, and second by
liberalizing access to low pressure distribution networks. So we compute the value
function for three access regimes: the fragmented market v0, the integrated market
v1 and the fully liberalized market v2. Then we solve the games, either with the
Shapley value ϕ or the nucleolus µ, and compute three differences: the impact
of trunk pipe liberalization (∆ϕ1 = ϕ(v1) − ϕ(v0)), the incremental impact of access
to distribution networks (∆ϕ2 = ϕ(v2) − ϕ(v1)), and the total impact of the ongoing
reforms (∆ϕ12 = ϕ(v2) − ϕ(v0)). The corresponding values for the nucleolus are ∆µ1,
∆µ2, and ∆µ12.
Before we look at the details for individual players, we assess the importance of the
reforms. As liberalization will benefit some of the market participants while hurting
others, its overall impact can be measured by the fraction of the surplus, which is
redistributed as a result of the reforms. Summing up the gains for those who benefit
(or the losses of those who are hurt) we obtain one figure R j, j ∈ {1, 2, 12}, for each
of the three differences mentioned above.49
49Our focus is on the impact of liberalization, hence the differences in the power index. These
differences are the same whether we normalize the game or not. When looking at the fraction of
surplus which is redistributed, we refer to the surplus of the non-normalized game.
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Table 2.1: Overall Impact (Shapley Value)
Redistribution in per cent of initial share







All players 2.0 12.4 13.0
100 ∗ R j/v0(N)
European players only 4.0 25.4 26.6
100 ∗ R j/ϕEU(v0)
We first report our point estimates for one particular calibration of the model: the
short-sighted or status-quo variant, in which pipeline capacities are given. We also
assume a rather large difference of 1500 Euro between demand intercept and sup-
ply cost. Then we briefly discuss the robustness of the results as to changes of
parameters and scope. All figures are rounded to the first decimal.
2.3.1 Shapley Value
Table 2.1 displays the redistribution as a percentage of the initial rent of all players
v0(N) and as a percentage of the joint shares of the EU players before the reform,
ϕEU(v0). The figures show that the total impact of the reforms on the European
gas market will be quite substantial. The rent which some players lose, and others
gain, through the full liberalization adds up to 13% of the total rent or to one quarter
of the joint rents of the European players. The second step, the liberalization of
access to distribution networks, appears to be decisive. Its incremental impact is
six times larger than that of the initial step, the opening of access to trunk-pipes.50
Liberalization had progressed slowly during a time when the European gas market
was subjected to several outside shocks, first the long international boom before
2008, then the fallout of the financial crisis, then the shale gas revolution. The
comparably modest impact of the first step will make it difficult to trace results in
empirical data so far (Haase and Bressers (2010)). But from the failure to do so
one must not conclude that future steps have little impact as well.
The two steps differ not only in their overall relevance, they also affect the various
players in markedly different ways. In table 2.2 we report the gains and losses,
50Since the direction of redistribution is reversed in some cases, the final volume of redistribution is
not the sum of the two incremental effects.
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Table 2.2: Liberalization and Power-Structure (Shapley Value)
Change of Shapley Value [ percentage of all gains ]







100 ∗ ∆ϕ1/R12 100 ∗ ∆ϕ2/R12 100 ∗ ∆ϕ12/R12
Outside Countries
Russia −7.0 14.7 7.7
Belarus 3.1 −0.4 2.7
Ukraine 1.9 0.4 2.4
Algeria −0.5 6.8 6.3
Libya 0.0 1.6 1.7
Norway 0.9 11.6 12.5
Netherlands 0.2 1.3 1.5
champion 0.3 −6.6 −6.3
customers −0.1 7.9 7.8
Center-Easta 1.4 −5.3 −3.9
champion −0.6 −13.0 −13.6
customers 1.9 7.7 9.6
Italy 3.8 −9.6 −5.8
champion 1.1 −23.1 −21.9
customers 2.7 13.4 16.1
Centerb −5.9 −12.6 −18.5
champion −6.6 −30.8 −37.4
customers 0.7 18.2 18.9
South-Westc 1.5 −7.8 −6.3
champion 0.7 −19.7 −19.0
customers 0.7 11.9 12.6
Poland 0.1 −0.6 −0.4
Belgium −0.4 −1.0 −1.4
United Kingdom 0.1 1.2 1.3
Turkey & Balkand 0.7 −0.3 0.4
all champions −5.1 −93.1 −98.2
all customers 5.9 59.1 65.1
European Unione 1.5 −34.7 −33.2
a Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
b Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
c France, Spain and Portugal
d Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
e Including Turkey
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now measured in percentage of the overall redistribution of the full reform (R12).
For convenience we also report the aggregated figures for some groups of players
(given in italics). In the first column we give the figures for the impact of opening
access to trunk pipes. The move from a fragmented to an integrated market figures
yields rather heterogeneous effects. Within Europe, we observe the strongest effect
for the champion in Center : a loss of well over six percentage points. The region is
well connected to competing suppliers, Russia, Norway, Netherlands, hence there
is little to gain from improved access to additional suppliers. At the same time
its strategic location with respect to gas shipments earned him substantial transit
rents, which are now lost.51 Champions which are located more at the periphery,
e.g. in Italy or in the South-West, gain more from improved access to suppliers
than they suffer from the loss of transit rents. The customers in the Union tend to
gain. Altogether they improve by almost 6 per percentage points, which is a little
more than what the champions lose. The only exception are the customers in the
Netherlands, which, given ample local supplies, enjoyed a privileged position in the
fragmented market.
Considering customers and champions together, we find some regional redistribu-
tion within the Union. The Center loses power while Italy and the South-West gain
power. The liberalization of trunk pipes becomes effective only for those within the
jurisdiction of the EU. Access to pipelines in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus is still
exclusive. Nevertheless we find a rather strong regional redistribution outside the
Union. Russia loses 7 percentage points, the largest figure in this column. This
big loss of an outside producer is largely compensated by gains of Ukraine and Be-
larus, as well as Norway, Russia’s strongest competitor. Belarus has no own natural
gas production and Ukraine consumes much more than it produces. Both countries
totally depend on Russia for their very substantial imports. With the liberalization
of shipment through the EU they can more easily access gas from Norway, which
increases their bargaining power vis-a-vis Russia.
Overall, the first step of reforms produces modest redistribution from champions
to customers within the Union, but there is no rent leakage to outside countries.
Instead, there is even a small gain of the Union.
51At first glance Center’s role as a transit region may appear to be modest. With 4.3 bcm/a and 9.1
bcm/a gas flows through Center to France and to Italy, respectively, are not particular large. However,
the region is Europe’s most important potential gas hub. Whenever one of the major producers is
taken out of the picture, Center becomes an important transit region. For more details see Hubert
and Orlova (2014a).
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The picture changes dramatically when moving on to the second step, the liberal-
ization of access to the distribution systems. With the notable exception of transit
regions such as Ukraine, Belarus and to a smaller extent Turkey& Balkan, the incre-
mental impact of this step is much larger, sometimes by order of magnitude, and
clearly dominates the total effect. Thus, we confine our interpretation to the last
column in table 2.2, which describes the effect of both steps together.
Here we find a very clear pattern. All champions lose and their aggregated losses
amount to 98 percent of the total volume of redistribution. Essentially, the full lib-
eralization of pipeline access in the EU has one big effect: it destroys much of the
market power of the established regional champions, which apparently depended
more on controlling access to local customers than on controlling transit. This is
true even for those champions which gained from improved access to alternative
supplies or additional customers during the first phase of the reform, such as Ital-
ien Eni. Its initial gain of 1.1 percentage points turns into a loss of 21.9 points, the
second biggest loss of all. It is only surpassed by the Center’s champion, whose
initial loss of 6.6 points is amplified to a loss of 37.4 percentage points.52
Dismantling the power of regional champions is, first of all, to the benefit of the
customers. In all the regions customers gain from full liberalization, often by order
of magnitude more than from liberalizing only transit. With the exception of Nether-
lands, however, the customers gain less than the champions lose. On average, one
third, of what is taken away from the champions does not end up with customers but
leaks to players outside the Union, with Norway, Russia and Algeria being the main
beneficiaries.53 Even for Russia, which was quite badly hurt from opening transit
pipelines, the losses turn into a substantial net gain. Being able to sell gas directly
to its customers turns out to be much more valuable than the partial protection
against competing suppliers, which it enjoyed in the fragmented market.
Taken together, these results suggest that the Commission’s claim quoted in the
introduction has some merit for the first step of reform. Liberalizing access to the
high pressure transmission system strengthens the bargaining power of at least
52This last figure, however, has to be interpreted with care. As mentioned before, assuming only
one champion for the central region is a rather strong simplification as we have at least two sub-
stantial players, E.ON-Ruhrgas and Wintershall, in reality. In addition, these players had only rather
incomplete control of distribution networks before the reforms.
53Apart from that, there is only very limited regional redistribution from Poland and Belgium on
one side to the UK and the Balkans on the other. These are regions, for which we did not separate
between customers and champions.
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Table 2.3: Robustness: Overall Impact (Shapley Value)
Redistribution in per cent of initial share







min max min max min max
All players 1.9 2.0 12.0 13.4 12.6 13.7
100 ∗ R j/v0(N)
European players only 3.8 4.0 24.7 27.2 26.0 27.9
100 ∗ R j/ϕEU(v0)
some European Energy companies. However, it is grossly misleading for the sec-
ond step. The liberalization of access to the distribution systems clearly weakens
the old incumbents through tougher competition both among each other as well as
with outside producers. If power is assessed with the Shapley value, we also find
support for concerns about the dominance of outside producers. For every two Eu-
ros which European customers gain in bargaining power, one Euro leaks to players
outside the Union.
Robustness.
In this section we briefly assess the robustness of the previous results by consid-
ering three more variants. First, we changed the temporal scope of the analysis
by analyzing a ‘flexible’ network, in which the capacities of the pipelines can be
increased through investment. This change does not affect the overall surplus from
the gas trade, but it has a considerable impact on the relative bargaining power
of the different players. Second, we reduced the difference between the common
supply cost and the demand intercept, hence the absolute surplus from gas trade,
by two thirds, both for the static and the flexible network. We express all our results
as percentage of surplus, which tends to neutralize the re-scaling of the surplus.
Nevertheless, the power-structure is affected because transportation and invest-
ment cost have a larger impact when the difference between demand intercept and
supply cost is reduced.
Instead of going in detail through all these variants, we simply report the minimal
and maximal values achieved in any of the four variants in tables 2.3 and 2.4, which
correspond to tables 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. The differences between the max-
imal values in any of the variants and the corresponding minimal values are sur-
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Table 2.4: Robustness: Power-Structure (Shapley Value)
Change of Shapley Value [ percentage of all gains ]







min max min max min max
Outside Countries
Russia −7.2 −6.9 14.5 16.7 7.5 9.5
Belarus 3.1 3.2 −0.8 −0.4 2.2 2.7
Ukraine 1.8 2.0 −0.9 0.4 0.8 2.4
Algeria −0.5 0.1 5.1 6.9 5.2 6.5
Libya 0.0 0.2 1.3 1.7 1.5 1.8
Norway 0.9 1.1 10.0 12.1 10.9 13.1
Netherlands 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.6 1.2 1.8
champion 0.3 0.4 −7.3 −6.2 −7.0 −5.8
customers −0.2 −0.1 7.8 8.3 7.6 8.2
Center-Easta 1.4 1.9 −5.3 −4.6 −3.9 −2.7
champion −0.6 0.2 −13.0 −12.5 −13.6 −12.3
customers 1.8 2.0 7.7 7.9 9.6 9.7
Italy 2.8 3.8 −9.7 −8.4 −6.0 −5.6
champion 0.5 1.1 −23.1 −22.4 −22.0 −21.7
customers 2.2 2.7 13.3 14.0 15.9 16.1
Centerb −6.1 −5.7 −12.6 −11.2 −18.7 −16.9
champion −6.8 −6.3 −30.8 −29.9 −37.5 −36.2
customers 0.6 0.7 18.1 18.8 18.8 19.3
South-Westc 1.1 1.5 −7.9 −7.3 −6.4 −6.3
champion 0.6 0.7 −21.8 −19.7 −21.2 −19.0
customers 0.5 0.8 11.9 14.5 12.6 14.9
Poland −0.1 0.1 −0.6 −0.5 −0.6 −0.4
Belgium −0.5 −0.2 −1.1 −0.8 −1.6 −1.0
United Kingdom −0.1 0.1 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.3
Turkey & Balkand 0.7 0.9 −0.5 −0.3 0.4 0.5
all champions −5.3 −4.6 −93.9 −92.6 −98.5 −97.9
all customers 4.9 6.0 58.8 63.3 64.7 68.2
European Unione 0.7 1.5 −34.9 −31.3 −33.9 −30.2
a Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
b Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
c France, Spain and Portugal
d Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
e Including Turkey
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Table 2.5: Overall Impact (nucleolus)
Redistribution in per cent of initial share







All players 2.0 16.1 18.1
100 ∗ R j/v0(N)
European players only 4.0 31.8 35.7
100 ∗ R j/µEU(v0)
prisingly small. With minor modifications all previous statements could be repeated
independently of whether we take the largest or smallest value.
Take for example the overall impact of full liberalization (table 2.3). Depending on
the variant, it redistributes between 26 and 27.9 per cent — or roughly a quarter of
the joint rent of all European players. The overall effect is clearly dominated by the
impact of opening access to distribution systems, the incremental impact of which
is about six times larger than that of the first step. If we look at the power structure
(table 2.4) we again find that the players in the Union gain between 0.7 and 1.5
percentage points from the first step — a negligible amount. In contrast, they lose
between 30.2 and 33.9 points, i.e. roughly a third, from the full implementation of
reforms.
These observations suggest that our results for the change in power as measured
by the the Shapley are robust with respect to changes in the parameters of the
model. We turn next to the question, whether they are also robust with respect to
the solution concept.
2.3.2 Nucleolus
Opening access to pipelines will increase the value for some coalitions. Others
might be unaffected, but the value of a coalition will never be reduced. Hence,
the excess will (weakly) increase and the core will be compressed. Unfortunately,
the core is characterized by over a million of inequalities which makes it difficult to
identify patterns of change. Instead, we use the nucleolus, a unique point within
the core, as an indicator for the impact of liberalization.
The pattern of the aggregated impact looks similar for the nucleolus and for the
Shapley value (compare tables 2.5 and 2.1). The impact of the first step is essen-
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Table 2.6: Liberalization and Power-Structure (nucleolus)
Change of nucleolus [ percentage of all gains ]







100 ∗ ∆µ1/R12 100 ∗ ∆µ2/R12 100 ∗ ∆µ12/R12
Outside Countries
Russia −4.9 0.0 −5.0
Belarus 0.1 0.0 0.1
Ukraine 1.7 0.0 1.7
Algeria 0.1 0.0 0.1
Libya 0.1 0.0 0.1
Norway 0.2 0.0 0.2
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 0.1
champion −1.4 −12.6 −14.0
customers 1.4 12.6 14.1
Center-Easta 0.3 0.0 0.3
champion −1.0 −10.8 −11.8
customers 1.3 10.8 12.1
Italy 0.0 0.0 0.1
champion −1.6 −19.7 −21.3
customers 1.6 19.7 21.4
Centerb −0.3 0.0 −0.3
champion −2.1 −27.3 −29.5
customers 1.9 27.4 29.2
South-Westc 0.1 0.0 0.1
champion 0.0 −18.3 −18.3
customers 0.1 18.3 18.4
Poland 0.0 0.0 0.0
Belgium 0.0 0.0 0.0
United Kingdom −0.2 0.0 −0.2
Turkey & Balkand 2.6 0.0 2.6
all champions −6.0 −88.8 −94.9
all customers 6.3 88.9 95.1
European Unione 2.7 0.1 2.8
a Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
b Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
c France, Spain and Portugal
d Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
e Including Turkey
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Table 2.7: Robustness: Overall Impact (nucleolus)
Redistribution in per cent of initial share







min max min max min max
All players 0.9 2.0 15.3 16.6 16.6 18.1
100 ∗ R j/v0(N)
European players only 1.8 4.0 30.7 32.7 33.2 35.7
100 ∗ R j/µEU(v0)
tially of equal magnitude and in both cases the second step appears decisive. For
the nucleolus the increment of the second step is even more significant, redistribut-
ing 16.1 per cent of total surplus instead of 12.4. Moreover for the nucleolus, the
two steps work into the same direction, wheres there was some partial offset un-
der the Shapley value. As a result, the aggregate impact of both steps together is
stronger. If power is measured with the nucleolus, redistribution through full liber-
alization, is equal to 18.1 per cent of the total surplus, or 35.7 per cent of the joint
share of the EU players.
A closer look at the power structure, however, reveals striking differences between
the two solutions (compare tables 2.6 and 2.2). The impact of the first step, free
access to transit pipelines, is still similar. With the nucleolus the champions lose 6
percentage points compared to 5.1 under the Shapley value. Customers gain 6.3
compared to 5.9. There is some redistribution between regions resulting in a gain
of 2.7 percentage points by the European Union. As before, Russia is the biggest
single loser, but the effect on outside producers and transit countries tends to be
smaller in magnitude.
The surprising differences come from the liberalization of access to distribution
systems, hence, customers. For the nucleolus, there are essentially no effects on
outside producers and transit countries, while there is a massive redistribution of
surplus from champions to customers within the Union. The effect of the second
step on customers and champions is again larger by order of magnitude. For exam-
ple, the Italian champion loses 1.6 points with the first step and another 19.7 points
with the second; for Center the corresponding losses are 2.1 and 27.3. In contrast
to the Shapley value, whatever the champions lose in the second step is now gained
by their respective customers. There are no additional regional effects within the
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Table 2.8: Robustness: Power-Structure (nucleolus)
Change of Nucleolus [ percentage of all gains ]







min max min max min max
Outside Countries
Russia −4.9 −2.8 −0.2 0.0 −5.0 −2.8
Belarus 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
Ukraine 0.4 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.7
Algeria 0.1 0.4 −0.1 0.0 0.1 0.3
Libya 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
Norway 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7
Netherlands 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2
champion −1.4 0.0 −13.1 −12.6 −14.0 −13.0
customers 0.1 1.4 12.6 13.0 13.2 14.1
Center-Easta 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3
champion −1.0 0.2 −11.2 −10.8 −11.8 −11.0
customers 0.1 1.3 10.8 11.2 11.3 12.1
Italy −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2 0.1
champion −1.6 −0.5 −20.4 −19.7 −21.3 −20.9
customers 0.2 1.6 19.7 20.4 20.7 21.4
Centerb −0.8 −0.3 0.0 0.1 −0.8 −0.3
champion −2.1 −1.3 −28.3 −27.3 −29.8 −29.2
customers 0.5 1.9 27.4 28.3 28.9 29.2
South-Westc 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3
champion −0.2 0.1 −21.9 −18.3 −22.1 −18.3
customers 0.1 0.3 18.3 22.0 18.4 22.2
Poland 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Belgium 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
United Kingdom −0.5 −0.2 0.0 0.0 −0.5 −0.2
Turkey & Balkand 1.6 2.6 0.0 0.1 1.7 2.6
all champions −6.0 −1.6 −94.7 −88.8 −97.0 −94.6
all customers 1.2 6.3 88.9 94.9 94.4 97.1
European Unione 0.8 2.7 0.1 0.3 1.1 2.8
a Austria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Serbia
b Germany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
c France, Spain and Portugal
d Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
e Including Turkey
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Union or spillovers to players outside. In spite of a dense pipeline network, liberal-
izing access to customers appears to be a local affair under the nucleolus. It affects
the power distribution only in the respective region. Although, access liberalization
‘cuts out the middlemen’, outside producers and transit countries cannot benefit, if
market power is measured by the nucleolus.
Robustness.
We again check the robustness of the results with respect to changes in demand
and network flexibility. As before we report only the smallest and largest values of
all variants (tables 2.7 and 2.8). While the numbers change slightly, all qualitative
statements of the previous section remain. In particular, the rent, which is redis-
tributed through the full liberalization constitutes roughly a third of the joint share of
EU players for all scenarios and the second step is clearly decisive. The smaller
regional effects result entirely from liberalizing transit, while opening access to cus-
tomers redistributes power at a large scale, but only within the region.
2.4 Conclusion
Opening access to bottleneck facilities such as electric power grids, rail tracks,
communication lines and pipeline systems has been a corner stone of market liber-
alization and deregulation of network based industries throughout the last decades.
Moreover, in the European Union, open network access is also necessary to over-
come the national and regional fragmentation of the respective industries, hence,
for the establishment of a common market. The general thrust has been to limit
public regulation to the network itself, a natural monopoly, and allow for free com-
petition in the provision of services or commodities using the network. It is argued
that such liberalization increases the efficiency of the industry and that customers
gain from enhanced competition between service providers.
However, the natural gas industry in Europe is peculiar in the sense that a small
number of external suppliers such as Russian Gazprom or Norwegian Statoil will
retain substantial market power through their control of gas fields beyond the juris-
diction of the EU. Given this dependency on few outside producers, a policy which
weakens the national champions within the Union might enhance the market power
of external suppliers. The Commission argues to the contrary, claiming that Eu-
ropean energy companies might even gain from better access to customers and
more diverse supply options.
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In this paper we studied the impact of liberalization on the balance of power be-
tween regional champions, customers and outside producers differentiating be-
tween opening access to trunk pipes and additionally liberalizing access to distribu-
tion systems, hence customers. Access to trunk pipes, here considered to be the
first step of reform, allows for free transit of gas within EU and moves the industry
from a fragmented to an integrated market. In a second step access to distribution
networks is also opened which establishes a fully liberalized market. In contrast
to earlier studies, we use cooperative game theory which allows us to derive the
power of the players endogenously from their role in the network without resorting
to ad hoc assumptions about the nature of the strategic interaction. All our results
are reasonably robust with respect to changes in the model calibration but it makes
a substantial difference whether we assess network power with the Shapley Value
or with the nucleolus.
For the Shapley value we find a heterogeneous impact of the first step of reform on
the power structure. Overall, there is modest redistribution from champions to cus-
tomers, but there is no leakage of power to outside producers. The picture changes
dramatically with the second step. The incremental impact of the liberalization of
access to customers clearly dominates the total effect. In a fully liberalized mar-
ket the power of all European champions is decreased. Dismantling the power of
champions is to the benefit of customers, but approximately one third of champi-
ons’ losses leaks to external suppliers, whose power is increased substantially. The
interpretation is straightforward. In a fragmented market, local champions secure
their position as ‘middlemen’ through their control of pipelines. Liberalization essen-
tially ‘cuts out the middlemen’ to the benefit of customers and external producers.
If we use the nucleolus as the power index, the pattern of power redistribution from
the first step of reform is similar and again the second step turns out to be decisive.
However, the pattern for the second step of reform is strikingly different. While local
champions are again badly hurt, their losses are transferred one to one to their
respective customers. For all other players the incremental effect of this step is
essentially zero. As a result, outside producers would not benefit from liberalized
access to customers if market power is assessed with the nucleolus. This finding
clearly contradicts the intuition gained from the ‘middlemen’ story.
In a nutshell: independently of whether power is assessed with the nucleolus or the
Shapley value, we do not find support for the claim that European energy compa-
nies might be strengthened through full liberalization of pipeline access. Quite to
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the contrary, under both solutions they will eventually lose a very substantial part
of their original power. Whether powerful outside producers are able to appropriate
part of this loss, in contrast, depends entirely on the solution concept.
It is beyond the scope of this paper, to investigate which of the two concepts yields
better empirical predictions. As the liberalization developed slowly over the last fif-
teen years, it seems impossible to disentangle its impact from the effects of changes
in LNG supplies, new pipeline links and the business cycle. There is, however,
some evidence that the Shapley value is a better predictor for this industry ob-
tained from transit agreements between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus (Hubert and
Ikonnikova (2011b)) and from recent investments in strategic pipelines (Hubert and
Cobanli (2014)). Hence, the possibility that the power of external producers is en-
hanced by Europe’s liberalization of pipeline access is not to be easily dismissed.
Appendix B
B.1 Calibration
For this paper the explanation of the calibration is the same as for the paper ”Com-
petition or Countervailing Power for the European Gas Market”. To avoid repetition
of the text, we report only tables.
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Table B.1: Pipeline Network: Consumption links
Links Consumption Slope Players
baseline low needed
[bcm/a] scenario surplus for
a = 1500 a = 500 accessa
from to fi j b j b j
Russia RussiaC 426.4 3.5 1.2 Russia
Belarus BelarusC 17.9 83.9 28.0 Belarus
Ukraine UkraineC 53.3 28.1 9.4 Ukraine
Belgium BelgiumC 16.9 88.9 29.6 Belgium
Poland PolandC 16.0 93.8 31.3 Poland
UK UKC 90.5 16.6 5.5 UK
Balkanb BalkanC 20.2 74.3 24.8 Turkey & Balkanc
Turkey TurkeyC 36.4 41.2 13.7 Turkey & Balkan
Regions with champion and customers






Center-Easte Center-EastC 41.4 36.2 12.1
Italy ItalyC 75.6 19.8 6.6
Netherlands NetherlandsC 48.3 31.1 10.4
South-West
France FranceC 44.1 34.0 11.3
SpainPortf SpainPortC 38.8 38.6 12.9
a We list the players which are needed in the fragmented and the integrated market. We mark with a * those
cases, where there is a change for the liberalized market. In the liberalized market only customers in a region are
needed for the access to the consumption link.
b Romania, Bulgaria and Greece
c Balkan and Turkey are aggregated into one player ’Turkey & Balkan’.
d Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and Luxembourg
e Austria, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Serbia, Slovenia
f Spain, Portugal
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Table B.2: Pipeline Network: Production links
Links Capacity Flow Operating Players
Cost needed
cP + ∆i j for access
from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm]
Production outside EU
RussiaP Russia 650.8 550.5 cP Russia
NorwayP Norway 99.4 99.4 cP − 7 Norway
AlgeriaP Algeria 77.7 77.7 cP − 5 Algeria
LibyaP Libya 15.9 15.9 cP − 8.8 Libya
BelarusP Belarus 0.2 0.2 0 Belarus
UkraineP Ukraine 21.9 21.9 0 Ukraine
Production within EU
BalkanP Balkan 10.8 10.8 0 Turkey & Balkana
BelgiumP Belgium 0 0 0 Belgium
CenterEastP CenterEast 4.9 4.9 0 champion in CenterEast
FranceP France 0.9 0.9 0 champion in South-Westb
CenterP Center 23.7 23.7 0 champion in Center
ItalyP Italy 8.1 8.1 0 champion in Italy
NetherlandsP Netherlands 78.7 78.7 cP − 4.4 champion in Netherlands
PolandP Poland 5.8 5.8 0 Poland
SpainPortP SpainPort 0 0 0 champion in South-West
TurkeyP Turkey 0.7 0.7 0 Turkey & Balkan
UKP UK 62.1 62.1 0 UK
a Balkan and Turkey are aggregated into one player ’Turkey & Balkan’.
b Spain, Portugal and France are aggregated into one region South-West.
Table B.3: Pipeline Network: LNG links
Links Capacity Flow Operatinga Players
Cost needed
cP + ∆i j for access
from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm]
BalkanLNG Balkan 0.8 0.8 2cP Turkey & Balkanb
BelgiumLNG Belgium 3 3 2cP Belgium
FranceLNG France 10.1 10.1 2cP champion in South-Westc
CenterLNG Center 0 0 2cP champion in Center
ItalyLNG Italy 2.9 2.9 2cP champion in Italy
NetherlandsLNG Netherlands 0 0 2cP champion in Netherlands
PolandLNG Poland 0 0 2cP Poland
SpainPortLNG SpainPort 28.5 28.5 2cP champion in South-West
TurkeyLNG Turkey 6.1 6.1 2cP Turkey & Balkan
UKLNG UK 10.1 10.1 2cP UK
a The global parameter cP is set equal to 20. We give the unit cost for flows up to 75% of the capacity. For the
remaining 25% of capacity the numbers are increased by 20%.
b Balkan and Turkey are aggregated into player ’Turkey & Balkan’.
c Spain, Portugal and France are aggregated into one region South-West.
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Table B.4: Pipeline Network: Transit




i j for access
b
from to [bcm/a] [bcm/a] [e/tcm] [e/tcm/a]
Transit outside EU
Russia Belarus 100 49.2 2.1 - Russia, Belarus
Russia RussiaN 165 0 2.3 - Russia
Russia RussiaS 240 8.9 2.1 - Russia
Russia UkraineE 415 109.1 2.0 - Russia, Ukraine
RussiaS UkraineE 200 24.6 1.2 - Russia, Ukraine
UkraineE Ukraine 122 95.1 2.5 12.6 Ukraine
TurkeyE Turkey 20 11.8 2.4 12.1 Turkey & Balkanc
Transit into (out of) EU
Algeria Italy 30.2 25.4 6.2 - Algeria*
Algeria SpainPort 12 9.2 4.5 - Algeria*
Libya Italy 11 9.0 4.7 - Libya*
Belarus Poland 33 31.3 1.4 8.9 Belarus*
Norway Belgium 15 12.2 5.2 - Norway*
Norway France 18.3 15.0 5.9 - Norway*
Norway Center 46 29.2 5.2 - Norway*
Norway UK 46.4 24.0 4.9 - Norway*
UkraineE Balkan 31.3 16.5 3.4 4.0 Ukraine*
Ukraine Center-East 105.8 77.0 1.9 9.5 Ukraine*
Ukraine Poland 5 3.2 1.2 6.0 Ukraine*
RussiaN Center 55 0 6.9 26.8 Russia*
Balkan Turkey 16.3 8.9 1.8 9.2 Turkey & Balkan
RussiaS Balkan 0 0 5.6 23.8 Russia*
RussiaS Turkey 16 8.9 4.8 11.9 Russia, Turkey & Balkan
Transit within EU
Belgium France 30 14.9 0.8 4.0
In the integrated and
the liberalized market
access to transit
pipelines within EU is
free.*
Belgium Center 26 1.0 0.6 3.0
Center-East Balkan 1.7 1.0 3.3 16.5
Center-East Center 77.8 18.4 2.4 12.0
Center-East Italy 37.0 21.3 2.7 13.5
Center France 28 4.3 1.4 7.1
Center Italy 20.2 9.1 3.5 17.3
Netherlands Belgium 53 10.7 0.5 2.6
Netherlands Center 80 11.7 0.6 3.0
Netherlands UK 15.3 7.0 1.0 3.5
Poland Center 31.4 24.4 3.2 16.1
UK Belgium 25.5 7.5 1.5 4.9
France SpainPort 4.7 1.1 3.2 15.8
Balkan Italy 0 0 3.9 28.5
Out of regional scope
Azerbaijan RussiaS 0 0 3.8 - Russia
Azerbaijan TurkeyE 4.5 4.5 2.4 - Turkey & Balkan
Iran TurkeyE 7.2 7.2 1.2 - Turkey & Balkan
Iraq TurkeyE 0 0 1.7 - Turkey & Balkan
Kazakhstan Russia 0 0 5.1 - Russia
Kazakhstan RussiaS 32.3 32.3 3.6 - Russia
a In the farsighted scenario we allow for investments in the links within EU and in the pipelines for Russian gas.
b We list the players which are needed in the integrated and the liberalized market. We mark with a * those
cases, where there is a change for the fragmented market. Then either both players from the left column are
needed or the champions in the respective regions are needed (if the champion was introduced explicitly for the
region).
c Balkan and Turkey are aggregated into one player ’Turkey & Balkan’.
Chapter 3





We relate three solutions for cooperative games, the Shapley value, the nucleo-
lus and the core. We use an empirical case study, provided in Hubert and Orlova
(2014b) to analyze the liberalization of network access in the European gas mar-
ket. For these games the Shapley value is not in the core. To obtain a differentiated
picture of the (in)stability of an allocation, we propose the nϵ-core which is a gener-
alization of the strong ϵ-core, and define three stability measures. We find that the
liberalization of network access increases the degree of instability of the Shapley
value for all three metrics. The nucleolus is a unique point in the core, hence often
used to characterize stable imputations. We show that liberalization compresses
the core, but not always the nucleolus corresponds well to the shifts in the minimal
and maximal values which players might receive in the core.
Keywords: Network Access, Natural Gas, Shapley Value, Nucleolus, Core
JEL class.: L1, L95
This paper is part of larger collaborative research project on the Eurasian gas network to which Onur
Cobanli made essential contributions. I am very grateful to Prof. Dr. Franz Hubert, without whom this
work would be impossible.
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3.1 Introduction
In a recent series of papers, cooperative game theory has been used to assess
the power structure in the network for natural gas and how it is affected by invest-
ments in new pipelines or changes in access regulation.54 In this applied literature
dis-aggregated network models are being used which are calibrated with real data.
While the results are typically robust with respect to the assumptions on parame-
ters, the findings turn out to be very sensitive depending on which solution from
cooperative game theory, the Shapley value or the nucleolus, is used to obtain the
power index. Moreover, the Shapley value appears to fit economic intuition and
the empirical evidence better than the nucleolus (Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b),
Hubert and Cobanli (2014), Hubert and Orlova (2014b)). At the cost of some simpli-
fication, the basic story of these papers is one of ‘cutting out the middlemen’. Either
a new pipeline can bypass a transit country or access to an existing pipeline is lib-
eralized. Intuition suggests that in both cases the owner of the bottleneck facility is
weakened, while customers and gas producers would be strengthened.
For the most simple imaginable network, in which one pipeline connects a gas pro-
ducer and a customer, this intuition is fully supported. In the initial situation the
owner of the pipeline, acts as an indispensable middleman between the producer
and the customer. If the access is liberalized, or a bypassing pipeline is built, the
middleman is cut out and the producer is able to sell gas to the customer with-
out cooperation of the middleman. If the middleman is needed for access to the
pipeline, the value of all coalitions, except the grand coalition, is equal to zero.
None of the three players alone, neither any pair of players, can create any surplus.
If the access is free, the value of the coalition which consists of only producer and
customer, is the same as the value of the grand coalition. The value of all other
coalitions is equal to zero. One can verify that in the initial situation the Shapley
value and the nucleolus allocate one-third of the total surplus to each of three play-
ers.55 If the producer and the customer do not need the middleman to create the
54Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b) consider the strategic relevance of various options to expand the
network. Hubert and Cobanli (2014) investigate three pipeline projects in detail: Nord Stream, South
Stream, and Nabucco. Cobanli (2014) considers pipeline projects for the Central Asian region. Hubert
and Orlova (2014a) and Hubert and Orlova (2014b) look at the liberalization of pipeline access within
the European Union, with the first paper emphasizing regional effects and cartels, while the second
paper’s focus is on customers versus local champions.
55The core is not unique and is given by a triangle in the three-dimensional space. Let xi be the
payoff of player i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Normalizing the value of the grand coalition to 1, c1 = {x : x1 + x2 + x3 =
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surplus from trade, both the Shapley value and the nucleolus allocate zero payoff
to the middleman and split the total surplus equally between the producer and the
customer. By cutting out the middleman both players benefit the equal amount of
1/6 as compared to the first game.56 For both games the Shapley value is equal to
the nucleolus and both are located in the center of the core. One can also verify that
both games are convex, guaranteeing that the Shapley value is in the core, and that
the players’ contributions change monotonically with the change of access rights.
As these properties are lost for the more realistic models of gas networks used in
the applied literature, there is little theoretical guidance regarding the properties of
the different solutions.
Hubert and Orlova (2014b) study the effect of granting third party access to
pipelines within EU on the balance of power between local champions, acting
as middlemen, customers, and external suppliers. Under the Shapley value the
customers gain less than the champions lose and one third of champions’ losses
leaks away to external suppliers. For the nucleolus, in contrast, Hubert and Orlova
(2014b) obtain pure redistribution from champions to customers while outside pro-
ducers gain nothing. Similarly, Hubert and Cobanli (2014) find for the Shapley value
that new pipelines weaken those transit countries which they allow to circumvent,
while producers and importers gain. For the nucleolus, in contrast, these pipelines
appear to be essentially irrelevant. The intuition gained from our simple example
is somewhat preserved for the Shapley value but it is lost for the nucleolus. More-
over, the limited empirical evidence also supports the Shapley value as the more
appropriate solution for this network (Hubert and Ikonnikova (2011b), Hubert and
Cobanli (2014)). While these results suggest that the Shapley value is a better
guide to assess power in the gas network than the nucleolus at least two major
questions remain. First, the Shapley value, if not in the core, may be an unlikely
outcome because it lacks stability. Second, the nucleolus is just one element of the
core and may be misleading when used to measure the impact of some change on
the set of stable allocations.
In this paper we attempt to provide a more systematic evaluation of the three con-
cepts. Using the model developed in Hubert and Orlova (2014b), we study how the
1, x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0, x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0}.
56Now the core is given by the side of the triangle determined by zero payoff to the middleman
(i = 2); c2 = {x : x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 1, x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x3 ≥ 0}. From the first
and the third conditions it follows that x2 = 0.
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Shapley value and the nucleolus relate to the core. Following Hubert and Orlova
(2014b) we consider three market structures. Before the onset of reforms, in the
fragmented market, regional champions control local production, LNG imports, ac-
cess to both transmission and distribution systems. The first step of reform is open-
ing of access to trunk pipes that provides free transit of gas within EU and creates
the integrated market. In the integrated market regional champions lose control
over transmission, but keep control over access to local customers. The second
step of reform opens access to distribution networks that provide access to cus-
tomers in a region and leads to the fully liberalized market. In the liberalized market
champions retain control only over local production and LNG imports, but they are
not needed for access to local customers.
As a first result, we establish that for none of the variants considered in Hubert and
Orlova (2014b) the core is ever empty, but the Shapley value never belongs to the
respective core. This result, however, does not tell us anything about the degree of
instability of the Shapley value and how it depends on the market structure. In an
applied analysis we need measures of stability that can be used, once an allocation
is not in the core. A payoff allocation is not in the core, if there exists at least
one coalition which can improve by acting on its own. Shapley and Shubik (1966)
generalized the concept by introducing two famous approximate cores: ’strong’ ϵ-
core and ’weak’ ϵ-core. For the strong ϵ-core, ϵ can be interpreted as the costs
of setting up a coalition. For the ’weak’ ϵ-core the costs of setting up a coalition
are assumed to increase in fixed proportion to the size of the coalition. These
concepts induced a number of studies on approximate cores which focus on the
conditions for approximate cores to be non-empty for different classes of games
(e.g. Wooders and Zame (1984), Shubik and Wooders (1983), Wooders (2008)).
In this paper we also take into account that it might be more difficult to set up
larger coalitions, but do it in a different manner as compared to the weak ϵ-core.
We approximate the core by relaxing the strong ϵ-core concept with respect to the
size of deviating coalitions. For a group of players the decision to deviate from the
proposed allocation should involve not only the computation of the respective value
function, but also the agreement about the rent sharing. We suggest to consider
whether the allocation is stable with respect to the set of coalitions, the size of
which can be limited from above. The more we restrict the size of coalitions, the
larger becomes the relaxed core, as the payoff allocation has to satisfy the smaller
number of conditions. We call the relaxed core the nϵ-core.
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The nϵ-core enables to introduce three stability measures related to the coalition
size and the costs. In general, the first metric is based on the minimal costs of es-
tablishing a coalition for a given upper bound on the size of coalitions. The second
metric refers to the minimal number of players, which are necessary for setting up
a coalition to veto the payoff for a given costs of establishing a coalition. The third
metric is a probabilistic one. It is based on the probability of picking up a deviating
coalition for the given costs and for the given upper bound on the coalition size.
To analyze how the instability of the Shapley value changes with liberalization, we
apply the three measures to our real life model. We find that liberalization increases
the degree of instability. Opening of access to pipelines increases the minimal costs
of setting up a coalition that provide the stability of the Shapley value, decreases
the minimal number of players in a deviating coalition and raises the probability of
selecting such a coalition if we select coalitions at random.
In contrast to the Shapley value, the nucleolus belongs to the core. To relate the
nucleolus and the core, we study whether the impact of reform on the nucleolus is
a good indicator of the influence on the core. As the first step, we analyze the effect
of liberalization on the core. To deal with the numerous inequalities, characterizing
the core, we partially describe it by computing the minimal and the maximal gains
of players in the core. Then, we discuss whether the change of the nucleolus is a
good indicator of the change of the core.
We find that liberalization compresses the core. The core in case of the fully liber-
alized market is contained in the core of the integrated market, which, in its turn,
is contained in the core of the fragmented market. According to this compression,
the full liberalization shrinks the range of values between the minimal and the max-
imal payoffs of all players in the core. The impact of full liberalization is dominated
by the second step of reform for the EU champions and the customers, but by the
first step for the countries outside EU and for the EU regions without champions
and customers. For the champion and the customers in a region the compression
of the range is of the same magnidute, but is determined by different factors. For
all champions the compression is a result of the decrease of maximal gains in the
core. For all customers the range decreases because the minimal gains increase.
We are interested in how the change of the nucleolus is related to the change of the
core.57 We find that in the fragmented market the nucleolus of a player tends to be
57Two findings about the compression of the range: i) that the total effect of reform is dominated
by the second step only for the EU champions and the customers and ii) that the losses of the
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centrally located, i.e. in the middle between the minimal and the maximal payoffs
in the core. For each step of reform for a number of players the nucleolus and the
respective midpoint shift into the same direction. However, for each step we find
examples of movement into the opposite direction and cases when the nucleolus
changes, but the range is not affected. Overall, it is difficult to infer the pattern of
the impact on the core from the change of the nucleolus. At the same time, as the
core compresses, the nucleolus becomes a more precise estimate of a point in the
core in the liberalized market.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no applied studies devoted to ϵ-cores and
stability issues which are calibrated with real data. The literature on approximate
cores is theoretical and presents non-emptiness conditions. Also, Wooders and
Zame (1987) developed conditions for the Shapley value of a large game to be
in the individually rational ϵ-core. To our knowledge, our paper is a first attempt
to analyze the degree of instability of the Shapley value. In addition, the paper
contributes to the quantitative studies using the cooperative approach. Application
of the cooperative game theory to the real world problems is mainly limited to the
voting games (Shapley and Shubik (1954)) and the cost allocation problems (Shu-
bik (1962)). While the Shapley value is the most widely used measure of voting
power from the cooperative game theory (Felsenthal and Machover (2004), Mon-
tero (2005)), in the literature on the cost allocation problems various solutions are
applied, including the nucleolus, the Shapley value and the core.58 For example, in
the series of papers the landing fees for Birmingham airport were computed using
the Shapley value and the nucleolus. Littlechild and Owen (1973) find that the fees
in the Shapley value case are larger than the actual charges for the smallest and
the largest aircrafts. Littlechild (1974) receives the similar results for the nucleolus.
Littlechild and Thompson (1977) find that the structure of movement fees based on
the Shapley value approximates the actual structure of charges better than the set
of fees given the nucleolus. Comparison of the cost allocations resulted from the
different solutions with the real tariffs was also conducted by Engevall et al. (1998,
champion and the customers in a region are of the same magnitude, correspond to the results in
case of nucleolus. In Hubert and Orlova (2014b) we find that in case of nucleolus the second step of
reform dominates the effect of full liberalization only for the EU champions and the customers, and
that full liberalization leads to pure redistribution of power between the champion and the customers
in a region.
58 See Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) for a detailed review of studies, applying cooperative game
theory to the cost allocation problems.
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2004) and Thomas (1992). Our paper refers to the empirical studies comparing the
Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2 we describe the concepts and
introduce stability measures, in section 3.3 we compare the Shapley value, the
nucleolus and the core according to the amount of power allocated to players. We
study the core of the games and report the influence of liberalization on the minimal
and the maximal values achievable in the core in section 3.4. In section 3.5 we
relate the nucleolus and the core. In section 3.6 we relate the Shapley value and
the core by studying the degree of instability of the Shapley value.
3.2 Solution Concepts
The inter-dependencies among the players in the Eurasian gas network can be
represented by a game in value function form Γ = (N, ν), where N is the set of
players and the value (or characteristic) function ν : 2|N| → R+ gives the maximal
payoff, which a subset of players S ⊆ N, also called coalition, can achieve (Hubert
and Orlova (2014b)). Such representation allows us to compare the solutions for
cooperative games in value function form. We denote the set of payoff vectors
x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) which are efficient Σi∈N xi = ν(N) and individually rational xi ≥ ν(i),
so called imputations, as X(Γ). We denote the set of payoff vectors, for which only
the efficiency condition holds, so called pre-imputations, as X∗(Γ).
Shapley value
The Shapley value (Shapley (1953)) assigns a unique payoff to each player,
ϕi, i ∈ N.59 It is based on the contribution ν(S ∪ i) − ν(S ) which a player i can
make to the various subgroups of other players S . The Shapley value nicely cap-
tures the intuition, that a player’s payoff from cooperation, interpreted as his power
in the game, should increase with his importance for other players, as measured





P(S ) [v(S ∪ i) − v(S )] (3.1)
where P(S ) = |S |! (|N | − |S | − 1)!/|N |! is the weight given to S . The Shapley value is
the unique function satisfying the axioms of symmetry, carrier and additivity. Young
59This paragraph is similar to the description of the Shapley value presented in Hubert and Orlova
(2014b).
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(1985) proved that the Shapley value is the unique symmetric allocation featur-
ing strong monotonicity: a player’s share never decreases when his contributions
weakly increase. However, as is well known, the Shapley value may not be ‘stable’
in the sense that a group of players might get less than it could insure by acting on
its own. This leads us to the other major criterion for solving cooperative games -
the core.
Core
Let x be a vector of payoffs, and x(S ) =

i∈S xi, S ⊆ N be the corresponding
payment to a group of players S . The excess e(x, S ) = v(S ) − x(S ) measures what
the group would gain by acting separately rather than accepting x. If the excess
is positive for a coalition, these players could block or veto x. Intuitively, it appears
difficult to achieve or maintain x as a solution, if it is easy to find groups, which
could improve a lot by acting on their own. The core provides for a particularly
sharp formalization of this intuition. It requires that no coalition can improve by
acting separately. Formally, the core is the set of payoffs x such that there exists no
coalition for which the excess is positive c = {x ∈ X(Γ) : e(x, S ) ≤ 0,∀S ⊂ N}.
One limitation of the core is that it might be empty and if not, it is rarely unique.
If the game is convex, the core is not empty (Shapley (1971)). In fact, the games
considered in this paper are not convex, but the core is never empty for the analyzed
games. According to the definition of the core, its characterization involves 2|N| − 2
(in our case over a million) inequalities, and hence, it is of limited practical use as
such. To deal with such large set of inequalities we introduce the partial description
of the core. The partial description involves finding the minimal and the maximal
gains of a player in the core. In the following we refer to the interval of values
between the minimum and the maximum as to the ’min-max range’ of a player in
the core. We compute the min-max range for all players. It is important to note
that one has to be careful with the interpretation of any vector with coordinates
taken from the min-max ranges. Not all such vectors will belong to the core. For
example, consider the vector of payoffs equal to the maximal values for all players.
Obviously, the efficiency condition is not satisfied and, hence, the vector does not
lie in the core. To characterize the core in an alternative way one could think about
the computation of the core-center which is behind the scope of this paper.60
60González-Dı́az and Sánchez-Rodrı́guez (2007) defined the core-center concept for games with a
non-empty core. The core-center presents ”the expectation of a uniform distribution defined over the
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Another limitation of the core is that any given imputation x is either in the core,
hence considered stable, or not in the core, hence unstable. Stability is black or
white. If the game is convex, the Shapley value lies in the core (Shapley (1971)).
In general, the Shapley value does not necessarily belong to the core. We find that
the Shapley value is unstable for each market structure. In an applied analysis it
might be useful to have a metric which allows for different degrees of stability.
Extensions of the core
Shapley and Shubik (1966) proposed a useful generalization of the core, the so
called strong ϵ-core, which requires that the gains from blocking x must not be
larger than a threshold ϵ, formally c(ϵ) = {x ∈ X∗(Γ) : e(x, S ) ≤ ϵ,∀S ⊂ N}. The strong
ϵ-core is the set of payoffs that cannot be vetoed by any coalition if establishing a
coalition entails a fixed cost of ϵ (a negative ϵ indicates a bonus). It is easy to see
that any x will be in the strong ϵ-core, provided ϵ is large enough. On the other side
the strong ϵ-core becomes empty if ϵ is made sufficiently small. The authors defined
also the weak ϵ-core by making the costs of setting up a coalition proportional to
the size of coalition. Formally, cw(ϵ) = {x ∈ X∗(Γ) : e(x, S ) ≤ ϵ|S |,∀S ⊂ N}.
Here we propose to relax the strong ϵ-core with respect to the coalition size n in a
different way than the weak ϵ-core. We allow for fixed costs of setting up a coalition
and control for the number of players in a deviating coalition. We introduce an upper
bound on the size of coalitions which provides stability of an allocation.
Our approach can be motivated by the following thought experiment. Consider a
game (N, v). The players have to agree on a proposed payoff x. As a first step,
every single player checks whether the offer is individually acceptable. In total
this requires the computation of |N | values v({i}). Next, pairs of players consider
whether to object x. To do so another |N|(|N | − 1) values have to be computed
and, upon finding that the excess is large enough, a pair would have to agree
on how to share before seriously blocking the proposal.61 Then we move on to
groups of three players, then four and so on. As we reach ever larger coalitions,
not only the number of necessary computations might grow, also the complexity
of organizing the group will increase. Instead of relating coalition size to these
core of the game” (see González-Dı́az and Sánchez-Rodrı́guez (2007), p. 28.)
61For the game with |N | players there are |N |(|N | − 1)/2 pairs of players, but each player in a pair has
to implement the calculation so that in total |N|(|N| − 1) values will be computed. For the groups of k
players the total number of computations is kc|N |k .
83
cost in a particular way, we propose to account for the group size directly. Let
S(n), 1 ≤ n < |N | denote the set of coalitions which can be formed by permutations
of at most n players: S(n) = {S ⊂ N : |S | ≤ n, S , ø,N}. We define the nϵ-core
as c(n, ϵ) = {x ∈ X∗(Γ) : e(x, S ) ≤ ϵ,∀S ∈ S(n)}. Besides the fixed cost of setting
up a coalition to veto x, the nϵ-core can also account for the fact that it might be
more costly to set up larger coalitions. The larger we select ϵ and the smaller we
select n, the larger will be the nϵ-core. Obviously, c(1, 0) is equivalent to individual
rationality: xi ≥ v({i}), i ∈ N. The strong ϵ-core is c(|N | − 1, ϵ) and c(|N| − 1, 0) yields
the core. For a superadditive value function the Shapley Value ϕ ∈ c(1, 0). Trivially
ϕ ∈ c(|N| − 1,∞).
With the nϵ-core we have two dimensions to measure the stability of a given payoff
x. For a given n we can look for the minimal ϵ∗(x, n) so that x ∈ c(n, ϵ∗) or we can
ask for the minimal n∗(x, ϵ) so that x ∈ c(n∗ − 1, ϵ). In other words, n∗(x, ϵ) denotes
the minimal number of players which are necessary to veto a payoff x.
Finally, we take c(n, ϵ) as given. For a payoff vector x not in c(n, ϵ), we assess the
‘degree’ of instability by comparing the number of coalitions which could gain from
vetoing x to the total number of coalitions formed by permutations of at most n
players. Let Ŝ = {S : S ∈ S(n) and e(x, S ) > ϵ}. The larger the fraction f (x, n, ϵ) =
|Ŝ|/|S(n)| is, the more likely it is that we pick a coalition rejecting x if we select
coalitions at random.
Nucleolus
Yet another major solution concept for the cooperative games is nucleolus (Schmei-
dler (1969)). Let θ(x) be the vector of excesses arranged in the non-increasing order
for a payoff vector x for all possible coalitions S(|N | − 1). The vector θ(x) is lexico-
graphically smaller than θ(y), θ(x) ≺ θ(y), if there is an integer k such that θl(x) = θl(y)
for all l < k, and θk(x) < θk(y). The notation θ(x) ⪯ θ(y) means that either θ(x) ≺ θ(y)
or θ(x) = θ(y). The nucleolus of a game Γ is the set of payoff vectors that minimize θ
in the lexicographic ordering over the set of all imputations µ = {x ∈ X(Γ) : θ(x) ⪯ θ(y)
for all y ∈ X(Γ)}.62
The nucleolus always exists and is unique. It can be considered to be the lexico-
graphic center of a game. Maschler et al. (1979) define the lexicographic center of
a game as the set of payoff vectors obtained after the termination of the process of
62Maschler et al. (1979), p. 331.
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minimization of the maximal excesses.63 They prove that the lexicographic center
consists of a single point and is equivalent to the nucleolus.
The merit of the nucleolus over the Shapley value is that if the core of the game
is non-empty, the nucleolus always belongs to the core. In general, the location of
the nucleolus in the core is not known. Maschler et al. (1979) provide an example
of two games, for which the cores coincide, but the values of nucleolus differ. Only
in the special case of the ’big boss’ games the nucleolus is the center of the core
(Muto et al. (1988)). The merit of the Shapley value is that while the Shapley con-
cept features not only the aggregate, but also the strong monotonicity, the nucleolus
does not satisfy even the property of the aggregate monotonicity (Megiddo (1974),
Young (1985)). Megiddo showed that if the value of the grand coalition increases
and the values of all other coalitions are not changed, then the payoffs under the
nucleolus can decrease. In case of the Shapley value the payoffs for all players
will increase. Another advantage of the Shapley value is that it is easy to compute
once the value function is defined. Calculation of the nucleolus is much more com-
plicated. There are number of papers on the algorithmic schemes of computation
of the nucleolus which involve the solution of either one linear program (Kohlberg
(1972), Owen (1974)) or a sequence of linear programs (e.g. Maschler et al. (1979),
Sankaran (1991), Potters et al. (1996)).
3.3 Concepts: power allocation
In this section we study how the Shapley value, the nucleolus and the core are
related to each other with respect to the power in our real world game. We use the
same model as in Hubert and Orlova (2014b) and, hence, we have to compute only
the minimal and the maximal gains of players in the core. Here we do not describe
the games determined by the three access regimes. We refer the interested reader
to Hubert and Orlova (2014b) for the definition of players, for details of the model
calibration and the value function calculation. We report the results for the short-
sighted scenario, when investment options are not available for a coalition, and a
63The lexicographic center is defined by the following procedure. First, in the set of all imputations
X0 = X(Γ) one should find the payoff vectors X1 that minimize the maximal excess for the set of all
possible coalitions S0 = S(|N | − 1). Denote the minimal value as ϵ1. Then, from the set S0 one should
take out the coalitions whose excess is equal to the minimal value ϵ1 for all x ∈ X1. The new set of
coalitions is denoted as S1. The next step is to minimize the maximal excess for the reduced set of
coalitions S1 over X1. The process is terminated at the step k, when the set of coalitions Sk becomes
empty. The subset of imputations Xk, obtained on the last step, is the lexicographic center of a game.
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high value of demand intercept.64 The results are robust to changes of parameters
(see Appendix C).
All results are presented in the graphs (see Figures 3.1-3.3). For each player and
for all three market structures we depict the min-max range as the grey bar. All
figures are given as percentage of the total surplus. We also present the nucleolus
and the Shapley value as the blue elliptical disks and the red circles, respectively.
Trivially, as the nucleolus belongs to the core, it lies in the min-max range.
The Shapley value assigns more power to Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya than
the nucleolus (Figure 3.1). Moreover, all external producers get larger shares
than the corresponding maximal values achievable in the core. Both Belarus and
Ukraine have less power under the Shapley value as compared to the nucleolus. In
addition, Belarus is assigned less power than the respective minimal values in the
core. The same pattern holds for Ukraine in the integrated and liberalized markets.
In the fragmented market the share of Ukraine under the Shapley value falls into
the min-max range.
For the EU champions and the customers the results depend on the market struc-
ture (Figure 3.2). In the fragmented and integrated markets the Shapley values be-
long to the respective min-max ranges. The relation of the power under the Shapley
value and the nucleolus depends on the player and the access regime. For exam-
ple, the Shapley value assigns less power to the champions in Italy, South-West
and Center-East regions, but allocates more power to Netherlands’ champion than
the nucleolus. The latter holds for the champion in Center region only in the frag-
mented market. In the liberalized market the Shapley value assigns more power
to all EU champions than the nucleolus. Moreover, their shares are larger than the
corresponding maximal values in the core. The opposite pattern emerges for the
EU customers. They appear less powerfull under the Shapley value than under the
nucleolus and receive less than their minimal values in the core.
We present the results for the EU regions without champions and customers in
Figure 3.3. With few exeptions, we observe that the Shapley value allocates less
power to these regions as compared to the nucleolus and that it does not belong to
the min-max range.





























































































































































































3.4 Compression of the Core
As it can be seen from Figures 3.1-3.3, liberalization compresses the min-max
range for all players. If the compression results in a small scope between the mini-
mal and the maximal values, then we will not find the allocation in the core which is
very different from the nucleolus. To understand why we observe the compression
of the core, we prove the simple lemma.
Consider two games Γ0 = (N, ν0) and Γ1 = (N, ν1) with non-empty cores. Let games
Γ0 and Γ1 have the same set of players and the same values of grand coalition:
ν0(N) = ν1(N) (as well as the same values of the empty set: ν0(ø) = ν1(ø) = 0).
For other coalitions the value function of Γ1 either increases or does not change in
comparison to the value function of Γ0: ν1(S ) ≥ ν0(S ) ∀S , N. We denote the core
for the game Γ0 as c0 and for the game Γ1 as c1.
Lemma 1: If ν0(N) = ν1(N) and ν1(S ) ≥ ν0(S ) ∀S , N, then c1 ⊆ c0.
Proof: Recall from the definition of the core (section 3.2) that the core for Γ0 is
defined as:
c0 = {x :


i∈S xi ≥ ν0(S ) ∀S , ø,N,N
i=1 xi = ν
0(N)
} (3.2)
The core for Γ1 is defined as:
c1 = {x :


i∈S xi ≥ ν1(S ) ∀S , ø,N,N
i=1 xi = ν
1(N)
} (3.3)
As the values of grand coalition are equal ν1(N) = ν0(N) for two games, we can
rewrite (3.3) in the following form:
c1 = {x :


i∈S xi ≥ ν1(S ) ∀S , ø,N,N
i=1 xi = ν
0(N)
} (3.4)
Clearly, as ν1(S ) ≥ ν0(S ) ∀S , N, c1 ⊆ c0. □
Consecutive liberalization of access to the transmission and distribution systems
does not change the total surplus due to calibration (Hubert and Orlova (2014b)),
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but either increases the value function or does not change the value function for
any other coalition: ν2(S ) ≥ ν1(S ) ≥ νo(S ) ∀S , N. In other words, the value
function never decreases for any coalition. We know, that the core is not empty
for each market structure. Then, by Lemma 1, the core compresses with each
step of liberalization. The core in the fragmented market case contains the core in
the integrated market case, and the latter contains the core in the fully liberalized
market case. Compression of the core is reflected in the change of minimal and
maximal values that players get in the core.
Typically, it is difficult to explain why the minimal and the maximal values change.
But occasionally the effect is simple. The maximal value of a player in the core
might be given by his contribution to the grand coalition. The player cannot require
a higher payment, as then the rest of the players will ’kick’ him out and form the
coalition on their own. If for either two market structures the maximum of a player
is equal to the respective contribution, it is enough to consider the effect of reform
on the contribution. The minimal value of a player in the core, in the simplest case,
is given by his stand alone value. In other words, by the amount that the player
can assure on his own. Liberalization does not influence the stand alone values of
players. If for either two market structures the minimum of a player is equal to his
stand alone value, then trivially there is no effect on the minimum. If the minimum
of a player is determined by the binding individual rationality constraint only for the
initial market structure, we proceed as following. For the new access regime we
find the coalitions corresponding to the binding constraints. Then we consider the
effect of reform on the values of such coalitions.
We study the effect of each step of reform and the overall impact of full liberalization
on the minimal value, the maximal value and the difference between the two. We
refer to the difference between the maximal and the minimal values as to the range
or the span. Results are presented in Table 3.1. All figures are expressed as
percentage of the redistributed amount resulted from the full liberalization.65 In the
columns 2-4 we report the influence of liberalization of access to the high-pressure
pipelines on all three values. In the columns 5-7 we report the incremental effect of
liberalization of access to the distribution systems. In the columns 8-10 the impact
of full liberalization is shown. The range can be reduced either because of the
65 The redistributed amount from the full liberalization is equal to the sum of benefits of those
players who gain from two steps of reform. For the estimates of redistribution given nucleolus see
Hubert and Orlova (2014b).
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Table 3.1: Impact of Liberalization on the Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core
Change of Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core [% of Redistribution]
step 1: transmission step 2: distribution two steps together
∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span
Outside Countries
Russia 0.1 −8.9 −9.0 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.1 −9.0 −9.1
Belarus 0.6 0.0 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 −0.6
Ukraine 4.2 0.0 −4.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 −0.1 −4.2
Algeria 0.3 0.0 −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 −0.3
Libya 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 −0.1
Norway 0.5 0.0 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 −0.1 −0.6
Netherlands
champion 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −25.2 −25.2 0.2 −25.2 −25.4
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.2 0.0 −25.2 25.2 0.0 −25.2
Center-East a
champion 0.1 −0.1 −0.2 0.0 −21.7 −21.7 0.1 −21.8 −21.9
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.6 0.0 −21.6 21.6 0.0 −21.6
Italy
champion 0.2 −0.4 −0.6 0.0 −39.6 −39.6 0.2 −40.0 −40.2
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.4 0.0 −39.4 39.4 0.0 −39.4
Center b
champion 0.1 −0.4 −0.4 0.0 −54.8 −54.8 0.1 −55.2 −55.3
customers 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 54.6 0.0 −54.6 54.6 −0.1 −54.7
South-West c
champion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −37.0 −37.0 0.0 −37.0 −37.0
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.3 0.0 −36.3 36.3 0.0 −36.3
Poland 0.4 0.0 −0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 −0.4
Belgium 0.1 0.0 −0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 −0.2
United Kingdom 0.0 −0.2 −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.3
Turkey & Balkand 4.9 0.0 −4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 −5.0
aAustria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia
bGermany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
cFrance, Spain and Portugal
dRomania, Bulgaria and Greece
increase of minimal value or the decrease of maximal value, or because of both
changes. We report the impact on the minimal and the maximal values and point
out the change, which is the most important for the compression.
We start analysis with the first step of liberalization. For all EU champions, except
the champion in South-West, we observe a modest compression. The decrease of
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maximal values tends to be more significant than the increase of minimal values.66
In the fragmented market for all champions the maximal payoffs are determined
by the respective contributions to the grand coalition. The pattern is similar in the
integrated market.67 Consequently, we may consider the effect of the first step
on the contributions. Opening of access to trunk pipes decreases contributions of
champions to the grand coalition as in the integrated market the gas can be shipped
freely within EU.68
For the EU customers, except the customers in Center, there is no compression of
the range. In the fragmented and integrated markets for all customers the minimal
values are determined by the respective stand alone values. As a result, we do not
observe any impact on the minimal values. The maximal values of all customers,
except the customers in Center, are determined by the corresponding contributions
to the grand coalition.69 Neither step of reform has impact on the contribution of a
customer to the grand coalition. As a result, we observe the minor decrease of the
range only for the customers in Center.
The span compresses for the producers and the transit countries outside EU. For all
countries, except Russia, the range decreases due to the increase of minimal val-
ues. Only for North-African countries the increase of minimal values corresponds to
the simple case. In the fragmented market the minimal values of Algeria and Libya
are determined by the respective stand alone values. In the integrated market pro-
ducers can ship gas freely within EU and the minimal values are determined by
the coalitions with regions which could not be accessed in the fragmented market.
Opening of access to trunk pipes increases the values of such coalitions making
the individual rationality constraints non-binding. For Russia the compression is
the strongest, but the decrease of maximal value cannot be explained by the sim-
ple case. For other producers and transit countries the maximal values are either
determined by the respective contributions or are slightly less than the contribu-
tions. Neither step of reform has impact on the contribution of a supplier or a transit
66The only exception is the champion in Netherlands, for the champion in Center-East the two
effects are shown as equal due to rounding.
67In the integrated market only for the champion in Center the calculated maximal value is less than
the respective contribution. But the difference between the respective contribution and the maximum
is minor.
68The contribution of the champion in Netherlands is not affected by the first step of reform.
69 Only in the integrated market for the customers in Center the calculated maximal value is slightly
less than the respective contribution.
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country. As a result, if the maximal values are affected, they decrease only slightly.
The incremental impact of liberalization of access to the distribution systems on
the range varies for the different groups of players. For all EU champions and
customers the span decreases. The compression resulted from the second step
of reform is much larger than from the first step. Therefore, the total impact on
the range is clearly dominated by the second step for the champions and the cus-
tomers. The pattern is different for all other players. The incremental compression
is either zero or close to zero, and hence, tends to be substantially less than from
the opening of access to high-pressure pipelines. Therefore, the total effect is dom-
inated by the first step of reform for these players. In the following we find the main
factors of compression for the EU champions and the customers.
For all champions the impact of the second step of reform on the minimal val-
ues is essentially zero. The maximal values drop substantially. Recall, that in the
integrated market the maximal values tend to be determined by the respective con-
tributions to the grand coalition. In the liberalized market this pattern holds for all
champions. In contrast to the integrated market, in the liberalized market customers
can be reached without a champion. Hence, the share of the total surplus which
the champion can require decreases substantially. As a result, for the EU cham-
pions the compression from the full liberalization is determined by the decrease of
maximal values from the opening of access to distribution networks.
The pattern is reversed for the EU customers. The impact on the maximal values
is essentially zero, but the minimal values increase a lot. In the integrated market
the minimal values are determined by the respective stand alone values. In the
liberalized market the individual rationality constraints become non-binding. The
minimal values increase because opening of access to distribution networks raises
the values of coalitions with customers which could not be accessed by producers in
the integrated market. As a result, for the EU customers the compression from the
full liberalization is determined by the increase of minimal values from the opening
of access to low-pressure pipelines.
We report the results for the last column of Table 3.1. The range compresses signif-
icantly for the EU champions and the customers. Though we observe the different
factors of compression, the magnitude of the loss in the span is approximately the
same for the champion and the customers in a region. For example, for the cham-
pion in Netherlands the range decreases by 25.4 percentage points. The decrease
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for the customers is equal to 25.2 percentage points. In comparison to the cham-
pions and the customers, the magnitude of losses in the span is low for all other
players. The largest compression is observed for Russia and is equal to 9.1 per-
centage points. It is more than two times less than the lowest shrinkage within the
group of EU champions and customers.70
3.5 The Nucleolus and the Core
In Hubert and Orlova (2014b) we find that under the nucleolus the total effect of
reform on power is dominated by the second step only for the EU champions and
the customers. For all other players the total effect is dominated by the first step of
reform. We receive the similar result for the compression of the core. In addition,
given the nucleolus, there is pure redistribution of power between the champion
and the customers in a region. We find that the min-max range compresses for
both the champion and the customers in a region and the losses in the range are
of the same magnitude. At a first glance, these findings allow us to assume that
the change of the nucleolus is a good indicator of the impact of liberalization on the
core.
To check this hypothesis, for each player we consider the direction of the movement
of the nucleolus as compared to the shift of the midpoint of the min-max range. The
idea behind such measurement is the following. On the one hand, in the fragmented
market for most of the players the nucleolus is centrally located in the min-max
range (see Figures 3.1-3.3).71 On the other hand, the movement of the midpoint
depicts the pattern of compression of the min-max range. If the increase of minimal
value is larger than the decrease of maximal value, then the center shifts to the
right. If the opposite holds, then the center shifts to the left. In the previous section
we discussed the dominant effects of compression. Thus, we consider the impact
of reform on the nucleolus to be a good indicator of the effect on the core, if the
nucleolus is shifted into the same direction as the midpoint of the respective min-
max range.
We start analysis with the first step of reform. The nucleolus and the respective
center move into the same direction for two-third of the players. This pattern holds
70The lowest compression of the span within the group of EU champions and customers is equal
to 21.6 percentage points and corresponds to the customers in Center-East region.
71The difference between the center and the nucleolus is larger than 10% only for Belarus, Belgium,
Poland and UK. For these players the nucleolus is shifted to the right endpoint of the min-max range.
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for all players in the group of outside producers and transit countries and for all
players in the group of EU regions without champions and customers (see Figures
3.1 and 3.3). Within the group of EU champions and customers the values shift into
the same direction only for the champions in Center, Center-East and Italy. In some
cases the compression ’forces’ the nucleolus to move into the same direction. Con-
sider, for example, Russia. The decrease of maximum is larger than the increase of
minimum so that the midpoint shifts to the left. The nucleolus moves into the same
direction. As the maximal value in the integrated market is less than the nucleolus
in the fragmented market, the movement into the opposite direction is not possible.
For the rest of the players we observe two cases. First, the nucleolus shifts into the
opposite direction as compared to the respective midpoint. Second, the midpoint
is not affected, but the nucleolus changes. The first case holds for the champions
in Netherlands and South-West and for the customers in Center. The second case
holds for all other customers.
These two cases are also fulfilled for the second step of reform. The nucleolus
moves into the opposite direction for Algeria. For Belarus the min-max range is not
affected, but the nuclelous decreases. For all other players the values shift into the
same direction. The champions and the customers are exposed to the largest shift
of both the nucleolus and the center. In contrast to the integrated market, in the
liberalized market for the champions and the customers the nucleolus is not always
centrally located in the respective min-max range. Nevertheless, the magnitude
of the shift of the nucleolus and the midpoint is approximately the same due to
the substantial compression of the min-max range. In other words, the nucleolus
becomes a more precise estimate of a point in the core in the liberalized market.
Overall, in the fully liberalized market, as compared to the fragmented market, for
all players the nucleolus and the midpoint move into the same direction. But for
each step of reform we find exceptions. We find players, for which the values shift
into the opposite direction as well as cases when the midpoint is not affected, but
the nucleolus changes. Taken together, not always the impact of reform on the
nucleolus corresponds well to the effect on the core.
3.6 Stability: the Shapley value and the Core
For each access regime there are a number of coalitions which find it profitable to
deviate from the Shapley value. This means that for neither market structure the
Shapley value is in the core and, hence for neither market structure the Shapley
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Table 3.2: Impact of Liberalization on Stabiltiy Measures
Stability measures
fragmented integrated liberalized
ϵ∗(ϕ, |N | − 1)/

ϕ0EU 1.7 2.2 8.0
n∗(ϕ, 0) − 1 8 1 1
f (ϕ, |N | − 1, 0) 0.0002 0.0019 0.0907
value is stable. In this section we study the degree of instability of the Shapley
value depending on the access regime. To implement this analysis we relate the
Shapley values to the measures of stability introduced in Section 3.2. The results
for the three metrics are presented in Table 3.2. The first metric to consider is the
minimal costs of setting up a coalition of any size ϵ∗(ϕ, |N | − 1), such that it is not
profitable to deviate from the Shapley value. We report ϵ∗(ϕ, |N | − 1) as percentage
of the joint share of EU players in the fragmented market in the first row of Table 3.2.
In the second row, for zero costs of establishing a coalition, we present the second
metric. The second measure is the maximal number of players n∗(ϕ, 0) − 1, such
that all coalitions, formed by permutations of at most this number, cannot block the
Shapley value. In the third row we find f (ϕ, |N | −1, 0), the fraction of coalitions which
could gain from vetoing the Shapley value. Computation of the third metric involves
assumption that setting up a coalition of any size would not cost anything.
We start analysis with the first metric. In the fragmented market the costs of es-
tablishing a coalition have to constitute at least 1.7% of the joint rent of the EU
players. Then rejection of the Shapley value becomes unprofitable for all coalitions.
Opening of access to trunk pipes raises the value of threshold up to 2.2%. In the lib-
eralized market the costs increase up to 8%, which is several times larger than the
corresponding values in both the fragmented and integrated markets. With liberal-
ization a coalition gets access to resources that were unavailable in the fragmented
market and, hence, can gain more than before the reform. As a result, the costs
of establishing a coalition have to increase in order to make the deviation from the
respective Shapley value unprofitable.
Now we turn to the second metric, related to the size of deviating coalitions. In the
following calculations we set ϵ equal to zero. For each market structure we search
for n∗(ϕ, 0), the minimal number of players necessary for setting up a coalition to
veto the corresponding Shapley value. In the fragmented market n∗(ϕ, 0) = 9, so
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that the coalitions, formed by permutations of at most 8 players, cannot improve by
acting on their own. In other words, in the fragmented market almost half of the
players has to be in a coalition to be able to veto the Shapley value. We find two
coalitions with 9 players for which the excess is positive. The two coalitions include
different types of players: EU champions and customers, outside producers, transit
countries for Russian gas and Turkey & Balkan region.72 In the integrated and lib-
eralized markets the size of deviating coalitions diminishes. In both cases the mini-
mal number of players in a deviating coalition is equal to 2. In the integrated market
Belgium and Libya find it more profitable to cooperate on their own rather than to
accept their Shapley values. In the liberalized market the customers in Center re-
gion can veto the Shapley value together with either the champion in Netherlands
or with Norway. Thus, while in the fragmented market the deviation requires bar-
gaining between relatively large sets of players, in the integrated/liberalized market
the deviation from the Shapley value can be profitable even when there are only
two players in a coalition.
The third metric is the fraction of coalitions, which could block the Shapley value. In
the following calculations we set ϵ equal to zero and consider the set of coalitions
which can be formed by permutations of at most 19 players (n = |N | − 1 = 19). We
find the ratio of the number of coalitions which can veto the Shapley value and the
total number of coalitions. The fraction of deviating coalitions increases when we
move from the fragmented to the integrated and liberalized markets. In the frag-
mented market, the fraction is the lowest and is close to zero. In the integrated
market, the share increases, but it is still less than 1% of the total number of rel-
evant coalitions. The fraction increases further in the liberalized market, so that
with probability 9% we can pick a coalition rejecting the Shapley value if we select
coalitions at random.
Therefore, as liberalization provides access to new resources for a coalition, the
attractiveness to act on its own increases in the integrated/liberalized market in
comparison to the fragmented market. As a result, the instability of the Shapley
value raises with liberalization with respect to all three measures. For the two mea-
sures, the costs of establishing a coalition and the fraction of deviating coalitions,
the second step of reform dominates the first step with respect to the increase of
72The coalitions are: { Algeria, Turkey & Balkan, Belarus, customers in Center-East, champion in
Center-East, customers in Italy, champion in Italy, Russia, Ukraine } and { Turkey & Balkan, Belarus,
customers in Center-East, champion in Center-East, customers in Italy, champion in Italy, Libya,
Russia, Ukraine }.
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the degree of instability. The opposite holds for the second criteria.
3.7 Conclusion
When applying cooperative game theory to the real world problems, we have to
decide on how to solve the game. Though in the simple models different solu-
tions may provide the same results, it can be completely misleading for the more
complicated cases. We show that liberalization of access in simple system leads
to the same power redistribution in case of the Shapley value and the nucleolus.
Cutting out the middleman benefits both producer and customer. In Hubert and
Orlova (2014b) we consider the Eurasian natural gas supply system and study the
impact of opening access to transmission and distribution networks on the balance
of power between regional champions, customers and external producers. In this
case the Shapley value and the nucleolus yielded different results with respect to
the power redistribution.
In general, the choice of the concept is complicated by the fact that the Shapley
value and the nucleolus have different merits and shortcomings. The nucleolus
presents the stable imputation for the game with the non-empty core, which is not
necessarily true for the Shapley value. The Shapley value is a monotone concept,
but the nucleolus is not.
In this paper we use the model of the Eurasian natural gas supply system to re-
late the Shapley value and the nucleolus to the core. We examine the degree of
instability of the Shapley value and how it depends on the market structure. We
study whether the effect of liberalization on the nucleolus is a good indicator of the
influence on the core.
To evaluate the degree of instability of a payoff allocation which is not in the core,
we propose several stability measures. We relax the strong ϵ-core concept by
taking into account the size of deviating coalitions. Using the nϵ-core one can study
whether the payoff allocation is stable with respect to the set of coalitions, the size
of which is bounded from above. We introduce three stability measures related to
the coalition size and the costs of setting up a coalition. We find that liberalization
increases the instability of the Shapley value for all criteria.
To study whether the change of the nucleolus might be considered as an indicator
of the change of the core in our model, we first analyze the impact of liberaliza-
tion on the core. We find that liberalization consecutively compresses the core.
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The compression is depicted in the decrease of the range of values between the
minimum and the maximum of a player in the core. As the nucleolus tends to be
centrally located in the min-max range in the fragmented market, we compare the
direction of the shift of the nucleolus with the movement of the respective midpoint.
For each step of reform we find players characterized by the movement of values
into the opposite direction. In addition, we also find examples when the min-max
range is not affected, but the nucleolus changes. Hence, it is difficult to judge about
the change of the core on the basis of the impact of liberalization on the nucleolus.
Taken together, the Shapley value suits better for the application to the Eurasian
natural gas system. As it is pointed out in Hubert and Orlova (2014b), the results
under the Shapley value correspond to the intuition derived from the middleman
story. Though the instability of the Shapley value increases for all criteria, the de-
gree of increase differs between the metrics. The first measure, the minimal costs,
and the third measure, the fraction of deviating coalitions, provide less sharp re-
sults than the second measure. Liberalization consecutevily increases the minimal
costs of establishing a coalition, but even in the fully liberalized market this amount
does not exceed 10% of the joint rent of EU players. The fraction of deviating coali-
tions in the liberalized market never exceeds 20%. Simultaneously, according to
the second metric, only two players are enough to reject the Shapley value in the
fully liberalized market. Looking at all three metrics together, we find it easier to
apply the Shapley value in the fragmented market. So that taking into account the
second criteria, application of the Shapley value in the integrated and liberalized
markets requires more caution.
Appendix C
C.1 Robustness
As in Hubert and Orlova (2014b), we assess the robustness of our results by con-
sidering three more variants: a high value of demand intercept and the far-sighted
scenario, a low value of intercept and the short-sighted scenario, the low value of
intercept and the far-sighted scenario. We will discuss the robustness of our results
in the same order as they are reported in the main text.
Power allocation
We start analysis with the comparison of concepts according to the power allocation
(see Figures C.1-C.9). With minor modifications, all previous statements from the
main text could be repeated for each of three scenarios. For example, for all variants
of parameters it holds that the Shapley value assigns more power to all outside
producers than the nucleolus and the core. It also holds that Belarus and Ukraine
have less power in the Shapley value case as compared to the nucleolus. Moreover,
for Belarus the shares are less than the respective minimal values in the core. Only
for Ukraine it depends on the scenario and the access regime whether the Shapley
value falls into the min-max range.
For all scenarios, in the fragmented and integrated markets, the Shapley values of
champions and customers belong to the respective min-max ranges. All results for
the liberalized market can be repeated. For all scenarios the Shapley value assigns
more power to all champions than the nucleolus and the core. All customers have
less power under the Shapley value than under the nucleolus and the core.
In case of all variants the Shapley value tends to allocate less power to other EU
regions as compared to the nucleolus. For the low value of demand intercept only
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in half of the cases it holds that the Shapley value does not belong to the respective
min-max range.
Compression of the core.
The impact of liberalization on the minimal values, the maximal values and the
range is presented in Tables C.1-C.3. For all scenarios it holds that the total effect
on the range is dominated by the second step of reform only for the EU champi-
ons and the customers, but by the first step of reform for all other players. For the
champions the compression of the range is determined by the decrease of maximal
values resulted from the second step of reform. For the customers the compression
is determined by the increase of minimal values from the second step. The state-
ments concerning the influence of liberalization on the minimum and the maximum
hold for all scenarios.73 For example, in the fragmented and integrated markets the
minimal values of all customers are determined by the binding individual rational-
ity constraints so that we do not observe any impact of the first step of reform on
the minimal values of customers. In contrast, in the liberalized market the individ-
ual rationality constraints become non-binding. In other words, the minimal values
increase with the second step of reform.
The nucleolus and the core.
The main results concerning the relation of the nucleolus and the core are robust
to changes of parameters. With the first step of reform the nucleolus and the re-
spective midpoint move into the same direction for 60% or 70% of the players,
depending on the variant. Within the group of champions and customers such pat-
tern holds only for two or four players. For other players in this group the values shift
into the opposite direction or the min-max range is not affected, but the nucleolus
changes. For the players outside EU and for the EU regions without champions
and customers the values shift into the same direction for all scenarios. In case of
the second step of reform for all variants it holds that for all champions and cus-
tomers the nucleolus is forced to move into the same direction as the respective
midpoint. Among other players we find examples when the values shift into the
opposite direction. We also find cases when the min-max range is not affected, but
73Minor modifications in the statements might refer to the maximal values. In the basic scenario
for a number of maximal values it holds that the value is equal to the respective contribution. With




Stability: the Shapley value and the core.
Results concerning the degree of instability of the Shapley value are robust to
changes of parameters (Tables C.4-C.6). For all scenarios it holds that liberalization
increases the instability of the Shapley value. The minimal costs of establishing a
coalition in the fully liberalized market are several times larger than the counter-
parts in the fragmented and integrated markets. Opening of access to pipelines
decreases the minimal number of players in a deviating coalition. In the fully liber-
alized market only two players are enough to veto the Shapley value. The fraction
of deviating coalitions raises with each step of reform. The increase realized from
the second step of liberalization is larger than from the first step for all scenarios.
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Table C.1: Impact of Liberalization on the Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core (far-
sighted scenario, high intercept)
Change of Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core [% of Redistribution]
step 1: transmission step 2: distribution two steps together
∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span
Outside Countries
Russia 0.1 −6.7 −6.7 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.1 −6.7 −6.8
Belarus 0.6 0.0 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 −0.6
Ukraine 1.3 0.0 −1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 −0.1 −1.4
Algeria 0.3 0.0 −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 −0.3
Libya 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 −0.1
Norway 0.5 0.0 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 −0.1 −0.6
Netherlands
champion 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.0 −25.8 −25.8 0.2 −25.8 −25.9
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.8 0.0 −25.8 25.8 0.0 −25.8
Center-East a
champion 0.1 −0.1 −0.2 0.0 −22.2 −22.2 0.1 −22.3 −22.4
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 0.0 −22.1 22.1 0.0 −22.1
Italy
champion 0.2 −0.4 −0.6 0.0 −40.5 −40.6 0.2 −41.0 −41.2
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.3 0.0 −40.3 40.3 0.0 −40.3
Center b
champion 0.1 −0.4 −0.5 0.0 −56.1 −56.1 0.1 −56.5 −56.5
customers 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 55.9 0.0 −55.9 55.9 −0.1 −56.0
South-West c
champion 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −44.1 −44.1 0.0 −44.1 −44.1
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.7 0.0 −43.8 43.7 0.0 −43.8
Poland 0.4 0.0 −0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 −0.4
Belgium 0.1 0.0 −0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 −0.2
United Kingdom 0.0 −0.2 −0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.3
Turkey & Balkand 3.8 0.0 −3.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 0.0 −3.9
aAustria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia
bGermany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
cFrance, Spain and Portugal
dRomania, Bulgaria and Greece
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Table C.2: Impact of Liberalization on the Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core
(short-sighted scenario, low intercept)
Change of Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core [% of Redistribution]
step 1: transmission step 2: distribution two steps together
∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span
Outside Countries
Russia 0.1 −8.8 −9.0 0.0 −0.2 −0.2 0.1 −9.0 −9.1
Belarus 1.3 0.0 −1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 −1.3
Ukraine 4.5 −0.1 −4.6 0.1 0.0 −0.1 4.6 −0.1 −4.7
Algeria 1.0 0.0 −1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 −1.0
Libya 0.3 0.0 −0.3 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.4 0.0 −0.4
Norway 1.6 −0.1 −1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 −0.1 −1.7
Netherlands
champion 0.5 0.0 −0.5 0.0 −25.4 −25.5 0.5 −25.4 −25.9
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.3 0.0 −25.3 25.3 0.0 −25.3
Center-East a
champion 0.3 −0.2 −0.5 0.0 −22.1 −22.1 0.3 −22.3 −22.6
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.7 0.0 −21.7 21.7 0.0 −21.7
Italy
champion 0.5 −1.3 −1.8 0.1 −40.3 −40.4 0.6 −41.6 −42.2
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.6 0.0 −39.6 39.6 0.0 −39.6
Center b
champion 0.2 −1.2 −1.4 0.0 −55.7 −55.7 0.2 −56.9 −57.1
customers 0.0 −0.3 −0.3 55.1 0.0 −55.2 55.1 −0.3 −55.4
South-West c
champion 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.0 −37.8 −37.9 0.0 −38.0 −38.0
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 36.7 0.0 −36.8 36.7 −0.1 −36.8
Poland 0.9 −0.2 −1.1 0.1 0.0 −0.1 1.0 −0.2 −1.1
Belgium 0.5 −0.1 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 −0.1 −0.6
United Kingdom 0.1 −0.7 −0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 −0.7 −0.8
Turkey & Balkand 3.4 0.0 −3.4 0.2 0.0 −0.2 3.6 0.0 −3.6
aAustria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia
bGermany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
cFrance, Spain and Portugal
dRomania, Bulgaria and Greece
105
Table C.3: Impact of Liberalization on the Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core (far-
sighted scenario, low intercept)
Change of Minimal/Maximal Values in the Core [% of Redistribution]
step 1: transmission step 2: distribution two steps together
∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span ∆min / ∆max / ∆span
Outside Countries
Russia 0.1 −8.4 −8.5 0.0 −0.2 −0.2 0.1 −8.5 −8.7
Belarus 1.4 0.0 −1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.4 0.0 −1.4
Ukraine 2.2 −0.1 −2.3 0.1 0.0 −0.1 2.3 −0.1 −2.4
Algeria 1.0 0.0 −1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 −1.0
Libya 0.3 0.0 −0.3 0.1 0.0 −0.1 0.5 0.0 −0.5
Norway 1.6 −0.1 −1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 −0.1 −1.7
Netherlands
champion 0.5 0.0 −0.5 0.0 −26.0 −26.0 0.5 −26.0 −26.5
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.9 0.0 −25.9 25.9 0.0 −25.9
Center-East a
champion 0.3 −0.2 −0.5 0.0 −22.6 −22.6 0.3 −22.8 −23.1
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.1 0.0 −22.1 22.1 0.0 −22.1
Italy
champion 0.5 −1.3 −1.9 0.1 −41.2 −41.3 0.6 −42.5 −43.2
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.4 0.0 −40.5 40.4 0.0 −40.5
Center b
champion 0.2 −1.3 −1.5 0.0 −56.9 −56.9 0.2 −58.2 −58.4
customers 0.0 −0.3 −0.3 56.3 0.0 −56.4 56.3 −0.3 −56.6
South-West c
champion 0.0 −0.1 −0.1 0.0 −44.3 −44.3 0.0 −44.4 −44.4
customers 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.3 0.0 −43.3 43.3 −0.1 −43.3
Poland 0.9 −0.2 −1.1 0.1 0.0 −0.1 1.0 −0.2 −1.1
Belgium 0.5 −0.1 −0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 −0.1 −0.6
United Kingdom 0.1 −0.7 −0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 −0.7 −0.8
Turkey & Balkand 3.4 0.0 −3.4 0.2 0.0 −0.2 3.6 0.0 −3.6
aAustria, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Serbia and Slovenia
bGermany, Switzerland, Denmark and Luxembourg
cFrance, Spain and Portugal
dRomania, Bulgaria and Greece
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ϵ∗(ϕ, |N | − 1)/

ϕ0EU 1.5 2.1 7.6
n∗(ϕ, 0) − 1 6 1 1
f (ϕ, |N | − 1, 0) 0.0003 0.0027 0.1775




ϵ∗(ϕ, |N | − 1)/

ϕ0EU 1.0 1.4 7.1
n∗(ϕ, 0) − 1 8 2 1
f (ϕ, |N | − 1, 0) 0.0001 0.0011 0.0820
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This technical documentation represents a joint work with Prof. Dr. Franz Hubert.
Till Section D.4 the documentation is similar to the documentation presented in
the dissertation of Onur Cobanli. The reason is that the papers which constitute
dissertation of Onur Cobanli and the papers which constitute my dissertation share
the calibrated network model.74
We give a documentation of the gas sector model and related calculations.
Together with the data-files and the codes, available from ”http://www.ms-
hns.de/research gas”, it should help the reader to check and replicate the results
of the following papers:
• Franz Hubert & Onur Cobanli: Pipeline Power [pipe1]
• Franz Hubert & Ekaterina Orlova: Competition or Countervailing Power for
the European Gas Market [reg1]
• Franz Hubert & Ekaterina Orlova: Network Access and Market Power [reg2]
• Onur Cobanli: Central Asian Gas in Eurasian Power Game [pipe2]
• Ekaterina Orlova: Cooperative solutions for the Eurasian gas network [reg3]
74I would like to thank Tim Dittler, Jeldrik Hanschke and Wadim Klincov for smooth running of
computer systems at Chair for Management Science. Special thanks to Jeldrik Hanschke who made
it possible for our optimization routine to be calculated on each kernel of computer.
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While the papers differ in their economic focus and in many technical details they all
use variants of a model of the European gas-network and notions from cooperative
game theory to analyze the power structure in the Eurasian gas trade. Papers start
from a broad description of the network: its geographical scope, major players etc.
In this respect, we have four basic variants (pipe1, pipe2, reg1, reg2); one for each
paper. In the paper reg3 the same variants are used as in the paper reg2.
The papers analyze how the bargaining power of the players is affected by vari-
ous changes such as a new pipeline, liberalization of pipeline access, a merger,
increase of demand etc. Each of these scenarios correspond to a distinct cooper-
ative game, for which we have a unique identifier, the variant-name or VN.75 These
games are formulated and solved using software written in Mathematica and in
MATLAB. The programming packages are described in the following.
A cooperative game is characterized by a set of players N and a value function v.
For each possible subset of players S ∈ N (also called coalition), v(S ) gives the max-
imal joint payoff which the coalition S can achieve on its own. In other words, v is the
result of a number of related optimization problems. These optimization problems
share a common structure, because they are derived from the same broad network
model, but they differ in the sense that smaller coalitions have only access to parts
of the whole network.
So the analysis proceeds in four steps.
1. We characterize the general network optimization problem of the cooperative
game. For each variant we specify the instruments and parameters of the
network optimization problem. These parameters include the specification of
access rights, so that we can derive the embedded sub-network optimization
problems of smaller coalitions. We refer to this representation of the game
VN-parameters.
2. We calculate the numerical values of the value function by solving all sub-
network optimization problems for a particular variant/game. We call this rep-
resentation VN-values. Since we look at a large set of coalitions, this step is
computationally the most demanding one.
75Typically the variant name consists of several parts referring to specific settings such as geo-
graphic scope, set of players etc. These variant names are used as identifiers to build file names for
the results (e.g. the Shapley values are saved in a file VN-Shapley).
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3. Using the numerical value function, we calculate for each variant various so-
lutions for cooperative games, such as Shapley value, nucleolus, core. We
refer to the solutions as VN-Shapley, VN-nucleolus, etc.
4. Finally, we compare the solutions of different variants to assess the impact
of pipeline investment, regulatory changes etc. and build the tables in the
papers.
The code which defines the parameters of the network optimization problem, cal-
culates the value function and then the Shapley value is written in Mathematica
(step 1-3). The code which calculates the Nucleolus and the minimal and maximal
values of players in the core is written in MATLAB (step 3). Further evaluations of
the results are again written in Mathematica (step 4). In the next sections, we give
a brief overview of the main programming tools for each of these steps.
We save results to a number of files in plain text format. The following files contain




description of network optimization model
VN-parameters-Mathematica The parameters for the optimization problem in the for-
mat required for calculateValueOneCoalition[] .
VN-parameters-General Same as above in a simplified format for use with other
optimization software.
value function
VN-value-Full Explicit list of coalitions and values, as well as any
errors reported from the calculation (very large).
VN-value-Mathematica Values in a compressed format, suitable for Mathe-
matica’s Subsets[] function.
VN-value.nuc Values in a compressed format, suitable for calculat-
ing the Nucleolus using MATLAB code of Johannes
Reijnierse.
cooperative solutions
VN-Shapley the Shapley Value
VN-Nucleolus the Nucleolus
VN-MinCore the minimal values players receive in the core
VN-MaxCore the maximal values players receive in the core
technical files
VN-nucl.dat log and results from calculating the nucleolus.
VN-MinCore.dat log and results from calculating the minimal values in
the core





\EAGas-model Mathematica notebooks and corresponding packages
for setting up the network optimization problem, calcu-
lating the value function, solving for the Shapley value.
\games+tools Mathematica and MATLAB code to convert files, to
calculate minimal and maximal values in the core.
\nucleolus HR MATLAB code provided by Hans Reijnierse for calcu-
lating the nuleolus.
\pipe1 special code and results related to Hubert & Cobanli:
Pipeline Power
\pipe2 special code and results related to Cobanli: Central
Asian Gas
\reg1 special code and results related to Hubert & Orlova:
Competition or Countervailing Power
\reg2 special code and results related to Hubert & Orlova:
Network Access and Market Power
\reg3 special code and results related to Orlova: Coopera-
tive solutions for the Eurasian gas network
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D.1 General Network Optimization Problem
All papers share a common data base from which the calibrations and definitions
of their network optimization problems are obtained using two Mathematica note-
books, a common one Gas Parameters and an additional one which is individual for
each paper. There are also packages to visualize the data base and the parameter
settings.
All code of this section is written in Mathematica. The general network optimization
problem is saved in files named VN-parameters-*, where the * stands for different
formats.
D.1.1 Data & Calibration
D.1.1.1 Definition of data.
The data are defined in Gas Data Base using a similar format as the data pro-
vided by Mathematica. All data which are needed for the model specification and
the displays (tables and maps) are assigned to global variables by loading the Math-
ematica package Gas Data Base .
requires: nothing
D.1.1.2 Visualization of data.
Gas Data Visu defines functions for the display of data.
requires: Gas Data Base , FH Tools
Data Overview
package function needs
Gas Data Base assignes data to global variables nothing
Gas Data Visu defines functions for display of data Gas Data Base
FH Tools
file output: none
D.1.2 Set-up for network optimization
The topology of the network is defined by a set of nodes R and a set of directed links
L (the geographical scope). Each link {i, j} ∈ L connects two nodes, which might be
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RP production nodes, RC consumption nodes, or RT transit nodes.76 For each link
we have (piecewise linear) cost reflecting transportation and/or production cost.
The game is defined by a set of players N and a value function v, mapping the
set of subsets of N into real numbers. A coalition S ⊆ N has access to L(S ) ⊆ L
(the access regime). The value of a coalition S is obtained by maximizing the
joint surplus (gross surplus from consumption s minus cost of transportation and
production T ) using the gas-flows fi j in the pipelines which are accessible:
v(S ) = max
{ fi j |{i, j}∈L(S )}
 
{i, j}∈L(S ), j∈RC
s j( fi j) −

{i, j}∈L(S )
Ti j( fi j)
 (D.1)
subject to
fi j ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ RP or j ∈ RC (non-negativity)
i fit =

j ft j, ∀ t ∈ RT (S ) (balancing)
| fi j| ≤ ki j, ∀ {i, j} ∈ L(S ) (capacity constraints)
The capacity constraint is dropped when we allow for investment. In this case T
also accounts for investment cost.
To keep the network optimization problem simple, we assume a linear demand
(quadratic surplus function) and piece-wise linear cost functions.
D.1.2.1 Definition of functions and some variants.
By loading Gas Parameters we define routines, which specify the functions and
parameters of the optimization problem using the data provided by Gas Data Base
.
The complete specification of the general network optimization problem (all the
technical and demand parameters as well as the access rights) are assigned
to global variables by calling: reSetParTo[parameter-list], which in turn
calls: setGeoScope[], setPlayers[], setPipeAccess[], setLinkParameter[],
setDemandParameter[]. These routines define the geographical scope of the
network, the players, the access regime, parameters for the individual links and
for demand. Different (but not all) versions of these settings can be combined.
selectVarList allows for an interactive selection of predefined arguments for the
subroutines.
76Production and consumption nodes are always linked to a transit node.
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feasiblePipes[coalition] returns the links to which a coalition has access.
In Gas Parameters we provide only the base variants, used in the different papers.
To obtain the specific definitions for a paper, an additional file has to be loaded;
e.g. Gas Parameters pipe1.m or Gas Parameters reg2.m. These define a unique
variant-name (VN) for each network optimization (game), which will be part of the
names of files for storing results etc. We also define setVar[VN] to return the
arguments for reSetParTo[] .
parametersToFile[VN, "Mathematica"] saves the parameter settings of a game
to a file with a name VN-parameters-Mathematica from which the settings can be
recovered using fileToParameters[VN, "Mathematica"]. When writing ”Mathe-
matica” can be replaced by ”General” to obtain a more compact format.
Gas Parameters and Gas Parameters *.m require Gas Data Base .
D.1.2.2 Visualization of parameter settings.
Gas Parameters Visu defines functions for the display of the parameter setting,
once they have been assigned by calling reSetParTo[]. There are tables and
maps, some of them interactive. Various functions are collected in the commands:
showMainParCurrent, showAllParCurrent, which display most of the settings.
requires: Gas Data Base , Gas Data Visu , FH Tools , Gas Parameters .
D.1.2.3 Starting from defined games.
Gas Parameters min collects those routines which are needed if the parameter
settings are already saved to files VN-parameters-Mathematica. If loaded, there is
no need to load other notebooks.
D.1.2.4 Example.




Gas Parameters defines functions for the assignment,
saving and recovering of parameters






Gas Parameters *.m defines additional functions and all the
variant names for the individual papers
(*: pipe1, pipe2, reg1, reg2)
Gas Data Base
Gas Parameters
Gas Parameters min collects functions needed for recover-
ing the parameters-settings from the
file and starting the optimization
nothing
Gas Parameters Visu defines functions for display of parame-










for illustration: workspace parameters.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package; VN : variant name
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D.2 Value function
Given our assumption on functional forms, we obtain the value function by maxi-
mizing surplus (quadratic) minus cost (piece-wise linear) subject to balancing con-
straints for transit nodes and non-negativity constraints for production and con-
sumption links.
D.2.1 The network optimization
By loading Gas Prog and Gas ProgLP we define the functions used for solving the
network optimization problem. calculateValueOneCoalition[] establishes the
sub-network, which is accessible for a given coalition of players and calls LinProg[]
from Gas ProgLP to calculate the payoff (value).
The general optimization routines coming with Mathematica turned out to be too
slow. To speed up the process LinProg[] approximates the quadratic surplus
functions by piece-wise linear functions and uses ”LinearProgramming” to solve
the resulting linear optimization problem.
D.2.2 Visualization of the result
Gas Prog Visu defines displayResChartLP[], and displayResTableLP[] for
the display of the optimal network usage using the output created by
calculateValueOneCoalition[] . It needs the full parameter definitions from
reSetParTo[] and requires Gas Data Base , Gas Data Visu , FH Tools ,




Gas Prog finds accessible network for a given coali-
tion of players and calls LinProg[] from




Gas ProgLP creates a linear programming problem to cal-




Gas Prog Visu display of the optimal network usage using
output created by
calculateValueOneCoalition[] .










for illustration: workspace program.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package
D.2.3 Calculating the value function (and the Shapley value)
Gas ValFuncShap defines functions for the calculation of the value function. Us-
ing the unique variant-name VN we recover the parameters from the associated
file VN-parameters-Mathematica. Then we calculate the value of all coalitions
(repeatedly calling calculateValueOneCoalition[] ). Depending on the num-
ber of players, this step may take a long time. The results are saved in two for-
mats. VN-values-Full has the value, the coalition and possible error-messages
and is very large. VN-values-Mathematica has only the numerical values or-
dered as the coalitions are ordered by Mathematica’s Subsets[] command, i.e.
{}, {a}, {b}, {c}, {a, b}, {a, c}, {b, c}, {a, b, c}.
As we have the value function already, it is convenient to invoke FH Shapley and
write the Shapley value into VN-Shapley.
For some changes, i.e. if two players merge, it is not necessary to run all optimiza-
tion problems again. The new value function can be obtained from the old one by
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re-matching values with coalitions. Suppose we start with a game {N, v} and let
players a and b merge. We define the new game as {N,w} by making a a ’proxy’
player and b a dummy player. The new value function w is obtained from v as77
w(S ) =

v(S ∪ b) if a ∈ S , b < S
v(S \ b) if a < S , b ∈ S
v(S ) else.
In these cases we save only the original value function.
Calculating Value Function & Shapley Value
package does loads
Gas ValFuncShap provides operations for the calculation
of the value function (which may take a











for illustration: workspace ValFuncShap.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package ; VN : variant name
D.3 Solving the game
We consider several solutions for the games defined by the different variants: the
Shapley value, the nucleolus, and the core, which we characterize by the minimal
and maximal values which a player can achieve. The starting point is always the
set of players and the value function as specified in VN-value-Mathematica.
We express the solutions as absolute values and as relative values (in per cent of
the value of the Grand coalition). In addition we report the player’s value when he
77If v is the non-normalized pre-merger value function, the stand alone value of proxy player in-
cludes also the surplus from trade between the merging parties. In order to keep the surplus in the
normalized game constant, replace w(a) = v(a ∪ b) with w(a) = v(a) + v(b).
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is alone and we give the solutions (absolute and relative) for the zero normalized
game.
For the calculation of nucleolus and minimal and maximal values in the core, we
use MATLAB code.
D.3.1 Shapley Value
We calculate the Shapley value intermediately after calculating the value function
(see section D.2.3). The function is defined in FH Shapley . In addition we have
some tools to rearrange and aggregate players once the Shapley values are calcu-
lated.
Calculating the Shapley Value
package does loads
FH Shapley functions to calculate the Shapley





FH Shapley tools functions to rearrange and aggregate
players in the output of FH Shapley (or
other solutions).
nothing
for illustration: workspace ValFuncShap.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package
D.3.2 Nucleolus
To calculate the nucleolus we use MATLAB code provided by Hans Reijnierse. It
implements an algorithm described in Potters, J. A.; Reijnierse, J. H.; Ansing, M.
(1996): Computing the Nucleolus by Solving a Prolonged Simplex Algorithm, Math-
ematics of Operation Research, 21(3), 757-68. The algorithm in turn is based on
the characterization of the nucleolus as the lexicographical center of the game de-
veloped in Maschler, M.; Peleg, B. Shapley, L. S. (1979): Geometric Properties of
the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts, Mathematics of Operation
Research, 4(4), 303-38.
We first convert VN-value-Full into VN-value.nuc. This file is used by MATLAB
program calcNucleolus, which invokes Reijnierse’s command ”nucleolus”. The
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log and results are written into VN-nucl.dat. We switch back to Mathematica code
to further process VN-nucl.dat, extracting the nucleolus and those coalitions and
their excesses which determine the solution.
Calculating the Nucleolus
package does loads
convert-nucleolus Preparing input for MATLAB, reading MAT-
LAB output and writing it to files. Convert
VN-value-Full into VN-value.nuc, extract
results from VN-nucl.dat (MATLAB output)














package to calculate the nucleolus written by




for illustration: workspace nucleolus.nb
workStepsNucleolus.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package ; VN : variant name
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D.3.3 Core
As the core is characterized by a large number of inequalities, we restrict attention
to the extreme values which a player can obtain in the core. For each player we find
the minimal and the maximal value in core.
As with the nucleolus we use MATLAB to compute the values.
Characterizing the Core
package does loads
convert-core collects routines for creating matrices
and writing ”*.csv” files for optimization
in MATLAB. We also define functions
to extract the values from MATLAB out-
put files, to compare these values with
the nucleolus and the Shapley value, to









and VN matrixname.csv, calculates
the minimum and the maximum for
each player, writes VN-MinCore.dat
and VN-MaxCore.dat.
nothing








for illustration: workspace core.nb
workStepsCore.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package ; VN : variant name
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D.4 Special packages for paper 1 [reg1]
D.4.1 Mergers
We study incentives for mergers in the fragmented and integrated markets using
the Shapley value concept. The package Gas Mergers defines routines to calculate
the value function in case of collusion and to compute the effect of a merger on the
power structure.
When we assume that Center region is ’proxy’ player, we write the post-merger
Shapley values to a file with the following naming convention: VN-the name of
the last player among dummy players-Merge. Hence, the name of the file con-
tains information about the merging parties. To report the impact of mergers with
Center region on the power structure in the table, we prepare the input for the table
using the files with the pre-merger and post-merger Shapley values (see package
TabTools Reg1 in the next subsection).
To analyze the effect of a merger on non-colluding players, we follow ap-
proach of Segal (2003). We present the difference between the Shapley val-
ues of non-merging players as the sum of weighted third-order differences. The
weighted third-order differences and the respective coalitions are written to a file
Player-Dummy-thirdOrderDiff-shortVN. We provide also the graphical represe-
nation of third-order differences. Gas Mergers defines the respective routines.
To consider the impact of all pairwise mergers on the power structure, we write
the differences between the respective Shapley values to a file with the naming
convention VN-AllMergers.
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Mergers: Calculating Value Function, Shapley Values and Impact
package does loads
Gas Mergers routines to calculate the value function
in case of collusion, to write respective
Shapley values to a file, functions to
study the impact of a player on ’com-
plementarity’ of merging parties, func-
tions to find the effect of all pairwise






















for illustration: workspace mergers.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package ; VN : variant name
D.4.2 Tables
Here we define routines to create tables for the paper reg1.
Creating the Tables
package does loads
Gas TabTools defines the functions to add the players
to the list of values for a concept and to
find the difference between the given

















for illustration: workspace tablesReg1.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package
D.5 Special packages for paper 2 [reg2]
D.5.1 Tables
Here we define routines to create tables for the paper reg2.
Creating the Tables
package does loads











for illustration: workspace tablesReg2.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package
D.6 Special packages for paper 3 [reg3]
Here we present the packages which are used to relate the Shapley value and the
nucleolus to the core. The packages are written to analyze the compression of the
core, to compute the stability measures and to create the tables and graphs for the
paper ”Cooperative solutions for the Eurasian gas network”.
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D.6.1 Compression of the Core
for Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
package does loads
ToolsForPart3 defines general functions which are





CoreCompression defines the functions to present the im-
pact of liberalization on the core, to
compare the computed maximal val-
ues of players in the core with the
respective contributions to the grand
coalition, to compare the minimal val-
ues with the respective stand alone val-












RelateNuclCore collects routines to create the tables,
which are used to relate the nucleolus
and the core (e.g., functions to deter-
mine the location of the nucleolus in
the min-max range, the shift of the mid-





graphsConcepts collects routines to create the graphs
for comparison of the concepts with re-





for Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5
file output: none
for illustration: workspace CoreCompression.nb
workspace NuclCore.nb
workspace graphsConcepts.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package
D.6.2 Stability Measures
The function stabilityMeasures[] allows us to assess the degree of instability of
the Shapley value as described in the text of the paper reg3. Deviating coalitions
are found given the assumption that setting up a coalition of any size would not




StabilityMeasures defines the functions which are used to
compute the three stability measures







for illustration: workspace StabMeasures.nb
→ : main functions defined in the package ; VN : variant name
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